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EDITORIAL

As the year comes to an end and we enter the new millennium, the USI moves forward towards attainment of its objectives. Research activities are making a steady progress. Maj Gen D K Palit, VrC (Retd) has offered scholarships for the conduct of research in military history, out of "General Palit Military Studies Trust". The Trust has identified one particular area in which it would like research to be done - 'The Sadhu Armies of India'. Its synopsis by Maj Gen DK Palit, VrC (Retd) appears on pages 553 to 559 of the Journal. The number of talks, panel discussions and seminars organised at the Institution have been on the rise.

While the Indian Armed Forces deserve praise for their outstanding performance in the Kargil operations; across the border in Pakistan, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was generally perceived responsible for the inept handling of the Kargil issue. Ever since the Pakistani forces were forced out of the intrusions in Kargil, the Coup in Pakistan was waiting to happen. It came about on 12 October 1999. The lead article by Lt Gen KS Khajuria titled 'Coup in Pakistan and its Implications for India,' makes interesting reading. The author has discussed the main personalities involved, the role played by them and has focused on important issues. From India's point of view, linking the discontinuation of support to militants in the State of Jammu and Kashmir to resumption of talks with Pakistan is a sound idea.

The year 2000 or Y2K bug has generated a lot of discussion in the Information Technology (IT) industry. Many electronic systems have been designed for referring the dates, which exclude the century, e.g., addressing 1999 as 99. Systems constructed on this architecture are likely to produce unpredictable results in the year 2000. Its impact will be across many parts of business and organisations including the Defence Services. The problem can be attributed to two aspects - the hardware and the software. The hardware problem lies in a small chip known as Real Time Clock (RTC), which keeps count

of time for the computer. Where this clock has been designed to represent years upto 1999 only, the answer lies in its replacement. The software problem is generally due to constraints of memory. An article titled 'Y2K Bug' by Lt Col PN Singhal focuses on this important aspect of the IT. Remedial measures for beating the bug and controlling damage have been discussed in this interesting and informative article.

We wish all our readers a Happy New Year. May the new millennium bring peace to humanity!

Coup in Pakistan and its Implications for India

LT GEN K S KHAJURIA, PVSM (RETD)

The coup in Pakistan was waiting to happen. The US had warned well in advance that it should not take place, thereby giving an inkling that it was more than likely to happen. Consequently, when it did take place the element of surprise was missing even though the sequence of actions that triggered it were new and unique. The first reaction to the news was whether it was bloody or bloodless. As events unfolded there was a general feeling of relief that it was bloodless and only later in the night did the drama unfold. The events are too well known to be repeated. To understand the happenings and to draw conclusions from it would need some comments on the main personalities involved, General Pervez Musharraf and Nawaz Sharif, as also the main issues that caused it.

General Pervez Musharraf - Sketch and Role

He is an officer handpicked by Nawaz Sharif after forcing the resignation of the previous Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Jehangir Karamat. As a soldier, Musharraf has a reputation for being a hard-liner and, with his commando background a 'toughie'. To have succeeded in a Punjabi-dominated Army, he would have built up a reputation of a totally committed and army-oriented soldier. Despite his origins in India, defining him a *Mohajir*, he was respected in the Army circles. His record of service would suggest that his competence has been the cause for the Army backing him totally.

Kargil, the basic factor that triggered the coup, is attributed to planning and execution under Musharraf's directions. That Kargil

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was part of a deeply planned strategy to wrest Kashmir from India's legitimate control suggests quite clearly that the Army is totally committed to securing Kashmir for Pakistan, whatever the cost or the means adopted. The COAS thus becomes a strong symbol of that design, which in the last 50 years has become an obsession with Pakistan. The strong reaction of the general public to Nawaz Sharif's capitulation to American pressures to vacate Kargil is a pointer.

It is important for Musharraf to play his cards right as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Pakistan in the coming months, lest a 'Nasser' emerges and confines him to the back seat. The chance of a counter coup therefore cannot be completely ruled out, as there are even reasons for some sections of the Army hierarchy to feel that a change is needed. As of now, he seems to be playing his cards adroitly to ensure that the general public support to his coup is sustained and the public continues to feel that a good thing is happening and will continue.

Mian Nawaz Sharif - Sketch and Role

Young as the years go, Nawaz Sharif is a politician of standing who has been on the scene in Pakistan for more than a decade. Belonging to a very rich business and landed family, the Punjabi Musalman entered politics early and has consolidated his position over the years. With Benazir Bhutto as his main rival, he has had a round robin game as the Prime Minister (PM) with her. The last elections saw him secure a definite majority and again become Prime Minister replacing Bhutto. This huge success gave him the ability to rule more firmly than in his earlier stint. It gave him the backing to start a process of consolidation of power, which hitherto had been shared by the 'troika', with the Army and the President as the other two pillars. His actions were as under: .

- (a) Repeal of the Eighth Amendment, which had given the power of dismissal to the President.
- (b) Removal of the Chief Justice who was not conforming and was instead pursuing the non-partisan policies expected of the judiciary.

- (c) Sacking of the Chief of the Naval Staff.
- (d) Getting General Jehangir Karamat, the COAS, to resign.
- (e) Interference in the appointments to military hierarchy, with a view to creating rivalries and breaking up of Army control.
- (f) Wooing the MQM in Sind initially and then dumping them. Draconian measures implemented.
- (g) Persecution of Benazir Bhutto and her husband Zardari.
- (h) Autocratic and self-centered policies to consolidate power.
- (j) Using the Islamic card to gain greater legitimacy as also popularity, even though this encouraged fundamentalism.
- (k) Permitting an overall increase in corruption levels to the detriment of the public.
- (l) Allowing religious intolerance levels to rise, creating strife and insecurity.

The circumstances leading to the coup are very clear, as is the fact that it was expected ever since the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the intrusions in Kargil under American pressure. Nawaz Sharif, in a typical political manoeuvre, was looking for scapegoats to ease the pressure from his generally perceived inept handling of Kargil. Notwithstanding the US warnings that a coup should not take place, the stage was being gradually set up for it to happen. When General Musharraf was away to Sri Lanka, on the day of his return he was sacked and replaced by the ISI Chief. The Pakistan International Airlines plane bringing Musharraf back was denied permission to land. It is at this stage that the Army acted and the Coup became a reality.

Planning for Staging the Coup

It would be pertinent to state that the speed, precision and nation-wide actions suggest that contingency planning for a possible coup had already been carried out by the Army Headquarters and that key senior officers were privy to it. It cannot be termed

as a normal occurrence that such contingency planning was done, but events such as the meeting of two key Corps Commanders with the political hierarchy a few weeks earlier and as a consequence their sacking by the COAS would be trigger points for such planning. The Coup was a fact by next morning when Musharraf addressed the Nation and, declaring himself the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), confirmed the Army take over.

Consolidation after the Coup

It is important to review the various actions that have been taken since the Coup.

- (a) The Coup produced immediate and strong international condemnation and adverse comments, specifically from the Western Countries.
- (b) The Commonwealth nations not only condemned the Coup and asked for the restoration of democracy, but subsequently suspended Pakistan from its membership at the CHOGM in South Africa.
- (c) The US was initially against the Coup and demanded a return to democracy, as this happened despite its earlier warnings. However, gradually there appears to be a move to legitimise the Coup and Musharraf's CEOship.
- (d) There was across the board acceptance and even support for the removal of Nawaz Sharif's government. This was due to the mass scale corruption, feudal empowerment, autocratic functioning and a feeling of being 'shamed' by Nawaz Sharif's capitulation to the US pressure. Side by side, the near collapse of Pakistan's economy, which looms large, makes the populace feel that the Army rule would reverse matters.
- (e) One month given by Musharraf for return of bad bank loans to the tune of \$ 7 billion or so and at the end of that period actions to recover the amounts would be an assuring factor for the public. In fact, the US has also used this action as one reason for accepting the Coup.

(f) The follow-up actions are under scrutiny by the public and it would be important for the military rulers to show positive results to gain further legitimacy. Failure to do so could be a trigger point against the military rule.

(g) The dispensation of power and the appointment of civilian administrators are moves to reduce the military face of the regime, as also to bring known talent to handle the difficult economic and internationally tarnished image.

(h) Over the past month or so some voices for democracy have been heard. The need to keep this at a low level in the months ahead would dictate the actions of the military rulers. Whereas there was near total acceptance of the end of the previous regime, the transparency and wide reach of the media puts the present rulers in a glass house.

(j) The Taliban and Afghan factors are going to assume importance, specifically after the sanctions imposed due to the non-surrender of Osama bin Laden. With the involvement and consequent dependence of Afghanistan on Pakistan and the strong ties at the religious level, it is not going to be easy for Pakistan to implement a sanctions regime. The porosity of borders and the oncoming difficult winter months will stretch Pakistan's efforts to prevent the flow of necessities to Afghanistan.

(k) Musharraf is on record as saying that, "Islam in its tolerant form is good for everybody and my aim is to have this type of polity in Pakistan". How far this will be acceptable to the hard liner fundamentalist clergy is anybody's guess. The big *Lashkar-e-Toiba* congregation near Lahore to which Musharraf was invited, but did not attend, could well be the beginning of a stand off!! Some indications for the future in this regard should manifest themselves within a few months.

The aspect of being in a glass house is going to make this military takeover different from the earlier ones. The trial of Nawaz Sharif by a special court in Karachi is also going to be under the international gaze and even within Pakistan. Despite the earlier precedence of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, this time the situation could be

different. The present military set up cannot afford Sharif's return to power. The price would be too heavy to pay, whereas Nawaz Sharif's removal, even while creating a furore, will eventually fade away. At present, therefore, a wait and watch policy would be prudent.

The Future Prospects of Indo-Pak Relations

Historical Background. Despite the difficult relationship that has existed between India and Pakistan from the very beginning, there can be no doubt that for India a viable and stable Pakistan is important. Even while forgetting that prior to 14 August 1947 we were one country and that socially, culturally and historically we share a common past, the fact of the matter is that even as two separate nations we complement each other. The degree of animosity and hatred that has existed in the past 50 years has shown that the cost has been too high and is paid for by the common man who has nothing to do with the issues that divide. The common man on both sides has suffered because progress and growth has been hindered by the arms race, the conflicts, and the barriers to trade and commerce. It would appear that this awareness is gaining momentum on both sides, because of the opening up of the media. Realisation seems to be growing that prosperity and well being can only come if the two nations accept each other readily.

The Vested Interests. Those wielding power in Pakistan, be it governmental or religious, have vested interests to keep the hiatus going. Pakistan came into being within a decade of the seed for it being sown. The mode of its coming into existence was not peaceful, nor was its Constitution a smooth one. The dominance by Punjab created problems for the other provinces and has continued to do so. There have been deliberate actions taken to nurture an anti-India campaign and some of these are as follows: -

- (a) That India has never accepted Pakistan as a Nation and has been trying to undermine it.
- (b) The State of Jammu and Kashmir, which should have been naturally a part of Pakistan, has been illegally usurped by India.

(c) After the 1948 War over Jammu and Kashmir, India has failed to accept the UN Resolutions to hold a plebiscite. (It is pertinent to add that on the issue of the UN Resolution on a referendum, the conditions stipulated have been not only ignored, but very deliberately obfuscated. It has become a case of repeating a falsehood so many times that it has become for Pakistan a truth and its propaganda world-wide tends to get opinion in its favour. Also, Pakistan only considers the result to be in its favour, and there is no such thing as an independent state of Jammu and Kashmir).

(d) India is shown as a *Kafir* Nation against which a '*jihad*' must be launched.

(e) To this end, even school books teach young children to consider India an enemy of Pakistan and of Islam. The seed for latent hatred is thus always there to be whipped into frenzy by the speeches of a Benazir Bhutto or any other charismatic leader.

(f) The religious angle is a deliberate thrust to keep centrifugal tendencies in check. A common and diabolic enemy is projected to keep the emotional and religious fervour going. Sind, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) have very strong grouses, which need to be controlled -- not to mention the *Mohajir* syndrome.

(g) The fundamentalist clergy also cannot readily accept that India's Muslim population exceeds Pakistan's. Also that despite the periodic riots, the Indian Muslim has better opportunities for advancement than his Pakistani counterpart in a liberal atmosphere.

(h) With the long-term plan to subvert Kashmiri Muslim mind, madarasas, propaganda and training of youth as militants was put into practice. What followed was a low intensity conflict in which the trained youth are used to commit acts of terrorism to subvert the governance in Kashmir and to make the security forces react in a manner that alienates the population. The targeting of Kashmiri Pundits resulted in an effective ethnic cleansing. The ISI, which directed this campaign, played its cards well.

The Political Environment. With all this as a background to the relations between India and Pakistan, the Coup on 12 October 1999 changes the playing field to a very great extent. Simultaneously, in India, after a few years of instability due to minority governments ruling through coalitions, there is now a government that has a degree of stability to think beyond just staying in power. In its previous spell of governance, the same combine had the sad experience of the Lahore Bus initiative, which put to rest its attempts to befriend Pakistan and normalise relations. This "stab in the back" experience will, therefore, play a major role in the present government's future ties with Pakistan.

Opportunities and Threats

It would be pertinent to make assessments and to put in efforts to analyse how to make the best use of the opportunities that are being, and are likely to be, thrown up. It is of course the easiest, but the least effective, way to stand on ceremonies and lay down preconditions. This path has been treaded for decades without any tangible results. The need of the hour in the best interests of the largest population in the world is to break new ground and look for a lasting peace and goodwill.

The Lahore Declaration and Kargil are interlinked in many ways. In brief, while the bus trip to Lahore was taking place, Kargil was already happening. Whether India knew about it or not is not the issue, because Pakistan did and still carried on with the charade. The consequence is the righteous(!) anger of the Indian political leadership and a red face. On both scores, India has the grouse. But that by now is history and cannot be turned back. What can and must be done is the realisation that in realpolitik such happenings have to be taken in the stride, and with the gained wisdom a fresh course must be chartered. Dynamics suggest making use of opportunities. In this instance, Pakistan's discomfort and the Armed Forces' success in Kargil should be converted to advantage by fresh initiatives to open dialogue and achieve the ultimate aim of good relations. To gloss over having international approbation and Pakistan being put in the dock is perhaps misplaced. Other world powers have reacted in a manner that

suits their interests, which may have coincided with India's but need not be taken as our success.

India is too big in every respect and militarily too strong for Pakistan to trifle with. A failed misadventure surely would convey to the hardheaded on the other side that chasing shadows is futile. All bellicose statements of 'many Kargils' must be taken as necessary for those uttering them for their survival. Of course, for India, the lesson should be increased vigilance, better preparedness and not just maintaining, but positively having, military superiority to prevent future misadventures. A decreased degree of 'tall talk' would help to grow up in statesmanship and national poise.

The military takeover is a happening due to the internal dynamics of Pakistan. There is no denying that democracy is our creed and as a nation we have always supported democratic struggles. That does not in any way suggest that we should get upset against what is today the preferred form of governance in Pakistan. When the CHOGM was heading towards suspending Pakistan because of an earlier Nigerian precedence, our response should have been as a participating member interested in a consensus. Overreacting does not behove a mature and responsible democracy such as India. That does not imply that when there is need to be angry, one should smile! Small victories and scoring points is something that should be avoided.

The debate is on whether the Coup bodes well for India or not. It is important and necessary to study and analyse all implications that concern national security, and where there is need contingency planning must be carried out. But again, it is important not to look at the negative side only; the positive possibilities also need to be viewed in perspective. On issues of national importance, politicking needs to be put on the backburner.

The Pakistani Army has many reasons to feel that it needs to redeem its honour against India. After 1971, this has become an obsession. Given the strong role the Army plays as one of the troika of power in Pakistan, the only check and balance factor can come through the Army hierarchy. Political pronouncements can

only project the strong Army sentiment and views. It is, therefore, important to specifically look for signs that senior Army leadership could provide the important breakthrough for understanding and eventual better relations between the two nations. This, notwithstanding the belligerence that will always be part of the spoken word from across the border.

It is important for India to have an open mind and keep channels open for dialogue. There can be no doubt that the futility of a permanent animosity has dawned on many in Pakistan and that devoid of the political compulsions, a way can be found for a serious attempt for lasting peace. It is, of course, absolutely important that not only is the guard kept up, but the Defence Services are equipped and prepared to ensure that any future Kargil is the last one.

Conclusion

The linking of stoppage of support to militants in Kashmir to future talks is a sound idea. But talks of *jihad* as at the *Lashkar-e-Toiba* rally in Muridke near Lahore puts it on low key by Pakistan for the present. Flexibility would need to be a key factor and signs from the other side weighed carefully and in depth, and made use of. Not doing business with the military rulers or hurried rejection of statements by Musharraf or Sattar seeking a dialogue or resumption of it needs to be curbed. Statesmanship demands considered views and actions. The Father of the Nation had even suggested offering the other cheek, but of course those times were different.

Y2K Bug

LT COL P N SINGHAL

Introduction

No single topic has generated more discussion in the whole of this century than the one on YEAR 2000 or Y2K bug. What is this issue and what has caused a near panic in the Information Technology (IT) industry round the globe. Today the time, effort and finance that have been ear-marked for the analysis, diagnosis and rectification of Y2K can easily surpass any major global project.

What is the problem? Many electronic systems have been designed for referring to dates, which exclude the century; e.g., addressing 1998 as 98. Systems constructed on this architecture are likely to produce unpredictable results on or in 2000, which is being referred to as Year 2000 or Y2K bug. The commonly held view is that the Year 2000 date problem is an information technology issue. Whilst it manifests itself in IT, the impact will be across many parts of business and organisations that affect the whole of mankind.

Y2K CAUSES AND EFFECTS

The problem can be attributed to two aspects, the hardware and the software.

Hardware

The genesis of the hardware problem lies in a small chip known as Real Time Clock (RTC), which keeps count of time for the computer, right from seconds to years. The number of years is added to a base year stored in the Basic Input Output System (BIOS) read only memory (ROM) chip; 1980 in most cases to calculate the present year. Unfortunately, this clock was designed

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to represent years up to 1999 only. This problem is therefore referred to as RTC or BIOS fail for Y2K.

Software

The software error is due to constraints of memory. In the past, all 'year' information was stored in two digits i.e., 88, 89 etc, and not 1988, 1989. Thus by the same analogy year 2000 gets represented as 00 and all calculations with this year would give wrong or absurd results.

The effect of non-Y2K compliant hardware and software will therefore be more in areas where the date reference is taken from the system date. This will be wrongly represented. All software application making use of calculation with mixed centuries, will be giving "00" as a past century year rather than a futuristic year of 2000. The confusion and catastrophe of such calculations in financial fields is left to one's own imagination.

WHO ARE BITTEN BY THE BUG

The Y2K problem is no more an IT related issue. This is going to touch the human race in every aspect of modern day living, right from the programmed morning alarm system for a wake up call to giving you a cup of coffee from an automatic vending machine late at night. Although the effect of this is more critical on financial and commercial systems, some of the defence systems are also likely to be affected, such as :-

- Outdated inventory management system.
- Preparation of QR for panels of officers involving age and seniority.
- Calculations of financial dues like pensions, gratuity and so on.
- Systems monitoring long duration projects related to budgetary control.

The Y2K problem is going to affect the systems in the Defence Forces at two levels i.e., at the PC-based application level and the embedded systems of weapons and equipment. The systems date field in the PCs and embedded systems is stored in the BIOS, which is used by all computer programmes. The format for this is month, day, year in the versions of PC and systems older than 1996. Applications maintaining appointments, alarms, reminders etc, use this date. However, such PCs, as per the discard policy, are likely to be discarded well before next century but the embedded systems will continue to be in use.

In the preceding years, almost all software applications were written in COBOL or X Base. These applications have been in use for the past several years. These programmes calculate the time elapsed between two dates by subtracting the last two digits of the date field of the former from the last two-date fields of the latter. Y2K problem is likely to affect applications that use date field based calculations.

A large number of equipment and weapon systems such as EW Systems, Radar, Guided Missile Control Systems, Automatic Test Equipment, Special Test Equipment and Communication Systems have embedded computers and microprocessors for the following functions :-

- Feedback.
- Process Control.
- Mathematical Calculations.
- Storing of the Information.
- Diagnostic Functions.

These computers are also prone to the Y2K problem. Army agencies will have to, therefore, carry out an analysis of these systems.

ARE DEFENCE FORCES SAFE FROM THE BUG?

The Defence Forces were amongst the pioneers in the automation of Management of Information System (MIS) and use of microprocessor-based systems in the country. They maintain

large databases pertaining to human, material and financial resources that are processed on state-of-the-art computers. The Defence Forces also have a plethora of sophisticated weapons and equipment systems in its inventory. A majority of these systems are microprocessor based, having embedded chips for control, monitoring and other functions.

The Y2K problem has been identified and is being addressed on a war footing in the Defence Forces. A Steering Committee has been formed, which is working in conjunction with the Ministry of Defence Y2K Cell. Specialised training has been conducted on both computer hardware and software and corrective actions are under implementation.

The hardware on which critical systems are being processed have been made Y2K compliant, while the non-critical ones are in the rectification process. In the realm of software, the Defence Forces are systematically replacing or updating non-Y2K compliant systems software and operating software with Y2K compliant ones. The application software running the large databases is in the process of rectification. The personnel management systems have been made Y2K compliant, while the Materials and Inventory Management systems are being addressed. The task will be completed before the onset of the year 2000.

Embedded systems in weapons and equipment being mission critical are being addressed with the urgency and care they demand. The problem has been identified in some of the communication equipment. These are being attended to by the concerned suppliers. In order to ensure that non-Y2K compliant systems are not inducted, the Defence Forces have inserted a clause ensuring Y2K compliance in all future procurement contracts.

BEATING THE BUG

Awareness of the enormity of the Y2K problem is the first step towards finding the solution to the problem. All organisations should work towards identifying the application software, which are likely

to be affected by the problem. A detailed analysis of systems in-use by the organisations needs to be carried out, to identify the portion of data fields containing dates, and the outputs generated using the data. This task merits to be taken up on priority, so that necessary correction is taken well in time. All affected users should form core groups of officers for analysis of their systems. The core groups thus formed should formulate a "Time Bound Action Plan" for studying and solving the Y2K problem with respect to their applications. The problem is required to be solved and all modifications tested before December 1999.

A general awareness has been created amongst officers dealing with automation. However, users are still not clear about the different functional aspects of hardware and software, which may be affected by the Y2K problem. In the case of standard PCs, the issue of their hardware and system software not being Y2K compliant is manageable. However, the expertise to tackle the Y2K problem in case of existing software applications is not available with all users as these software packages were developed either locally or in-house, without any standardisation or proper documentation. These application software with various users and organisations in the Defence Forces vary widely. Therefore, such users would require specific training for tackling and managing the Y2K problem in their respective application software packages.

IT managers for the last few years have been involved in finding the techniques to solve the problem. A few tools to fix the problem have also been evolved. Some of the techniques in use are as under :-

- Date field expansion.
- Data encoding (BIT Twiddling).
- Windowing (Fixed and Sliding).
- Encapsulation of date fields.
- Convert client server environment.

Embedded Systems

Details of chips that are not Y2K compliant are available with vendors. These need to be verified with the ones in the embedded system. The affected chips will thereafter need to be changed through their original equipment manufacturers and suppliers under the overall control of the repair and procurement agencies.

DAMAGE CONTROL IN CASE Y2K STRIKES

The Defence Forces responded to the Y2K problem and established Y2K monitoring cells with a core group of officers. Y2K affected software and embedded systems were identified by this cell. Corrective methodology was evolved based on the criticality and magnitude of each system. To begin with, manpower was trained to identify and handle the Y2K issues. The monitoring cells obtained regular progress reports till completion on Y2K affected systems through feedback from the end users. This progress was submitted to the steering committee at the MoD level. To ensure that systems were Y2K compliant, an internal audit was carried out on all systems. This internal audit was further substantiated with an inter-organisation external audit team. This ensured that all critical systems achieved Y2K compliance by 30 October 99. The observations on Y2K issues of external audit team were then implemented.

The loss of vital data and information will be circumvented by ensuring timely dumps of all files and adequate backups. Power backup and alternate communication setup have been planned to overcome any unforeseen failures.

Conclusion

The technological constraints of yesteryears have saddled us with the "Millennium Bug", which will spare none. It will strike on schedule and it will strike viciously on those who are unaware of it. The intensity will depend on the criticality of the system and extent of dependency on automation using computers.

Remodelling the Higher Control Structure of Defence

LT GEN A M VOHRA, PVSM (RETD)

Armed forces have long been pleading for a rational higher control structure which lets the Chiefs manage the professional aspects of their respective Services and stands the scrutiny of efficiency as well as economy.

In the present system the Ministry of Defence (MOD) is a department of the government and the Service Headquarters are not, and all matters of higher control of defence require the approval of the MOD. Directors or Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) at Service Headquarters are required to send recommendations signifying the approval of their respective Chiefs for the decision of the Ministry. If the Director General of Military Training (DGMT) of the Army feels that there should be a 'Pamphlet Writing Team' to write and keep up-to-date manuals on weapons, tactics and administration, on which training in units of the Army as well as at Schools of Instruction is based, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) can give his approval. However, the case has to be sent to the MOD for a decision. The MOD open their own file on the subject which is then processed from desk officer upward and may end up with the joint secretary stating the he does not quite agree with the recommendation of the Chief of the Army Staff. The Army Headquarters file will then be sent back with a note to the DGMT from the Deputy Secretary and, after two or three movements of the file to and fro, a 'Pamphlet Writing Team' may be approved by the 'Government' for six months; to be reviewed periodically.

Before the Second World War the War Department under the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) managed the Armed Forces. There was also a Department of Defence with specific functions. After independence the two departments were merged into the MOD, which has,

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over a period of time, taken over the management of the Defence Services. It functions as a separate entity; as a superior military headquarters. There is a triplication in the consideration of all proposals; by the Service concerned, by the Ministry of Finance and by the MOD. The time thus taken to arrive at a decision is prolonged and the structures created are against the principle of economy. What is more important is the fact that the Services feel that professional matters are commented upon by civil servants who are only superficially conversant with the issues.

Integration of Service Headquarters into the MOD

It needs to be mentioned that the present system prevents direct interaction between the Minister and the Services by the intervening bureaucracy who have the last word on all proposals. The recommendation of integrating Service Headquarters into the MOD is based on two principles. First, the Chiefs of the three Services should be responsible for and manage their respective Service with integrated finance. These matters should not be subject to the approval of the civil servants, as it were. Second, the Chiefs should have direct access to the Minister. Any proposal or other matters that require political approval, in keeping with the accepted concept of civilian control, should go direct from them to the Minister.

The restructured MOD should have four segments each under the COAS, the CNS, the CAS and the Defence Secretary, respectively. The responsibilities of the three Chiefs have been stated in the previous paragraph. The Defence Secretary would be responsible for the budget, procurement, inter-ministerial matters, liaison with the States, parliamentary questions, military lands, management of tri-Service organisations like the NCC, public relations and resettlement of ex-Servicemen. This is not intended to be a complete list but the principle is clear; all professional matters of the three Services will be managed by the three Chiefs as part of the MOD and not by the Defence Secretary. The Minister will have four advisers dealing directly with him in their respective fields of responsibility. The Principal Secretary (PS) to the Minister should be a Service officer. Coordination will be achieved by the Defence Minister's Committee (DMC) provided for in the existing higher control of defence organisation.

The Council System

To ensure continuity, and as a measure of checks and balances, we should adopt the system of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force Councils to be chaired by the Minister with the Service Chief concerned, PSOs and Defence Secretary as members. It is hoped that the recent much-talked about integration of Service HQs with the MOD would be based on the principles referred to earlier and structured as outlined above. Cosmetic changes of appointing a few military officers in the MOD without basic changes in the responsibilities of the Defence Secretary and the Chiefs will not work. The present irritants would continue. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the MOD in the UK is structured on the above lines.

Coordination

The remodelling of the higher control structure of defence could be carried out in phases. The first phase, which can be implemented immediately by redefining the place of Service Headquarters in the MOD and curtailing the charter of the Defence Secretary, requires only government approval and issuance of directive instructions by the Minister. No new institutions have to be created. The question of Service Councils can be the next phase. This involves constituting these institutions from within the existing set up. However, this phase need not be immediate and all concerned can ponder over it for a while.

The third phase relates to the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) system. This is essential to ensure coordination among the three Services in training, planning and operations. The CDS would be provided a joint staff from the three Services. The appointment would be rotational among the three Services. He would be the permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and his joint staff will issue instructions to ensure coordination and compliance. The present system of the Chief longest in the chair functioning as Chairman COSC has not been able to ensure any coordination and the three Services function in watertight compartments. The COSC has secretarial support but no joint staff or charter to ensure coordination.

Even after 50 years of independence during which the part played by the Armed Forces in the sphere of national integration is

acknowledged, our polity is still uncertain as to how to deal with the Services. This is so inspite of their completely apolitical behaviour. Political parties continue to be ignorant about the Armed Forces and display little desire to understand them. They are ignorant because, unlike the countries of Europe where most men were conscripted during either the First or the Second World War, they have not experienced personally the military way of life – its propriety, its discipline, its sense of purpose, its sense of urgency and its devotion to duty among other characteristics. This ignorance gives rise to apprehension that the CDS would have too much power and a strong incumbent may use this power unconstitutionally. The reality is that the CDS will command no troops and wield no direct power over them. It is also relevant that although there have been military take overs on the sub-continent on several occasions, there has been no such move in India. Our democracy is well established and changes in government have taken place constitutionally. We have also abided by the accepted and well defined roles of the basic constituents of the State – the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. In these circumstances, there need be no misgivings on establishing the CDS System. The Services too need have no fears of the Army monopolising the post of the CDS. Implementation of the principle of the best man for the job would create its own problems. The best course is to appoint the CDS by rotation among the three Services.

Another step that needs to be considered is theatre commands rather than separate commands of the three Services. The argument that theatre commands are necessary for overseas theatres only is not valid. Any operations to pursue our defence responsibility in the North or East would involve both the Army and the Air Force. Operations in the West or South are likely to involve all the three Services. Suitable joint theatre commands for such operations make much more sense than each Service having half a dozen or so commands each not necessarily related to operational tasks.

The Implications of Jihad

LT GEN M L CHIBBER, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

After returning from the Battle of Badr, Prophet Muhammad said, "we are finished with the **lesser jihad**; now we are starting the **greater jihad**."*

Introduction

The Kargil battle fought between the Indian and Pakistani Armies during May-July 1999 has sharply focused the attention of the people on the world "jihad." It is important that we have a proper understanding of the elevating and noble concept enshrined in this word. An analysis of the Kargil battle or the contentious issue of Jammu and Kashmir between the two neighbours is outside the scope of this essay.

Since the end of World War II, the word jihad has frequently hit the media headlines in relation to conflicts in various parts of the world. Without going into hurts and hates of history, real or imaginary, that are used by the hotheads or power brokers to motivate people for violence, the following are some examples :

- The Arab jihad to eliminate the state of Israel. It has lasted 50 years and the final reconciliation and peace seems to be in sight.
- The jihad between Iraq and Iran from 1980 to 1987. Iran declared Saddam to be an agent of America and a "kafir" (unbeliever).¹ Over 600,000 Iraqis and Iranians were killed and over 700,000 were wounded. Nobody won.

* The battle of Badr established the supremacy of Prophet Mohammad's early followers over the non-believers.

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- The jihad in Syria by the Islamic (Sunni) Brotherhood against the regime of the socialist Baath party; particularly against President Assad, who as an Alawi (follower of Ali) is considered an infidel and an idolater who worships Ali. After the failed attempt to assassinate Assad, the jihad was put down with an iron hand.
- The jihad being waged by the Islamic government of Sudan against the Sudanese in the south, who are largely non-Arab, English-educated, sub-Saharan Africans.
- The jihad being waged in Egypt by the Islamic Brotherhood and its offshoots to "uproot the infidel leaders and establish an Islamic state." The assassination of President Anwar Sadat by Lieutenant Islambouli and his colleagues in 1981 was a part of this jihad. Sadat was specially marked for having made peace with Israel.
- The jihad in Algeria since 1992 to establish an Islamic state. More than 100,000 Algerians have been killed in this jihad. Peace is now in sight.
- The proxy jihad being waged between the Sunni (Wahabi) Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran to capture the leadership of the Muslim nations.

The above list is a very cursory survey. However, there is one jihad that needs some discussion because it has worldwide ramifications : the jihad in Afghanistan that began in 1979 and, twenty years later, is still going on. In the first round of the jihad, "the Russians lost, the Muslims died, and the Americans won".² In the second round, the Arab veteran of the first round, Osama bin Laden, has become the symbol of the worldwide jihad for 'death to America' and to overthrow the 'un-Islamic' royal family of Saudi Arabia. Whatever the outcome of the second round, the death and destruction meted out to Afghanistan has pushed that suffering country back to the medieval age.

The Russians occupied Afghanistan in 1979. The fiercely independent Afghan tribal society resisted the Soviet might as it has

always done in history. General Zia-ul-Haq, the military ruler of Pakistan, scouted an enormous opportunity in this development to extract maximum largesse from the USA. The Americans were keen to do a 'Vietnam' on the Russians; the memories of losing to the Viet Cong, a surrogate state force of the USSR, was rankling in their minds. They agreed to a \$3.2 billion programme of assistance to Pakistan for its internal needs to persuade that country to agree to conduct the jihad against the Russians.

Operation 'Cyclone', the American code name for the jihad, was launched. *Jamat-e-Islami* of Pakistan, with Saudi money, was already active in Afghanistan. Youth from the Afghan refugees, who were pouring into Pakistan were paid, trained, and equipped to go back as Mujahideens (holy warriors) to fight the Russians. The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) organisation of Pakistan, "in which there was a significant Jamat-e-Islami presence", took charge of the jihad.

The American assistance,³ with matching contribution by Saudi Arabia, was channelled through the CIA to the ISI for the conduct of the jihad. These funds were transferred to special accounts in Pakistan and were controlled by the Director of the ISI, Lieutenant General Akhtar Abdul Rehman Khan. The American contribution was \$30 million in 1980; it rose to \$250 million in 1981 and reached \$ 1 billion from 1986 to 1989. The CIA operatives never directly interacted with the Mujahideens, but functioned through the ISI. Money for the war material, which included the American *Stinger* missiles, was provisioned separately and handled by the CIA itself. Weapons and equipment were procured by the CIA largely from Chinese and East European sources and shipped directly to the ISI in Pakistan; "10,000 tons were received in 1983, rising to 65,000 tons in 1987".⁴

From 1984 onward, Arab Islamists also started arriving to fight in the jihad on attractive salaries. At its peak, there were 15,000 from Saudi Arabia, 5,000 from Yemen, 3,000 to 5,000 from Egypt, 2,000 from Algeria, 1,000 from the Gulf countries, 1,000 from Libya, and a few hundred Kurds from Iraq. The Arab Mujahideens did not do well in battle as compared to the Afghans. As a result, they were mostly employed on support and administrative duties. The

American manuals for the art and techniques of covert warfare were translated into languages the mujahideens could read. When the Russians withdrew in 1989, the Arabs were forced to go back. Now known as the Arab Afghans, they are currently actively involved in some of the jihads listed above. Osama Bin Laden is a key figure among them.

The realisation in America that flooding Afghanistan with weapons could have unanticipated repercussions was rather slow to come. It suddenly happened when the World Trade Centre in New York was bombed in February 1993. A while later, the mastermind of this bombing, Ramzi Ahmed Yousaf, an Afghanistan jihad veteran, was arrested and convicted. A former CIA official, Victor Marcetti, comments:

Afghanistan was a golden opportunity for weakening the Evil Empire. But the CIA had had its experience time and time again: Korea, Cuba, Vietnam. In all these clandestine activities, the pressure is great to get something done and get it done right away so that no one takes a long-term view. They hire all sorts of people, some of whom are crazy. When the operation ends, they are inevitably left with people trained in demolition, firearm use, or guerrilla warfare, some of whom are suddenly out of job.⁵

To understand the real meaning and purpose of jihad, it is relevant to keep the following ominous words of Voltaire in mind: "Theological religion is the source of all imaginable follies and disturbances; it is the parent of fanaticism and civil discord; it is the enemy of mankind".⁶

Voltaire's immediate concern was the exploitation of Christian religion by the 'king and clergy' as a halo and smokescreen to capture and to perpetuate power. Like many idealists he became anti-religion when he saw its ruthless exploitation. Historically, however, his words are relevant for all theological religions. The following observations by a senior Pakistani Army officer on 4 December 1996 in Kabul vindicates Voltaire's view: "Very few of the leaders of Afghanistan have struggled for principles. They are struggling for power. So a nation bled and is still bleeding."⁷

The 20 years-old jihad in Afghanistan goes on. The Pushto-speaking Sunni Taliban are supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The Persian-speaking Shiite Northern Alliance is backed by Iran and Russia.

The purpose of this article is not to analyse jihad, as has been so masterfully done by Professor Huntington in his book 'Clash of Civilizations.' It is to understand the real meaning and purpose of the powerful world jihad; it is proposed to discuss the following;

- The meaning of jihad.
- The Lesser jihad.
- The Greater jihad.
- Jihad for liberation from the slavery of our current masters.

The Meaning of Jihad

The meaning of jihad is to *strive*, to *persevere*. But strive for what? It is to strive to live, guided by the following *five pillars* of Islam to overcome the selfishness and arrogance of human nature and rise above the traditional loyalty to family, tribe, sects, and other groupings.

- *Shahda* : Recitation of the central precept of Islam – there is no God but one God – in order to reinforce surrender to God.
- *Salat* : Prayer (individual and collective) to develop faith in God.
- *Zakat* : Obligatory charity for self purification.
- *Sawm* : Obligatory fasting and sexual abstinence during the month of Ramadan to develop self-discipline and will power.
- *Hajj* : Pilgrimage to Mecca to promote solidarity of Muslims.

The popular belief in the world, including among some sects of Muslims, is that jihad means a *holy war* to convert non-believers to Islam. Jihad, meaning a holy war, as the sixth pillar of Islam was introduced during the first generation after Prophet Mohammad, by the *Kharajis* (meaning secessionists). They were a group of ultra egalitarians who broke away from the then Islam on the issue of the appointment of the Caliph (the leader of the Muslim community). They were of the view that the Caliph should not be appointed on the basis of family connections with Prophet Mohammad or class. The Caliph, they argued, should be chosen for his irreproachable moral and religious character. They established a separate sect and waged a violent struggle for almost a century, but were eventually crushed. They survive as a sect in Oman. In the contemporary age, many sects, particularly the Wahabis, to which the royal family of Saudi Arabia belongs, subscribe to the interpretation of jihad as a holy war.

To some extent, the meaning of jihad as a holy war crept into Islamic thinking as a reaction to the *Crusades* (holy wars), mounted from 1095 to 1219 AD by the European Christians to free the holy land of Jerusalem from the Muslims. Huntington observes, "Christianity and Islam are both universalistic, claiming to be the one true faith to which all humans can adhere. Both of these missionary religions believe that their adherents have an obligation to convert non-believers to that one true faith".⁸

The Lesser Jihad

Kharajites' fanaticism and violence, which reflected their concept of jihad (which they termed the 'sixth pillar' of Islam), repelled most Muslims. "Yet in a sense they were the prototype for all subsequent revival movements, especially those that today are called fundamentalists".⁹ The fundamentalists believe that overt or covert violence to get their way is jihad. Some contemporary examples of these jihads have been mentioned in the introduction. Two pieces of recent writing are relevant to the current wave of fundamentalism. The first is a 54-page pamphlet titled the *Sixth Pillar*, written by the Egyptian engineer Abd as-Salaam Faraj, the ideologue of the secret *Al Jihad* organisation in Egypt. Lieutenant Islambouli,

who assassinated President Sadat, was a member of this organisation. A few quotes from the pamphlet reveal the philosophy of this sect.

If we cannot form an Islamic nation except by fighting, we have to fight... the first battle in our jihad is to uproot the infidel leadership... The tyrants of this earth will vanish only by the power of the sword... The way to get rid of a ruler imposed on us is by revolt... Today's rulers have become renegades of Islam, bred in the ways of imperialism, whether they be crusader or communist or Zionist... The peak of worship is jihad... We are asked to do God's bidding and not worry about the results.¹⁰

The second piece of writing is a 19-page article¹¹ written by Sheik Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Humaid, the ex-Chief Justice of Saudi Arabia, titled "Jihad in the Qur'aan and Sunnah". It is relevant to note that the House of Saud, the royal family of Saudi Arabia, is the patron of Wahabi Islam. This sect, founded by Abd al-Wahab (1703-1791), preaches the doctrine of 'back to the Qur'aan' as interpreted by al-Wahab. The publisher summarises the burden of the article thus: 'Jihad is regarded as the best thing one can offer voluntarily. It is superior to prayer, fasting, *zakat*, *umra*, *haji* (the five pillars of Islam) as mentioned in Qur'aan'.

The learned Judge consistently translates, in brackets of course, the meaning of jihad as 'holy fighting in Allah's cause'. Some extracts are :

Jihad (holy fighting in Allah's cause) is ordained for you (Muslims), though you *dislike* it, and it may be that you *dislike* a thing that is good for you and you like a thing that is bad for you. Allah knows but you do not know. (v2:216)

The fighting, even though it is by its nature *disliked* by the human soul because of the liability of being killed, or being taken captive, or being injured, with the wasting of the wealth, the damaging of industries, the destruction of the country, the spreading of fear and awe in the souls, and the [possibility] of being exiled from the homeland – [for this fighting] Allah had made ready an immensely good reward that cannot be imagined by a human soul.

Ikrima (a religious scholar) said, at first Muslims *disliked* it (jihad), but later they loved it and said, 'we listen and obey.' And it is because submission to the order to fight means hardship, but if the reward is made known, it results in comparing the hardship involved and its reward.

Paradise has one hundred grades, The distance between each of the two grades Allah (swt) has reserved for the Mujahideen who fight in his cause (as mentioned in the two authentic books, Al Bukhari and Muslim. See Sahih Al-Bukhari, Vol. 4, Hadith No. 48).

In his divine wisdom, Prophet Muhammad explained jihad in two categories, the lesser and the greater. To motivate youth to fight and be prepared to die is the cornerstone of all combat forces. Anyone who has been in the profession of arms is familiar with the techniques to be employed toward this end – pride in a cause, regimental or ethnic traditions, expectation of reward and so on. Two examples are the concept of *bushido* in Japan – the *kamikaze* pilots were a facet of this; and the Hindu Tamil Tiger human bombs in Sri Lanka. It is much easier to inject this motivation than to inspire people to *strive* and *persevere* (the greater jihad) to get rid of our debased tendencies and actions and achieve higher moral standard of character. It is the *striving* and *perseverance* essential for the greater jihad that human beings *dislike* the most. The greater jihad articulated by Prophet Muhammad refers to this difficult endeavour of reshaping our character.

The Greater Jihad

The word Islam means surrender to God. But surrender can never be complete and totally unconditional until we root out 'I-ness', meaning ego or *na'fs* in Arabic. Thus, to liberate '*myself from me*' is the goal of the greater jihad.

To give up 'I-ness' is a difficult and long struggle. That is why human beings, using less than two per cent of the God-given capacity of their brains *dislike* the greater jihad. We shall examine later how even the first step in the greater jihad needs great will power to persevere.

Perhaps the most vivid explanation of the real purpose of the greater jihad is by Professor Peter Kreeft, a well-known Roman Catholic philosopher. In his latest book, *Ecumenical Jihad*, he explains it by an imaginary conversation between Prophet Muhammad and himself:

Muhammad : The religion I taught my people was the simplest one in the world. There are times that call for complexity, and there are times that call for simplicity. Today is a time when 'simplistic' is the favourite sneer word of a decadent, arrogant, corrupt, and aggressively anti-God establishment. So what time do you think that it is today?

Kreeft : I had nothing to say, so Muhammad answered his own question.

Muhammad : It is time for a jihad, a holy war, a spiritual war. It is time to wake up to the fact that, whether you like it or not, you are in the middle of one.

Kreeft : But we are commanded to love our enemies, not to make war.

Muhammad : We love our human enemies; we war against our spirit (sic) enemies.

Kreeft : Aren't Muslims famous for confusing the two and fighting literal holy wars?

Muhammad : Some ... about five per cent of Muslims in the world, believe that jihad means physical war, killing infidels. But the Qur'aan' makes it quite clear that this war is first within oneself and against one's own sins and infidelities.

Kreeft : But your people, the Arabs, are world-famous for violence.

Muhammad : Unlike your people in Northern Ireland, I suppose.

Kreeft : But your whole history is full of...

Muhammad : Crusades and inquisitions and forced conversions and anti-Semitism and religious wars?

Kreeft : I quickly realised that my 'argument' was going nowhere except to blow up in my face.

Muhammad : Let me try to explain...*Islam* and jihad are intrinsically connected. For *Islam* means not only 'submission' but also 'peace', the peace that the world cannot give, the peace that only God can give when we submit to Him. And this submission requires the inner jihad, a war on our war against God. So we get the paradoxical result that peace (*Islam*) is attained only through war (jihad). And this peace also *leads to* war, because the submission that *is* this peace requires us to obey God's will, and God's will is for us to become spiritual warriors against evil.¹²

The good news about the greater jihad is that it deals with the highest common spiritual component in all faiths of the world. This component is that Creation is a temporary form of the Creator and in reality all is ONE:

- Tat Twam Asi Thou Art That; the perennial philosophy of India since the dawn of history.
- I am that I am Biblical articulation.
- I and my Father are one Jesus Christ, using the word Father for the Creator.
- Annal Haqq I am the Truth. Articulation by the famous mystic of Baghdad, al Hilaj, when he experienced his Reality.
- When you know Yourself, "I'ness" vanishes and you know that you and God are one and the same. iud-Din Arabi, the Great Sheikh.
- Ik Onkar All is One; Guru Nanak.

When the Sufi mystic al Hilaj declared " I am the TRUTH", theological scholars charged him with blasphemy for identifying himself with God. He was tried and sentenced to be executed. However, before implementing the sentence, his case was referred to another highly evolved Sufi mystic, Junaid of Baghdad. Junaid knew that the articulation of al Hilaj was true but he took a practical view. If men were told that they were a temporary form of God Himself, there would be chaos in society. So he opined that al Hilaj may be executed. It is significant that Junaid attended the gruesome execution of al Hilaj in his academic clothes and not the Sufi robe. Hilaj has since been immortalised by most Muslims.

Sufiism, the essence of Islam, has done great service to mankind and to Islam. Its essence was explained by an MBA Muslim student in the Sai Baba University in India. He said "ISLAM is the acronym of **I Shall Love All Mankind**". Sufiism teaches that by self-discipline and meditation, a person can experience one-ness with God. The shrines of Sufi mystics all over the world, as knowers of God, attract millions of people of all faiths because Sufiism touches the heart instead of the dry intellectualism, argumentation, and personal inclinations of the theologists.

Jamal al-Din Afghani,¹³ the well-know Egyptian reformer, encouraged people to interpret the Qur'aan and Sunna themselves. He exhorted them to win the greater jihad by frequently quoting the well-known Qur'aanic verse, 'Verily, Allah does not change the state of people unless they change inwardly.'

Mankind has evolved since the days of the Crusades and the time when al Hilaj was executed for identifying with God. God is no longer a mystery, or 'the opium of the poor', or a mere matter of faith. Science is helping people to appreciate that there is indeed a Cosmic Power as the source of the seen universe. This Power has been named differently by evolved individuals who have had a direct experience of this Power – God, Allah, Jehova, Brahma, the Self, the OverSoul and so on. These great souls conveyed the revelations to them in the form of religions relevant to the contemporary conditions and culture of their people. *Unfortunately, the devil lies in the details of the interpretations of their lofty teachings!* Consequently, all religions have numerous sects.

Read the following carefully to appreciate the sameness of the Reality as explained by a man of infinite wisdom in India, Sai Baba, and the well-known Professor of Quantum Physics, David Bohm. Here is what Sai Baba said,†

Real Form of God, Energy and Matter... Students, before trying to understand Divinity, try to understand the Universe itself. What is meant by *Vishwa Swarupa* (the real form of the universe)? The (seen) Universe is made up of galaxies, constellations, stars, the Sun, and the Moon. The *emptiness* within, that is known as the *Vishwa Swarupa* (the real form of the Universe). There, in the emptiness, are studded galaxies and constellations. Man, after considerable investigation, has discovered things about matter and energy. But in my view, there is nothing like matter in this (seen) universe. Everything is a temporary form of energy and is suffused with it. In one instance, this energy is turned into matter. In another instance it is energy again. This energy destroys the previous matter. It creates new matter. This is called the nuclear process.

In the above simple words, Sai Baba explained to the students that the real form of the Cosmic Power, called God, fills what appears to us as *emptiness*. It is relevant to add that more than 5,000 years ago, Indian spiritual scientists (rishis in Sanskrit), working in the laboratories of their brains in the Gandhara valley (near Peshawar in present-day Pakistan), had direct experience of the Cosmic Power named God. It was also revealed to them that this Cosmic Power has three inseparable characteristics:

Truth, meaning indestructible permanence; Energy and Love are two faces of it.

Consciousness.

Bliss.

Once we understand the above, we are ready to comprehend the profound statement made by Sai Baba many decades ago. It amounts to the Theory of Everything (TOE), the current quest of the scientists: "In this drama of the universe, there are only two actors, Energy and Consciousness, who play a million roles."

† Extract from Sai Baba's Address on 22 June 1995 at the inauguration of the LASER and Artificial Intelligence Laboratories in the Sai University.

The above TOE means that every thing in the seen Universe is a permutation and combination of energy and consciousness. Now let us read what David Bohm has said about the Reality of the seen universe, despite the fact that scientists are still fuzzy about consciousness.†

Matter and Consciousness : Unbroken Whole

Empty space contains an immense background of ultra high energy ('zero-point' energy of wavelength approximately 10 cm^{-32}),‡ and matter, as we know it, is small, 'quantised' wave-like excitation on top of this background, rather like a ripple on a vast sea. One cubic centimetre of this 'zero-point' energy is very far beyond the total energy of all matter in the known universe... What we perceive through senses as *empty space* is actually the plenum (the real universe), which is the ground for the existence of everything, including ourselves. The things that appear to our senses are derivative forms, and their meaning can be seen only when we consider the plenum in which they are *generated* and *sustained* and into which they must ultimately *vanish*.

Thus, the goal of the greater jihad is to reshape our character so as to reflect in our conduct the universal human values of Truth, Righteous Conduct, Love, Peace, and Non-violence. Then only can we liberate ourselves from 'I-ness'. However, we cannot even make a start until we liberate ourselves from the slavery of our current masters, who dominate every moment of our lives.


Liberation from the Slavery of our Current Masters

A Muslim youth from Turkey, visiting Sai Baba's Abode of Peace and Human Values, explained the identity of our current masters. These masters are a family of a mother and her five children. The name of the mother is Desire (for riches, fame and power). When we desire something intensely and don't get it, the

† Extract from the Book by Professor David Bohm titled *Wholeness and Implicate Order*, in which he discusses the totality of existence including matter and consciousness as an Unbroken Whole.

‡ .00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 01 cm.

first two children are born named Jealousy and Anger. Hatred is the inner nature of Jealousy. On the other hand, when we get what we want, the third child arrives, Attachment. As our attachment grows and we want more of the same, the fourth child takes birth, Greed. As our greed gets satiated, the youngest is born, Conceit. In a diagram the family looks like this:



Until we liberate ourselves from this family of masters, we can do very little good to ourselves, our community or humanity; we certainly cannot conquer "I-ness".

The proven technique to break our shackles is to tackle the mother. Place a 'ceiling on your desires' is a well-known teaching of Sai Baba. It becomes easy to do when we learn to, and have the will power to, discriminate between our *needs* and our *wants*. The reward of doing so is enormous. Not only do we start qualifying for success in the greater jihad, we also experience an increasing level of happiness. This is explicit in the well known equation of happiness:

$$\text{Happiness} = \frac{\text{Number of Desires Fulfilled}}{\text{Number of Desires Entertained}}$$

As we control and reduce the number of desires that we entertain, the level of our happiness rises.

Conclusion

We have discussed the lesser as well as the greater jihad. Jihad certainly does not exclude war for a *just cause*. But who can decide what is just and what is not just? This can be done only by leaders who, as spiritual warriors, have liberated themselves from the slavery of our 'current masters', have overcome their 'I-ness'

(*nafs*) and have moved close to winning the greater jihad ('Sadhana' in Sanskrit) by understanding that Creation, including those with whom we have differences, are merely a temporary form of the ONE God. Science today is helping us to understand that the totality of existence, including matter and consciousness, is an unbroken whole. It is leaders of this stamp who do not exploit religion as a halo or smokescreen to grab power or perpetuate it. If force has to be used for a just cause, then they teach and lead people to **fight without hatred**.

The renowned historian Arnold Toynbee, during the last few of his 86 years of life, reflected deeply over the panorama of the progress of man. During his long life he had researched history like no one before. With clinical detachment, he had looked at the integrated mega trends in the evolution of man. He saw how the attempts to impose unity on the world by conquest or through organised religion had failed. Reflecting on the meaning, purpose, and destiny of human life, he was worried at the contemporary situation. He feared that man might destroy himself because of three major developments. In nuclear weapons, man had acquired the capability to destroy all life on the planet many times over. Environmental degradation and pollution was ever rising and would make the world uninhabitable. To top it all, man had completely lost his moral moorings. He concluded that the only way man could survive was if "*there is unification of mankind*". And he opined that such a unification could be brought about only if man became spiritual by the "*world-wide spread of some common religion*".¹⁴ Can this happen?

For the last sixty years, a man of infinite wisdom in India, Sai Baba, has been working 18 hours a day, seven days a week, year after year, without a break, to bring about the *unity of man*. In his previous incarnation up to 1920, as the Baba of Shirdi near Bombay, he operated from a mosque. Now, for the 20th and early 21st Century, he is quietly, without fanfare or publicity, operating from the Abode of Peace and Human Values in a small village called Puttaparthi, near Bangalore. Millions of people from 135 countries are coming to him in ever increasing numbers to seek solace, love and peace of mind and to understand the purpose of life.

He has categorically declared that no new religion is necessary. He guides and indeed insists that a Christian be a good Christian, a Muslim be a good Muslim, a Hindu be a good Hindu, a Buddhist be a good Buddhist, and so on.

In just four lines, he has distilled the essence of all the faiths and philosophies that have gripped the minds of men since the dawn of history, as a blueprint for mankind in the emerging Global Village.

There is only one nation, the nation of humanity.

There is only one religion, the religion of love.

There is only one language, the language of heart.

There is only one God, and He is omnipresent.

The *common religion* Toynbee talked about is going to be *love*, which is the cornerstone of all faiths. It is important to define love with clarity. It is:

Love that knows no bargaining; love that is paid gladly as tribute to all living; love that is unswerving. Love alone can overcome obstacles, however, many and mighty.¹⁵

It is time that people in India and Pakistan learn a lesson from Western Europe. After 400 years of what scholars now describe as the *foolish civil war*, they are forgetting their hurts and hates promoted by their power-hungry rulers for selfish reasons.

The ethical word *jihad* has been misused by 'power-brokers' to mean a holy war to earn an assured place in Paradise. There is very little holy in, "attacking an Algerian baby with an axe, or two brothers shouting 'Allah-hu-Akbar' (God is Great) before throwing a petrol bomb into a bus carrying German tourists in the heart of Cairo"¹⁶. These and other jihads listed in this essay are inspired by power-brokers, who ruthlessly exploit the disaffected youth, especially from the poor families, who have faith in the richness of Islam, when their countries fail, "to satisfy their economic, employment, social, political, educational, and individual needs".¹⁶

The cause of fractured relationships in a family, in communities, within nation states and between nation states is due to a breakdown of frank, honest and sincere communications. Healing and convincing communication is in words that spring from the purity of heart. A great example of it is Abraham Lincoln during the four years of the American Civil War (1861 to 1865) between the secessionist South and Union. One million Americans out of the population of about 32 millions died in that conflict. Lincoln's reconciliatory words like, "*All men are created equal..... with malice towards none; with charity for all.....let us strive on to bind the nation's wounds..... to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and for his orphan.....to do all which may achieve lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.....that the government of the people, by the people, for the people will not perish from the earth,*"¹⁸ remade America into a mighty and progressive democracy.

It is time that people all over the world, and particularly in India and Pakistan, wake up and stop poisoning themselves with the past. They owe it to their children and the children of their children to join hands in waging a relentless jihad against poverty, illiteracy, environmental pollution and above all moral degradation. Indians and Pakistanis will do well to consolidate democracy in their countries, because that is the best and the proven way to tame "all divisive forces"¹⁹ like sects, castes, language, ethnicity, religion and selfishness. Kashmir will automatically become a bridge rather than a battleground, as so many battlefields in Western Europe have become. For example, consider Alsace. A region with predominantly German language and culture, it has been repeatedly contested by France and Germany over the centuries. After World War II, it was taken over by France. Today, Strasbourg, the capital of this region, has most appropriately become the home of the West European Parliament. In the broad sweep of the evolutionary process, mankind is on an irreversible march towards *unity of man, global economy, and eventually, earth citizenship*. The lesser jihad can retard the process but cannot stop or reverse it; the greater jihad can vastly accelerate it. The weapon of the lesser jihad is Desire; the weapon of the greater jihad is Love. The outcome of the lesser jihad is war, the outcome of the greater jihad is reconciliation. Mankind must win the greater jihad.

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ERRATA

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On Page 314, the year of issue of directive NSC-30 be corrected as 1948 instead of 1984.

How to Make a Career in the Armed Forces Attractive

LT GEN R N MAHAJAN, PVSM, VSM (RETD)

INTRODUCTION

The Armed Forces have been facing the problem of shortage of officer intake for some time. The need to refurbish the image and to make a career in the Armed Forces attractive to the younger generation has been felt for a long time. As early as 1982 the Chiefs of Staff Committee had underlined the dismal state of intake and dissatisfaction among serving personnel in its paper "Quality and Morale of Armed Forces Personnel."

A research project titled, "How to Make a Career in the Armed Forces Attractive" has been undertaken by Lt Gen R N Mahajan, PVSM, VSM (Retd) at the USI. The research work has been spread over a period of more than a year involving interaction at different levels and survey among serving and retired officers and students of recruitable age group. The study report is being published separately. A summary of the survey method and recommendations are given in succeeding paragraphs.

SURVEY

At the micro-level, a survey was conducted on the orientation and attitudes of individual members. The macro-level approach focussed on major contributing factors. Separate questionnaires were designed for serving officers, retired officers and students of recruitable age. Serving officers sent their responses direct to the author. Overall, there were 1,108 respondents: 534 serving (70 per cent were Major equivalent and below) and 131 retired (mostly Colonel equivalent and above) officers of the three Services and 443 students. The data generated was collated and analysed. Addition-

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ally, detailed letters were addressed to 75 senior officers of the three Services, serving and retired, detailing the problem and requesting their recommendations.

The principal findings of the survey are :

- (a) Most serving officers are satisfied with the values that govern career choice and retention, i.e., monetary compensation, professional development, life style and social status.
- (b) Job satisfaction and promotional avenues are unsatisfactory, but can be alleviated by in-service reforms.
- (c) Lack of married accommodation, quality education for children and truncated career are the main irritants in the quality of life indices.
- (d) Juniors hunger for better example and superior moral quality from senior officers.
- (e) The traditional non-material values of service life are still its most attractive features.
- (f) Certain non-institutional (organisational) trends have crept into the Armed Forces, which seek out-of-service appellates and/associations to represent their interests.
- (g) Retired officers have no regrets for having joined the Armed Forces. However, they are deeply dissatisfied with the existing resettlement apparatus.
- (h) Students retain their respect for the Armed Forces and want to join them for traditional reasons, but seek more flexible terms of service. They are quite ignorant about the Armed Forces.

Respondents were asked to give their suggestions (not under any specific headings) for improving the attractiveness of a Service career. Seventy eight per cent gave suggestions, which are tabulated below :

| | Number of Suggestions | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------|
| | Serving officers | Retired officers |
| Improve monetary compensation | 199 (12%) | 23 (7%) |
| Provide additional facilities | 122 (8%) | 13 (4%) |
| Improve career development | 266 (16%) | 54 (16%) |
| Improve service culture | 479 (30%) | 68 (20%) |
| Facilities for families | 170 (11%) | 34 (10%) |
| Facilities for retirees | 45 (3%) | 65 (20%) |
| Improve civil-military relations | 319 (20%) | 71 (22%) |
| Total suggestions received | 1600 (100%) | 328 (100%) |

Thus, the respondents' maximum concern is with improvement in service culture, civil-military relations and career development (65 per cent of the suggestions).

The study points to six principal causes, which have affected motivation and attractiveness of the Armed Forces as a career :

- Poor politico-bureaucratic management of the Armed Forces whereby the latter feel that they are not allowed to attain their potential.
- Continuous whittling down of the authority and status of the senior hierarchy by government, thus discrediting it and making it appear inept in the eyes of the subordinates.

- An entrenched feeling in the Armed Forces that the commitment expected of them is not matched by the society's commitment to them.
- There is a lack of internal cohesion in the officer corps caused principally by perceived poor moral quality of senior leadership and its inability to lead by example. Consequently, some negative societal values (e.g., sycophancy, individualism, careerism, consumerism) have permeated its fibre.
- Poor management of ex-servicemen's welfare and resettlement.
- Poor PR and media relations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Civil-Military Relations

The modern officer corps is termed a professional body and the modern officer a professional man (in the same sense as a physician, a lawyer, or a diplomat). The society, the state and even the officer corps are not fully cognisant of this. Therefore, the officer does not get the same deference from the society as other professionals, the state does not give him the status that is his due and, he himself does not strengthen the attributes that will enhance his standing. The society as client, is unaware of its obligation to suitably compensate him.

The Indian state has depended on the Armed Forces most significantly. Even so, we have no overarching academic study that relates our debilitating civil-military relations to existing theories and derives a format suited to our security needs. Only thus will various misconceptions be laid to rest and a healthy civil-military environment established. Such a study should be sponsored.

Political Management of the Armed Forces

Political attitude towards the Armed Forces is characterised by acquiescence to government proposals and appropriations. National

security is every citizen's responsibility, which he exercises through his elected representative. The latter, through genuine interest and informal debate, is expected to keep the government alert towards defence requirements, hold it accountable for lapses and improve the management of the Armed Forces.

Because of our political culture, we cannot expect our elected representatives to initially have the ability to contribute in security or defence debates. But a system should exist to enlighten them on important issues. Political parties, when in opposition, should have a defence spokesperson and develop a group of partymen who are considered experts in national security affairs.

A Defence Information System designed to provide information on security-related issues, and to arrange presentations, seminars and visits for the elected representatives should be established. Political parties should support candidature of retired military officers to the upper house of Parliament so that some expertise is available in a field that is becoming progressively more complex.

Politically, the attitude towards the Armed Forces, because of their exceptional liability and commitment, should be paternal and sensitive to their terms and conditions of service and quality of life issues. Pending legislation, the Defence Forces should receive priority for consideration.

The role of the Armed Forces should figure in the Constitution of India. This is an essential step for building national consensus on defence missions and provide guidance to the Forces to build necessary capabilities.

The government and the Armed Forces should encourage the expansion of the strategic community by referring strategic, defence and organisational issues to the universities and think tanks.

Defence Management

The interim system of higher defence management put in place, as the British were leaving India, should be replaced. What is needed

is an integrated and interactive system in which the politician, bureaucracy and the military participate together in decision making.

India's Prime Ministers should appoint Defence Ministers after due deliberation. Besides defence, numerous national security and crisis management issues fall in his pail. He is also the top spender of the national budget. A perceptive manager of a high bi-partisan standing - inspiring admiration and respect - is needed for this appointment. His office should have a small joint military staff for independent input and advice.

There should be mutual respect and confidence between the military and civilian arms of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Integrated planning and implementation is one side of the coin; the other is independent evaluation and monitoring of DRDO and Defence Production Projects. The waste, cost overruns, delays and failures in these two fields are disheartening for the Armed Forces.

Short (of about 20 working days' duration) programmes should be conducted for civilian officers appointed to the MoD. Separate courses at two levels are required - at operational and at decision making levels. These could be conducted at the United Service Institution. An officer posted as Joint Secretary or above should have done at least one earlier tenure at the MoD. Similar structured courses, again at two levels, are required for officers posted to Service Headquarters wherein the focus would be on contemporary policies and issues impinging on national security in general and national defence in particular.

The three Services should administratively be under their respective Chief of Staff, but the operational function should be under a Chief of Defence Staff. The latter will afford one-point advice to the Government and will discharge his operational responsibility through theatre commanders. The Chiefs of Staff, with their spans made more manageable, will be able to devote more time to presently neglected housekeeping functions. This one measure will also improve jointness - doctrinal, operational and organisational, and cost-effectiveness of the Armed Forces.

Manpower Management

A National Manpower Commission should be constituted to formulate policies and monitor their implementation. The principle should be to utilise trained manpower by remustering it for other skills within the Service or for other national purposes. These measures, besides reducing manpower costs, will provide a full career in government to all Service personnel, and will enhance the attractiveness of a career in the Armed Forces.

Another statutory body to be formed is the Armed Forces Pay Review Board. It should recognise the harsh and peculiar conditions and liability of service, which necessitate pay fixation to be unique and paternal.

Officer cadre management policies should be redrawn to offer a more challenging, varied and rewarding career. The terms should be made more flexible with inbuilt separation benefits, e.g., golden handshake, free professional education, or absorption in government service. The present reporting system has become inflated; it should be replaced. Officers seniority should be refixed after 10 years service. A faster track should be afforded to officers of exceptional merit. In order to reduce competition and careerism, a high proportion (50-60 per cent in the Army) of officer cadre should be non-regular.

Prestige and Status

Government and the society should recognise the deep injustice done to the officer corps by continuously whittling down its status in the warrant of precedence by upgrading bureaucrats. Equations in the warrant should take into account the length of the bureaucrat's service as was done before 1947. The reduction of the power and influence of senior officers by the government lowers their authority and respect and makes them appear inept to subordinates. This impacts adversely on the internal cohesion of the Armed Forces. Appointments should be given to retired officers in the government, committees, universities, commissions and corporations. This measure would increase the influence of the officer corps and make officership more attractive.

Quality of Life Indices

The serviceman experiences maximum anxiety and discomfort in two areas : non-availability of family accommodation and quality education for his children. These two facets and truncated career detract most the Forces' attractiveness.

Armed Forces are total institutions to which its members give total commitment. There is an institutional requirement to match this commitment and provide military housing to the servicemen in military areas. Rent in lieu of accommodation or hirings in civil areas places the serviceman thus living out in an insensitive and unfamiliar environment and is therefore undesirable.

The education of serviceman's children is as turbulent as is his career. This demands higher standards of education in Service schools and *Kendriya Vidyalayas*. For higher and professional education, there should be reservation of seats and removal of the domicile barrier.

Internal Security Management

The state must improve its political management so that internal problems are not sought to be resolved by prolonged employment of the Army. This decidedly affects the Army's elitist image and, therefore, its attractiveness. As in the case of national defence, structures and institutionalised processes for strategic planning and operational control of internal security must be created.

Senior Leadership

The study points to decayed service culture, values and professionalism. Most seriously, it shows that the senior leadership does not enjoy the respect and confidence of the juniors. The respondents' perceptions may only be somewhat exaggerated but are valid none the less (The late General Sundarji's letter of 01 February 1986 to Army Officers comprehensively addressed these very issues.)

Any detailed recommendations in this regard will be meaning-

less. Suffice it to say that military leadership is "leadership by deed" i.e., it shapes values by example. Should it fail to do so, societal values will take hold by default and adversely affect military ethos and professionalism.

Any correction should be based on consensus amongst senior officers; the approach being "top first; top down". Only then the malaise will be addressed and senior leadership of the Armed Forces reassert their moral authority.

Code of Ethics

In order to emphasise the morality of military service, and specially to shield the officer corps from disruptive societal values, a code of ethics needs to be adopted by each Service. To give it the authority of wide acceptance, such a code should be developed by consensus. Some precepts that should be considered for inclusion are : the recognition of the primacy of personal honour, obligation of duty, command and professional approach, subordination of self/group/branch interests in favour of the interests of the organisation, and a caveat against assuming unauthorised privileges and exploiting subordinates or resources for self, as also against seeking political favours.

As an essential corollary, and until a separate appellate is appointed, there should be a compact amongst star rank officers not to seek judicial redress.

Strengthening Corporateness

The internal cohesion in the officer corps should be strengthened within each Service; corps/regiment/branch rivalries must be removed by recognising and emphasising the importance of the part in the whole. Similarly, the three Services should reflect professional cohesion by adopting the principle of jointness and thus maximising their mission capability and influence in the state apparatus. Operational integration under one Chief will not only enhance military authority, influence and professionalism, it will also improve defence management and military security.

The three Services together should form a Defence Officers' Association with all officers, serving and retired, as members. It would be apolitical, non-profit making with the principal aim of promoting proper recognition of the military profession and assisting its development. It should seek to educate the public, the political elite and business leaders on important defence-related issues. Membership should be open to defence civilian officers, Territorial Army and NCC officers, public-minded civilians and leaders of industry. Such an organisation will also achieve external integration.

External Integration

The socio-political alienation of the officer corps and its lack of outside contact are indicative of low external integration. Links can be established by utilising to the maximum the civil education system for professional and higher studies, exchange of personnel between universities and the military training establishments and deputation of officers to other branches of the government. Socialising with other officials and professionals should be encouraged by making them honorary members of our Services' institutions. In this way, the officers' perspective will widen and be updated, and the external agencies will be sensitised to the needs of the Armed Forces. These contacts will also help the retirees in resettlement.

Ex-servicemen

The most comprehensive recommendations on the subject appeared in the USI Journal January-March, 1999: "A Department for Welfare of Ex-servicemen: A Proposal", by Lt Gen K Balaram, PVSM (Retd). It recommends the reorganisation, restructuring and legislation required, both at the centre and in the states for welfare and resettlement. These recommendations should be implemented.

The proposal to establish an Army-Navy-Air Force Bank should be examined in detail.

Placement now being a highly specialised field, professional firms should be hired for this purpose.

The recommendation to provide servicemen a full career in government after they retire will considerably reduce the size of the resettlement task and should be pursued.

Retiree associations should be homogeneous (therefore separate for officers and enlisted men; the former, however, should have strong links with the latter and promote their interests). Each state should have a separate tri-service association under an umbrella confederation. They should control their environment and promote their social, economic and representational interests.

Ex-servicemen need to be made more aware of their collective contribution in economic terms also, e.g., the land and property they own and their spending power in the community which creates jobs and support services. They should assert their due place in community affairs.

Education and Information

Education. Correspondence courses, strengthened by guest speakers and seminars at station/base level should educate the officer corps regarding politico-social-economic diplomatic management of national security. At the correct level, nuances of deterrence, coercion by force deployment, international relations, weapon transfers, internal political management and so on as they affect national security should be imbibed by the officer corps by liberal instruction.

PR. The need is for a specialised organisation in each Service and at COSC level to persistently project the Service, its ethos, culture and unique character of contract and challenge. As PR is also directed at those in service, the society and the decision makers, the requirements of these segments should be catered for.

Media. Detailed official codes should govern Service-media interaction and the present restrictions lifted. Correct media handling can only benefit the Armed Forces. This has been repeatedly demonstrated, most recently in Kargil. While the media will continue to publish the "masala" news regarding the Armed Forces, as a social duty they should also systematically educate the political elite and initiate debate on important defence issues.

Armed Forces should take measures to keep themselves in the public eye, participate in community projects, have small presentation teams tour schools and colleges, hold demonstrations of military skills, encourage realistic television serials and documentaries on military life. The aim should be to project a distinctive, purposive and modern group of people.

The service PR organisation should promote a strong and healthy relationship between the Armed Forces and the media. For this purpose, and to formulate policy and monitor results, there should be advisory boards. To provide expertise and continuity, professionals and retired officers should be included in these boards. A quiz on the Armed Forces should be introduced on television to generate students' interest.

Military Literature

Armed Forces need to promote literature - essays, short stories, plays and novels - in English, Hindi and other Indian languages. In due course, literature about the Forces should become a vibrant part of the national literary effort.

All examinations for entry to the Armed Forces and other public service, in the centre and the states, should have questions on national defence and the Armed Forces in the General Knowledge papers. For this purpose, two text books should be written; one at the high school level and the other at the college level.

CONCLUSION

The attractiveness of a career in the Armed Forces has multiple interlaced dimensions. In refurbishing the image of the Armed Forces, the higher Service hierarchy has to take the initiative and obtain the support of the society and the state. It should also employ social research in solving problems. It is said that only a crisis galvanises us. We have had two in the recent past : the noisy unrest in the technical branch of the IAF indicative of lack of internal cohesion and the Bhagwat affair which showed civil-military relations at their nadir. These two factors - correct civil-military relations and internal cohesion - are fundamental in motivating those who are in the Armed Forces and in attracting those who wish to join them.

Despite the changes in societal values and numerous occupational alternatives available, a certain type of youth will continue to be attracted to military life. This type is the mainstay of a voluntary force. The Armed Forces should so manage and project themselves, that he is not deterred from joining and, having joined, finds the ethos, values, culture, challenge and reward which he sought in military life.

Remoulding the Subcontinent

PART II

MAJ GEN VINOD SAIGHAL, VSM (RETD)

Dealing with China

For centuries on end Tibet has been considered a buffer between the two giant Asian neighbours. It is proposed that this millennial mindset be shed and in the next millennium Tibet become the bridge between:

- India and China;
- China and the West; and
- China and the rest of the world.

Such a reversal could become a historic turning point, not only for the future of Tibet, but for the future of India, of China, and for mankind as a whole. If nearly forty per cent of the total population of the globe decides to live in peace and harmony the prospect of world peace is immeasurably enhanced.

It is felt that it would be in China's long-term interest to accept the autonomy proposal of the Dalai Lama, while it can do so from a position of strength, as an act of far-sighted statesmanship. In the process it could turn to advantage the formidable goodwill created by the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan diaspora in the last forty years. The moment that China's great leaders look at the proposal dispassionately, in the context of the conditions obtaining in China at the close of the century, they would not fail to realise the enormous advantage accruing to China from turning the Dalai Lama into one of their closest allies. The Chinese people should start regarding Tibetan culture as a unique world heritage. By preserving it China enriches itself.

Excerpts of the talk delivered at the United Service Institution of India, New Delhi on 11 August 1999.

Maj Gen Vinod Saighal retired from the Directorate General of Military Training, Army Headquarters.

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Meanwhile, the inexorable consequences of the ecological ravaging of Tibet and the Himalayas will condemn the coming generations on the subcontinent, China and South East Asia to an existence far worse than is possible to imagine at this juncture, although the alarm signals are all there. The tragedy is that the two civilisations that pride themselves as being the repositories of the wisdom of the ages are ignoring it in a manner whose blindness is difficult to comprehend.

It is worth dwelling on this aspect for a while. Examine the evidence:

- Many great river systems trace their source from the Tibetan plateau, flowing into India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and China. They water some of the most productive croplands in the world.
- The population of the area between the Yellow River in the East to the Indus in the West comprises nearly forty seven per cent of the world's population.
- Over-exploitation of the fragile environment of Tibet and the Himalayas is leading to grave ecological devastation. Pollution at the headwaters of rivers in Tibet, including from nuclear wastes, is leading to serious ecological and bio-genetic consequences.
- Massive deforestation, resulting from equally massive military deployments, has contributed significantly to siltation and destructive flooding in the Brahmaputra, Yangtse, Mekong, Indus, Sutlej, Salween and the Yellow rivers. These rivers flow into the South China Sea, Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The global scale of these ecological disasters has yet to be fully assimilated.
- The Tibetan Plateau plays a critical role in the stability of the global climate and the Monsoons.
- Himalayan glaciers are receding at a worrisome rate.

One can go on endlessly in this vein, each frightening statistic numbing the mind further. The Eco Monitors Society had presented

last year a "Blueprint for the Demilitarisation of the Himalayas as an Ecological Imperative". It is under consideration by several international agencies as well as the concerned ministries of the government. In keeping with the spirit of that proposal a blueprint for the demilitarisation of Tibet is presented. The salient features of the plan include:

- In principle, agreement by China to commence demilitarisation of Tibet, as part of an overall understanding with India on the boundary question, with effect from 1 January 2000. China could continue to retain a reasonable military cordon around its existing nuclear and missile facilities till 2025 unless genuine progress were to be made in the interim towards universal nuclear disarmament. It would undertake not to augment the existing facilities. Plans would concomitantly be prepared for safe dismantling, which could commence as soon, thereafter, as the global environment becomes conducive for such action.
- Five giant Ecological Reserves to be created in Tibet for the 'ecorevival' of Tibet over the next hundred years. Billion dollar ecorevival trusts to be created with monies contributed by international donors. The 'ecoreserves' would be jointly managed by the Tibetans and Chinese representatives. They would include the Tibetans in exile. The donor agencies would nominate their own representatives.
- Where the Eco Reserves straddle the Himalayas in India, Nepal and other such regions, joint management by all the concerned governments, with preference given to globally respected non-governmental organisations from the participating countries.
- Establishment of an Eco Management Institute in Lhasa for training Tibetans in scientific methods of revival of degraded areas.

China is in a state of flux. The surface stability is deceptive. The Chinese leadership faces very real dilemmas. Apparently, there is a common saying going the rounds in China which goes something like: "if the communist party does not reform, it will die, and if it reforms, it is seeking death".

The banning of the Falun Gong sect may turn out to be a controversial decision. It is not the aim here to criticise the Chinese government action, but to communicate an apprehension. It would be worth taking note of a remark attributed to Thomas L Friedman:

"I believe that the key problem the world will face with China in the next decade will be managing its weakness. China may grow richer, and it may grow more authoritarian, but it is not going to do both at the same time."⁴

Dealing with the Central Asian Republics (CAR)

India must continue to strengthen its relations with the CAR states, not so much in the competitive mode with other global players vying for influence in the region, but in a manner that would strengthen the ability of these states to withstand outside pressures – pressures that could create tensions in the region. Towards this end it is recommended that:

- India should encourage CAR states to form a common policy for tapping the oil wealth of the region for the joint development of the region as a whole.
- Setting up, with Indian help, a regional Water Management Institute. At some stage the sharing of water resources would be crucial for the harmonious development of the region.
- Working with all like-minded people to formulate a policy that would exclude the development of fissiparous tendencies in the region. It is in the long-term interest of India, China, Russia, Iran and Turkey to ensure that they do not destabilise, or allow the destabilisation of the region. Such a policy may ultimately coincide with the interest of the United States of America as well as the European Union, should these latter countries take a long-term view.
- The setting up of a joint oil consortium between Gazprom, ONGC and the companies dealing in oil in Iran and China should be considered.

Dealing with South East Asia

Having dealt at some length on ASEAN in two earlier talks at this forum, notably "From Economic Intelligence to Strategic Intelligence" and "Subcontinental Realities at the turn of the Century", it only needs to be reiterated that:

- A tripartite guarantee by China, India and Japan to maintain the territorial integrity of ASEAN, both individually and collectively. No country should exploit, or be allowed to exploit, weaknesses developing in these countries as a fallout from the economic meltdown in the region.
- China, Japan and the concerned ASEAN states to demilitarise the Spratly group of islands and set up a joint holding company for the management of fisheries and the equitable sharing of revenues accruing from the oil or mineral wealth that might be found in the region in the next century.

It is believed that the non-regional powers that have interests in the region would not be averse to such agreements and could be expected to welcome them in the interest of ASEAN.

General Military Aspects

At this stage, it is important to bring in reforms that will strengthen India's fighting machine internally. Enough has been written on the aspects of joint defence planning and joint chiefs of staff system in the last fifty years to realise that without such a system the country will continue to suffer. If every modern fighting machine in the world has switched over to this system it requires a special type of obduracy to continue to oppose it. It is presumed that this time around the political hierarchy will itself introduce the long overdue reform, regardless of the specious reasoning provided by the bureaucracy, or the individual Service Headquarters to counter it. The Kargil victory was a near run thing. It would be foolish beyond belief to be carried away by the military success achieved locally - literally at platoon, company and the battalion levels. It is more than made up by the professional inadequacies and intellectual

dishonesty existing higher up the ladder. The National Security Council too needs to be revamped.

Meanwhile, it is recommended that a statutory five-member Military Commission be immediately set up. The Military Commission would comprise highly respected retired military officers (ex-Chiefs do not automatically fall in this category) and a retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The tenure of the members of the Commission would be limited to a single five years term. The Commission would not have any role in the formulation of defence policy, or its execution. It would be a watchdog body that would ensure that:

- Politicisation of the Armed Forces is totally excluded.
- Defence ministers, bureaucrats, or politicians do not exercise undue influence, to the detriment of the Services, in promotions, postings or transfers.
- It would also serve as a review body for all statutory complaints relating to officers of the rank of Colonel and above (and equivalent ranks in the other two Services). Its decisions would be final.
- It would *suo moto* examine, at random, defence deals, *post facto*, to reassure itself that extraneous factors had not come into play in the purchase of defence equipment. The Commission would be a body with extensive powers to order independent inquiries into matters where it felt that the national interest had indeed been compromised. It would under no circumstances get involved in the routine functioning of the Ministry of Defence or Service Headquarters.

Unless professionalism is improved in the top governance hierarchies, including the Defence Services, no amount of defence spending will ensure real security for the country. The Government of India must itself become more professional in the conduct of military affairs. As an example, it must lay down in the form of a directive, the minimum quantum of regular Army formations and units

that must be retained at all times in the Eastern theatre, regardless of the adversity of the situation that may develop in the Western theatre. The thinning out pattern that would have been established over the years would not have gone unnoticed. Exploitation of the vacuum created in the East, due to a misreading of the situation by Indian military commanders, could result in a disaster several orders of magnitude higher than what has been taking place in the West, from time to time. Attention has been rightly focused by a highly informed media on the need for acclimatisation of troops before committing them to battle at high altitudes. As any commander worth his salt would know, equal attention needs to be paid to terrain familiarisation.

As a general perception India's intelligence agencies are simply not geared to provide world class inputs that would be required by the country in the global environment of the next century. Without setting out an intelligence revamp blueprint in this presentation, some aspects that need to be kept in mind while undertaking such an exercise are mentioned below:

- Massive one time weeding out of deadwood.
- Bringing in outside talent from IIMs, IITs, colleges, industry, technocrats, military personnel (serving or retired) at the appropriate levels, commensurate with the quality that the inducted talent manifests. It could be permanent absorption, contract based employment for a given period or mission specific appointment. National interest must take precedence over narrow cadre interests. The best minds in the country must be allowed to contribute to the national interest. Those who are unable to see beyond their narrow service (or cadre) interests - which essentially means their own self interest - must be weeded out or phased out or transferred to less sensitive departments. Massive retraining and specialisation of the personnel that are retained after special screening exercises should be carried out.
- If necessary, a *tabula rasa* approach must be taken while carrying out the intelligence revamp. The country is faced with a structurally deficient intelligence system. It is no longer a

question of posting in professionally competent heads, whatever their provenance. What needs to be realised is that, as presently constituted, the system simply does not have the capability or capacity to perform at world class levels.

There has been a lot of talk, informed and not so well informed, on the reasons for the ingress that took place in the Kargil sector. Whether it was a command failure, intelligence failure or systemic failure in the way the defence of India is handled, the most obvious question that should have been posed has remained unasked. Simply stated the question is:

"If such was the state of affairs in the show window of national defence, what then is the real state of affairs in the other areas, far removed from the public gaze".⁵

It is a most troubling question. One shudders to hazard a guess.

Conclusion

In a way, strong global currents, far stronger than the forces that unleashed war and planet-destroying consumerism on the world, are coming into the ascendant to reshape the destiny of the planet. These stronger, humanity-embracing, currents represent the aspirations of ordinary people around the world.

The peoples of China, India and Tibet are civilisationally the best placed to use these currents, to harness them to their purpose, not only for the resurgence of China, Tibet, India and the region, but for the resurgence of the planet.

China is already a major force in world affairs. It might one day narrow the gap with the United States in nuclear and missile weaponry. It faces no military threat in the coming century. China could, instead, go under from the contradictions and pressures building up internally. Should its leadership, at the dawn of the new millennium, look at the world through a different lens, they would be the first to realise that a historic compromise with the Dalai Lama automatically relieves pressure on practically all other fronts - the

Western world, Falun Gong, internal unrest, and even Taiwan. The time has come for a great civilisation to turn a supposed adversary into an ally and thereby usher in a new destiny for the region and for the world of the 21st Century.

By the same token India and Pakistan would also need to come to terms with their shared history, geography and the abject misery in which the majority of their respective populations still live.

For India, the action in Kargil at the turn of the millennium could be the turning point in the country's march to greatness. A handful of young people with faith in their hearts and pride in their country have rekindled (modern) India's romance with the motherland.

At the end of the day, and whatever the earlier failings, the Armed Forces hierarchy needs to be complimented for having restored an adverse situation with panache and skill. And finally:

If India's national security aim for the second half of the 20th Century could have been succinctly defined as the preservation of India's unity, the country's aim for the first half of the 21st Century could equally succinctly be defined as the preservation of the integrity of the subcontinent, as an essential prerequisite for the global equipoise of the third millennium.

Notes

⁴ Thomas L. Friedman, "How to worry sensibly about China in transition", *The New York Times*. Refer also to the author's talk, "Dealing with China in the 21st Century", delivered at this very forum on 17 February 1999. The talk was reproduced in two parts in the USI Journal of the first and second quarters this year (1999).

⁵ The Kargil sector would be reckoned as one of the most (obviously) vulnerable sectors, where round the clock vigilance and instant reaction should have been the order of the day.

Human Rights and Low-Intensity Conflict

VIRENDRA DAYAL

Colonel Pyara Lal belonged to that fine tradition of Soldier-Intellectuals that thought deeply on matters of war and peace and encouraged the Armed Forces, and Society more widely, to reflect seriously on the moral choices and imperatives facing our nation and our times. I never had the privilege of knowing Colonel Pyara Lal personally; the loss was entirely mine. But this splendid Institution, its Library and Journal, all speak of Col Pyara Lal's immense talents and the inspiration that his life and work have brought to others. It is then in honour of his memory that I speak today. And, if I may be permitted a personal note, I also speak in memory of the patriarch of my family, Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal, former Foreign Secretary of India, who passed away at 90 on Saturday, 18 September 1999. He was a close personal friend of Dag Hammarskjold, for whom he served as Special Representative in Lebanon and the Congo. He shaped my life and ideas more deeply than anyone else. No doubt, the talk that I will give today will reflect that inheritance.

As I think of him, I cannot but recall other remarkable Indian officers and men who served the cause of international peace and security, soldiering for the United Nations, either in his generation or mine. I think of Generals Thimayya and Gyani, Prem Chand and Rikhye, Noronha and Satish Nambiar who set an example of integrity, composure and restraint that made the contribution of the Indian Army legendary in the cause of peace. It is that same Army of which I shall speak today.

Let me say at the outset that I accept with alacrity opportunities to engage in discussions with members of the Armed Forces on

Excerpts of the Colonel Pyara Lal Memorial Lecture 1999 delivered at the USI on 21 September 1999.

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questions of Human Rights. I am profoundly aware of the dangerous and often ambiguous circumstances in which they are called upon to serve the country. And I have found, in six years as a Member of the National Human Rights Commission, that these exchanges, whether with the leaders of the Army in Delhi, or in the training institutions in Wellington, Pune, Delhi or elsewhere, at Corps Headquarters or in the field, are invariably deeply thoughtful and - to me at least - edifying. Matters of life and death, of rights and wrongs are, by their nature, serious. There is no room for frivolity in them; they concentrate the mind.

There is a view - as banal as it is bizarre - that those who speak for Human Rights, and those who carry a gun to preserve the territorial integrity of their country, must be mortal enemies. Like many other widely held views, it is ridiculous. Nothing could be further from the truth. Human Rights activists and members of the Armed Forces can, on occasion, work at cross-purposes, but they certainly need not. In fact, they should not. There is a clear and emphatic relationship between the security of the State and the security of the individuals who comprise the State. There is a symbiosis between State Security and Human Security. The times are gone when a State could humiliate and destroy its own people behind the iron walls of sovereignty and claim the protection of Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations forbidding intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the State. At the end of the 20th Century - for better or for worse - the security of the State and its unity and integrity rest on the security and well-being of those who dwell in that State. It is no longer possible for a State to assume that it can, for long, have inviolate borders and violated citizens within those borders. Today, if the citizen is hurt, the State can itself be mortally wounded.

We need only to look at the recent litter of States around us to see what happens when this relationship is not fully understood. A State - powerful in arms and alliances - emasculates itself when its citizens feel their rights are not sufficiently protected within the State. Such a State grows vulnerable. It invites implosion from within; and intrusion from without. The Soviet Union collapsed when the Russian Federation seceded from the Kremlin. Yugoslavia collapsed

when its Constituent Republics went their own way. And outsiders, in such circumstances, sometimes help only too readily.

It is because I believe intensely in a strong and purposeful India, its interests secure and its territorial integrity intact, an India that radiates energy and positive ideas, that I work for the promotion and protection of Human Rights in our country. At the end of the 20th Century, our concepts of National Security need to be thought through fully and comprehensively: the protection and promotion of Human Rights must be factored into any comprehensive policy on National Security, not only because respect for Human Rights is essential in itself, but also because it is essential for the well-being of the State. No longer can National Security rest exclusively on arms, on weapons systems or alliances, or even the United Nations Charter, essential as these might be. Nor is skilful diplomacy enough. Nations can be beggared by trade decisions wrongly taken; they can grow vulnerable if their 'rights' records drive a rift between them and their own people, and they can be ruined if others can then drive a coach and wagon - or, should I say, a tank and an APC - through that rift.

This is, not least, the reason why those of us who have a vision of India in the 21st Century, as a country confident in its strength, its values and capabilities, must ensure that the Human Rights of all our citizens are respected, and that our house is in order and invulnerable. We must do what is right for our country, because it is right for the people of our country, for ourselves and our children.

No country has a Human Rights record of which it can be uniformly proud, just as all have elements in their history of which they can justly be proud. Consider the recent history of our planet:

- Slavery bound the New World with Africa in a chain of sorrow that claimed tens of millions of lives; Chinese were 'Shanghaied' to build the railroads of California; Indians were 'indentured' to plant cane in the Caribbean.
- Conquest and destruction marked the relationship of the Maya and Inca civilisations with Europe. The noble Indians

of North America were decimated long before they could have recourse to the Genocide Convention or an International Criminal Court.

- Colonialism denied to the peoples of Asia and Africa every known right, civil and political, economic, social and cultural.

It sometimes seems to me that a self-induced amnesia on such matters has resulted in the granting of both absolution and amnesty to some. Such amnesia would not be possible, if such crimes were committed today.

A country like India, whose share of world trade was some 24 per cent in the 1750's, at the end of the 20th Century has a share of 0.7 per cent. The countries of the South do not know whether to laugh or to cry when States that, as a matter of policy, justified the denial of right - comprehensively - to two thirds of the world barely a generation ago, now profess to be on a new civilising mission to further precisely those rights that they denied to our fathers. And, once again, some are too ready to use force, outside of the Charter, in defence of that "civilising mission."

Nothing, however, is gained from mutual recrimination, except a certain morbid catharsis. And Human Rights deserve far better. They are an affirmation of life and its possibilities, not a lament. There is a manifest need for each nation to look into its own history, to put its own house in order, and to stop behaving as if its first priority is to set its neighbour's house in order, as if its own were pristine. It has been the curse of the manner in which the United Nations has handled issues of Human Rights that, first, they fell foul to the schism between East and West, and now, to that between the North and South. It seems to me that Human Rights are too grave a matter to be left to a new breed of fanatics, or Pavlovian official spokespersons, who too readily divide humanity with the same Manichean zeal that, in earlier times, set denomination against denomination, even within the same religion. Human Rights, the great secular faith of the latter half of the 20th Century, must be saved from its zealots, from those who would use its concepts for political

purposes, to set human being against human being, people against people, nation against nation, just as the great religious faiths were so used - or rather abused.

Indeed, issues of Human Rights require far greater understanding than is generally in evidence. Consider certain additional facts of our century, unquestionably the bloodiest in human history.

- According to an estimate made for the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, of which I happened to be a member, some 100 million persons have been killed in armed conflict in this century, and 120 million more deaths have resulted from politically-related violence in which religion, race, ethnicity, language, political opinion or the like has sparked the killings. We have witnessed the horrors of the Holocaust, a crime so unspeakable, so ultimate in character, that an altogether new word had to be coined to describe it: "genocide." We have since witnessed genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda and, more recently, extraordinary violence in the Balkans and East Timor.
- South Asia has been no stranger to grave loss of life, if we count the costs of Partition, the wars fought, the slaughters since committed and the cross-border terrorism released in the name of these false gods. Our experience is too immediate to us to require repeating before an audience such as this. We are all familiar with the history of South Asia over the past 50 years.
- The UN Human Development Report of 1998 has reminded us that, whereas civilian deaths in situations of armed conflict were some 5 per cent of the total casualties at the start of the century, they were over 90 per cent of such casualties in the 1990's, with women and children being the principal targets (a recent report for UNICEF, written by Graca Machel, confirms that lamentable fact).

- The successive phases of the recent conflict in Kosovo and Serbia have confirmed this trend, as have developments in East Timor. Indeed, in the Balkans, it has been observed that NATO perfected an entirely new art form in the history of war. It suffered no military casualties whatsoever as a result of actual combat, and the casualties on the ground, whether advertent or "collateral", to use that cruel euphemism, were predominantly civilian - first, the brutal attacks on Kosovars by the Serbs, then the relentless bombing that claimed both Serb and Kosovar lives; now, the attacks on the dwindling Serb population in Kosovo. Judged by such standards, the conflict in Kargil was a notable exception. For all of the suffering it witnessed, the essential battle on the heights involved - at least - armed combatants, not armies against civilians.
- Assassination, calculated rape, kidnapping and mutilation are now routine as weapons of terror. In the 50th year of the Geneva Conventions, these noble instruments are being violated more egregiously than ever before.
- Child soldiers are back, in spite of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. A recent report by an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Olara Otunu, estimates that there are some 250,000 children under arms today.
- There are now in the world some 50 million people who are refugees or displaced persons; they have been forced to flee or abandon their homes. Once again, our region and our country is no stranger to such suffering.
- Indeed, never before has human rage been directed so vehemently against its own species. Never before has that destructiveness taken so heavy a toll, in addition, on other forms of life, or on the very eco-systems on which life itself depends.
- To complete the picture, we live in a world that has gone awry in economic and social terms.

Cruel and interlocking disparities persist, in all parts of the world - as Dr Mahbub-ul-Haq pointed out in his 1997/98 UN Development Report - in five areas: in income and wealth distribution between individuals; between urban and rural areas; between regions both within countries and globally; in gender inequalities; in ethnic and racial inequalities (which, transposed to our country, would mean the deep societal wrongs that we have, for centuries, inflicted on Dalits and Scheduled Tribes). We live in a world in which the three richest persons have assets that exceed the combined GDP of 48 of the least developed countries and the wealth of the 38 richest persons exceeds the total GDP of South Asia (1.3 billion persons). 4.4 billion out of 6 billion people on this planet live in developing countries, of whom 3/5ths live without basic sanitation, 1/3rd without safe drinking water, 1/4th without adequate housing, 1/5th do not study beyond grade 5, and 1/5th are severely under-nourished. And, as Amartya Sen and Mahbub-ul-Haq have pointed out, our South Asia has emerged as one of the most deprived regions in the world: with 22 per cent of the global population, it accounts for six per cent of global real income; it has 46 per cent of the world's illiterates and 50 per cent of the world's under-nourished children.

I have recited these facts to trouble and disturb you, because they are all relevant to the proper - or improper - promotion and protection of Human Rights. And they are of consequence to each of us, whether members of the Armed Forces, or diplomats, or administrators, or members of civil society more widely. They are the facts that condition our daily lives and, which can condition our future.

If, therefore, I have learned anything from a lifetime at the United Nations and now six years with the National Human Rights Commission, it is this:

- There can be no real peace between nations, large or small, rich or poor, unless the rights of all States are equally respected. Failing this, conflict results. The strong bully the weak, and a form of political-Darwinism rules the planet. It was the central purpose of the United Nations Charter to turn the world away from such behaviour.

- There can be no real peace within nations, large or small, unless the rights of all of their peoples, rich or poor, are equally respected. This is the central meaning of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Failure to recognise this, and to provide the good governance that this realisation requires, is a prescription for conflict within states. To be forewarned is to be fore-armed, and it is therefore to questions of good-governance, to reform and restructuring of institutions, to economic and social choices, to education and training, that the National Human Rights Commission has been bending its mind and its energies, as much as it has to dealing with, and seeking to redress, the 40,000 complaints that it has been receiving each year.

Given the state of the world as it is, what should be the role of the State, the Indian Army and Society in dealing with Human Rights matters, including questions arising from low-intensity conflict situations?

In the first place, I believe all of us need to be mindful of the overall international regime that has now been devised, largely under the auspices of the United Nations, to deal with Human Rights issues. What are the implications of this regime on national sovereignty, on each of us?

On the positive side, it is clear that the intent of this regime is to prevent a recurrence of the barbarisms of this century, into the next. Some 70 international instruments, of which 25 are instruments to which India is a party, bind nations to a "common standard of behaviour" and an answerability to each other for their conduct. This is a development without precedent in human history. There are eight treaty bodies to which we are answerable, and issues of rights are increasingly debated in all of the major deliberative bodies of the United Nations. In such a scheme of things, the United States of America is as answerable to us, as we are to it, or to Cuba or China. In addition to the treaty bodies, there are United Nations Special Rapporteurs for a range of subjects: Religious Tolerance, Freedom of Expression, Treatment of Minorities,

Torture, Enforced Disappearances and Extra-Judicial Killings, to name but a few. Down the road, there will be an International Criminal Court to deal, *inter alia*, with crimes against humanity and genocide; already two tribunals have been established under United Nations auspices to deal with the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. This is the likely shape of things to come, and we must be aware of it. In brief, the walls of sovereignty have been breached and Human Rights violations are now a matter of global concern.

I sometimes find that countries of the South lament this development, as they fear the arbitrary manner in which international human rights law is being developed and applied. I fully understand this apprehension because the international system is, indeed, riddled with double-standards, double-speak and selectivity. It is far easier, for instance, to bring to trial a Rwandese notable than to bring to book those foreign military and intelligence advisers who, in the 1980's, were involved in the training of "death squads" in Guatemala or writing manuals on how to use torture as a method of interrogating left-wing guerrillas.

Yet, we must remember that it was India, not the West, that first argued in the United Nations that "crimes against humanity" could not be sheltered behind article 2(7) of the Charter. It was Gandhiji who encouraged Pandit Nehru to have the question of Apartheid raised, in 1948, in the General Assembly, when Mrs Vijayalakshmi Pandit led the Indian delegation. And when General Smuts, the eminent Boer statesman and friend of Gandhiji, asked the latter to reconsider this decision on the grounds that it would stiffen Boer resistance and contravene the Charter, Gandhiji was compelled to reply that some crimes were so heinous that they could not be shielded behind the walls of sovereignty. In the same vein, it was India, on 2 November 1946, that first raised the issue of genocide in the General Assembly of the United Nations - and it did so even before it had itself attained Independence. Further, it was India that, in December 1971, felt constrained to act under Article 51 of the Charter, in exercise of its right to self-defence, to bring an end to the tragic situation obtaining in East Pakistan, that had led 10 million refugees to cross over the border into our country and imperil our State. Some years later, Tanzania felt constrained to do the same,

to deal with the despoiling of Uganda by Idi Amin, and to repatriate the massive influx of refugees that had come from that country into Tanzania.

But the right to intervene on 'humanitarian grounds' has disturbing aspects when such intervention cannot be related directly to Article 51 of the Charter, or the repelling of 'aggression' as prescribed in Chapter VII of the Charter. And it was precisely these issues that disturbed many observers of the recent NATO action in Kosovo and Serbia earlier this year. By any yardstick, the 'ethnic cleansing' of the Kosovars by the Serbs was absolutely unacceptable, and had to be halted. No doubt, Serbia has paid, and is still paying, a heavy price for this. But the issue of when, and who, should authorise the use of force in situations such as those that obtained in the Balkans remain grave questions. Under the Charter, only the Security Council could have granted such permission. Or, failing the Council, the General Assembly, acting under a "Uniting for Peace Resolution", as it did during the Korean War. But the Council itself is in desperate need of reform, being widely viewed as insufficiently representative. In any case, it was by-passed, and so was the General Assembly, by a "regional arrangement," namely NATO.

The NATO Strategic Concept Paper of 23-24 April 1999 therefore added to the discomfiture that many felt about developments in the Balkans. As many in this audience would know, that Paper advanced the view that NATO's security could be imperilled by a wide range of factors including "regional crises" at its periphery, resulting from ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, failed reforms, "*human rights abuses*," the dissolution of States and the consequent instability that results, quite apart from the proliferation of A,B,C weapons and delivery systems among "political adversaries, including non-state players," terrorism, the disruption in the flow of natural resources, etc. For any, or all of these reasons, the Paper suggests that "crisis response operations" can be undertaken by NATO outside of the area identified in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty establishing NATO. No mention is made of such possible operations requiring the specific advance clearance of the Security Council.

This ambiguity has added a further degree of disquiet and anxiety to the consideration of Human Rights issues at the end of this century. This is a pity. For under the Charter, questions of Human Rights were meant, essentially, to be dealt with under Chapter IX, relating to International Economic and Social Cooperation, and not under Chapter VII dealing with Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression. The gradual transposition of Human Rights issues from the area of co-operation and understanding to that of contention and enforcement through the use of force shows, once again, how far we have moved from the original understandings and moorings of the Charter.

What, then, should our State, our Army and Society do, when faced with low-intensity conflict and terrorism?

I have no doubt in my mind that the State has a fundamental duty to protect itself and its citizens in the face of such assaults. Whether in Western or Eastern political thought, the State has invariably been represented as having two essential attributes: the Sword is held high in one hand, the Scales of Justice in the other. Further, the State is like the individual writ large, as Aristotle observed. If the individual has the right to private defence under the law, the State has the right to Self Defence under 51 of the Charter. Yet neither has a licence to exercise force in excess, or to be brutal. The use of force must respect the principle of proportionality. The right to self defence is an inherent right, and Article 51 makes clear that nothing shall impair the right to individual or collective self-defence. I underline this because, today, the low-intensity conflicts and terrorism that we face are, regrettably but obviously, wars by proxy. In such circumstances, the State and the Army must exercise the right to self defence and use it in such a way that it triumphs decisively.

The next issue that arises is this: can terrorism be justified to achieve political ends?

For many years there was much intellectual confusion on this matter - the Charter, the UN Declaration on Human Rights and the two great International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are silent on the matter, all having been adopted before the rise of terrorism as a new way of conducting war. In consequence, it was readily argued, with a certain mental laxity, that one man's freedom fighter was another's terrorist, and the matter was shuffled-off in a cloud of uncertainty.

But faced with overt and increasing acts of terrorism and wars of proxy, the international community is gradually, and conclusively, defining its position and India's loneliness and exasperation are finally beginning to be understood as others are beginning to pay the price that India has long paid. While an over-arching Convention on Terrorism is yet to be adopted, between 1963 and 1999, 11 international instruments have been adopted to deal with various aspects of terrorism - or 'low-intensity' conflict - if one so chooses to call it. These include three covenants and a protocol on terrorism in the skies; a convention and protocol on maritime situations; a convention on taking hostages; two covenants on warlike materials falling into terrorist hands (including nuclear and plastic explosives); there is a convention on the safety of diplomatic personnel and a convention on terrorist bombing. A convention on nuclear materials is on the way, as is the Indian proposal seeking a comprehensive convention to deal with International Terrorism.

The turning point came in the World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna in June 1993. It was then unanimously declared that "The acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, as well as linkage in some countries to drug trafficking, are activities aimed at the destruction of Human Rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening the territorial integrity and security of States and legitimately constituted governments. The international community should take the necessary steps to enhance cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism."

Subsequently, the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 50/186 of 22 December 1995 and subsequent resolutions has created an obligation on States to combat terrorism. The Assembly has asserted, inter alia, that terrorism in all of its forms and manifestations can never be justified as a means to promote

and protect Human Rights; it unequivocally condemns "all acts, methods and practices of terrorism, regardless of motivation... whenever and by whomever committed as acts of aggression aimed at the destruction of human rights;" it condemns the incitement to ethnic hatred, violence and terrorism and calls upon States to take "all necessary measures, in accordance with the relevant provisions of international law and international standards of human rights, to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism, whenever and by whomever committed." Further, the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 49/160 of 9 December 1994, states unequivocally:

Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, or group of persons, or particular persons for political purpose, are in any circumstances unjustifiable whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.

States are called upon to "refrain from organizing, facilitating, financing, encouraging or tolerating" terrorist activities on their soil and asked to ensure that their "respective territories are not used for terrorist installations or training camps, or for the propagation or organisation of terrorist acts." In other words, it is naive in the extreme to argue that a State can, somehow, accord "moral" support to such activities and not be in serious breach of this Declaration.

How far, then, can the State and its Army go to deal with acts of terrorism and 'low-intensity conflict'?

In the National Human Rights Commission we have no illusions about the difficult choices that must be made by those who must, on the ground and in the heat of the moment, defend both the integrity of the State and yet not violate Human Rights. The predicament is compounded by the fact that the necessity to use force can, in extremis, lead to error or excess. The tragedy and the irony is exacerbated by the fact that terrorists, who are the implacable enemies of society and of Human Rights, are quick to claim the protection of these rights when under siege.

How, then, are such problems to be tackled?

Ideally, policies of equity and justice, of good governance and inclusiveness, of conciliation, negotiation and free and fair political processes - including the regular holding of elections - should be able to prevent situations of conflict from arising. In other words, the State has to give primacy to political means, and economic and social policies that are viewed as fair and equitable, to ensure that situations do not grow out of hand. The recourse to the use of arms should be the last resort; it should not be the easy way out. It does not help the Army to be used against other Indians and this is widely recognised within the Army itself. It does not necessarily strengthen national unity to send one young Indian with a gun against another young Indian with a gun. If, however, force must be used, then - and I say this with humility, having been spared the need to take such decisions myself - it must be used with a keen sense of exactitude and proportionality. We need to follow the moral law within, and the moral law without. The former requires us to use the minimum necessary force to achieve our ends, the latter requires us to act in conformity with the laws of the land and the treaty obligations of our country, whether in respect of Human Rights or humanitarian law more widely.

These are admittedly high standards. But we have set them for ourselves. The Freedom Movement fought, above all, for the inscription of non-derogable and justiciable Fundamental Rights in a Constitution that independent Indians have written for themselves. This was the essence of the constitutional demand that was made for nearly 50 years, from the 1895 Constitution of India Bill, through the Montague-Chelmsford Report, the 1928 Nehru Committee Report, the 1930's Round Table Conference, the 1940's Sapru Committee Report, the Cripps Mission, and the 1947 Objectives Resolution. And it is to be noted that, when we finally started drafting the Constitution of the Republic, it was the 'Strong Man of India', Sardar Patel, who was asked to chair the Committee that drafted Parts III and IV of the Constitution, on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles, respectively. The Founding Fathers of our Republic were under no doubt that a strong State required a strong assertion of Fundamental Rights, and the judicial protection of those

rights. Our Fundamental Rights, therefore, are not some alien concept imposed on an unwilling, unreceptive country. They are the reason for our struggle for Independence, and the justification for our Freedom. They are the standards we have set to measure ourselves in our own eyes, just as our treaty obligations are the standards we have adopted to be measured in the eyes of others. We cannot be unfaithful to our Constitution, our laws or our treaty obligations, if we wish to be true to ourselves. No Indian can set himself above the law, nor can an institution do so. We are a nation living under the law, and governed by it.

If this means, on occasion, that we must fight, as it were, with 'one hand tied behind the back', as I have often heard, said, so be it. It is the price we must pay for being a nation governed by law. If it means that the Army must hand over a captured suspect to civilian authorities with a minimum of delay, so be it. Our patriotic duties must be set against, and be guided by, our constitutional and legal proprieties. This is precisely what distinguishes a State governed by law from terrorists, who hold the law in contempt.

In such difficult and ambiguous circumstances, does the National Human Rights Commission have any care for the difficulties faced by the Army? Indeed it does. It will never rush to judgement lightly. It will always weigh the facts and circumstances with utmost care and balance. But when it reaches the conclusion that rights have been violated, the Commission will say so, and expect compliance with its views. The Commission has observed the care with which the Army has responded to its enquiries and directives and the actions that have been taken to bring to book those who have been guilty of violating Human Rights. It has also seen the increasing emphasis being given in training, at all levels, to respect Human Rights; it has noted, in addition, that Standard Operating Procedures have increasingly reflected this concern. The commission is aware, too, of the casualties that the Army has taken in exercising restraint. It respects the fortitude of those involved, and it has acted - to the maximum of its capacity - to ensure that soldiers and their kin are treated with the gratitude and respect that is rightly their's, not least when it comes to the sad subject of benefits. The Commission is only too conscious of the fact that

monetary recompense can never compensate for the loss of a life; indeed, the right to life is the supreme right, that all have a duty to respect and protect.

In a country governed by law, each component of civil society has a role to play, a duty to perform. The Armed Forces often feel, frequently with justification, that they are dragged into political controversies not of their making, or that there is a lack of appreciation of their role and difficulties. The press is often blamed for this. Yet in a free and democratic society, Freedom of Speech and Expression - as contained in Article 19 of the Constitution, is subject only to reasonable restrictions in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality. And Freedom of Speech and Expression are crucial to the well-being of society. Through the exercise of this freedom, as the Supreme Court of India has observed, the individual attains self-fulfilment; this freedom assists in the discovery of truth; it strengthens the capacity of the individual to participate in decision making; and it provides a mechanism by which to establish a reasonable balance between stability and change. In other words, the right to know and to question, is fundamental to a democratic society and to reasonable social and political discourse within it. Such a freedom can be inconvenient to the Army, as to others. But, as we say in our Commission, "Sunlight is the best disinfectant." This applies to all of us: Society needs the constructive tension that debate and dissent provide.

I should now like to close with a few observations:

First, for better or worse, we have to face the fact that the concept of absolute sovereignty is increasingly being challenged. Because of the arbitrary manner in which international relations are conducted this has, in certain respects, dangerous implications. But rather than trying to stop the world in its tracks, we need to take the lead in setting up global systems that are fair and balanced and that do not ride rough-shod over our interests. We must recognise, however, that national sovereignty was never as absolute as it pretended to be. In our day and age, it is becoming decidedly

porous. The revolution in information technology, in global finance and trade, the prevalence of global challenges that can only be met globally - whether relating to the environment, population, disease, the laws of the sea, the skies and even outer space - combine to make this change irreversible.

Two, there are many positive aspects to this change: information technology should transform consciousness in the remotest village; international law should create new and common standards of acceptable behaviour for all of us, including the most powerful, who should be brought firmly within its scope. We should not fear change, but be in the forefront of it, directing its content and direction. That would be a calling worthy of our country, the talent of our people and the exceptional resilience and power of our civilisation.

Three, certainly the greatest ideas, both religious and secular - including those relating to Human Rights - can and will be manipulated and used for political purposes of dubious provenance and purpose. We must build our defences against this by ensuring that our own house is in order. We must do what is right, because it is right. Because we believe in the dignity and worth of the human person.

Four, we need to redefine concepts such as patriotism and national security. The former should not be the "last refuge of the scoundrel;" it should, instead, be the pursuit of great principles and the observance of great virtues. And national security must encompass the promotion and protection of human rights, or else the security of the nation can itself become vulnerable. In this day and age, national security and human rights are symbiotic, not antagonistic.

Five, we therefore need a new logic to define our national character. Respect for the pluralism and diversity of this country must be the basis of that logic. That would mean respect for the rights of each of the citizens of India, regardless of caste, religion, gender, race or place of birth. Respect for Human Rights does not weaken our society, as some absurdly argue, but strengthens it,

by removing the causes of strife. In such a scheme of things, it would be understood by all that national security and patriotism would be diminished, not enhanced, if deaths or rape occurred in custody, if extra-judicial killings or "disappearances" were tolerated, if torture were justified in the name of the security of the State, or if those guilty of such abominations were shielded and not brought to book. In such a scheme of things, national security and patriotism would also mean rejecting those who are entrepreneurs of hate, and who incite one Indian to violence against another in the name of caste, language, religion or other parochial purposes.

Six, at the international level, it would mean that the promotion and protection of Human Rights would once again be the central purpose of international co-operation, not contention, and that the Charter and the Treaties of the Organisation would once again provide the guidance and the method for progress, not the military alliance of the day, however powerful or supposedly well-intentioned it may claim to be. The Charter was written and adopted expressly to move the world away from the uncertainties and tyrannies of military alliances and spheres of influence that had earlier characterised international relations. But the Charter itself needs to be amended, in order to make the Security Council more truly representative of a changing world. This is a purpose for which we must strive with subtlety and diligence.

Dag Hammarskjold once said, "In our era, the path to holiness must pass through the world of action." He was right. Whether through soldiering - a noble profession with a great tradition - or through acting to protect society in other ways, we must all pass through the world of action if we are to fulfil our vocations. Hammarskjold also said, apropos the United Nations, that "it was not created to bring heaven to earth, but to save earth from going to hell." He was right again. Whether soldiering to protect the State, or striving to protect human rights, none of us will bring Paradise to Earth. But, together, we can surely save this planet from going to hell.

General Palit Military Studies Trust : New Delhi

General

General Palit Military Studies Trust was founded by Major General DK Palit VrC (Retd) for the award of scholarships for the study of Indian Military History and Military Science in general. The research projects may cover aspects of the military history of the 17th, 18th and 19th Centuries; or of the two World Wars as affecting the Indian Army; or of the wars fought after Independence. The Board of Trustees may accept National Security matters in special circumstances.

Scholarship

In the normal course one scholar will be selected per annum. But, according to circumstances and resources, a second scholarship may be granted in the same year. A scholarship may be extended to a second year - consecutively or subsequently. If the standard is sufficiently high and the subject so merits, a period of study at the India Office archives and other libraries in London will be financed by the Board of Trustees. Stress will be laid on those periods of British Indian history in which some battles and other military incidents need more detailed research.

Scholars will be awarded a Trust Scholarship amounting to Rs. 40,000/- to Rs. 50,000/- per annum, depending on the circumstances. The amount will be paid in two installments, the second installment being contingent upon the quality of material produced in the first.

Specific Research Project Proposed by the Trust

Research be carried out on the part played in political and dynastic conflicts by armed ascetics - the Sadhu Armies of India.

Major General D K Palit, VrC (Retd) has written a synopsis as an introduction to this subject, which is enclosed as appendix.

Applications

Applications are invited from the following categories:

- (a) Serving members of the Armed Forces, the IFS, IAS and IPS.
- (b) Retired members of the aforementioned Services; and members from Academia and the Press.

Candidates should send their applications to the Director, USI, giving the following information:

- (a) Experience in military or other research and copies of publications.
- (b) Knowledge, if any, of the subject - 'Armed Asceticism in Indian History'.

Applications should be received by 1 March 2000. The research work on the project is to commence by 01 May 2000.

ACCESS TO DELNET

The USI is now connected to Delhi Library Network (DELNET). Information regarding books from other Libraries on DELNET can be accessed from the Colonel Pyara Lal USI Library.

Appendix

Armed Asceticism in Indian History : The complexity, depth and significance of powerful martial ascetics

The history of the nationalist movement against British rule is rife with images of armed ascetics fighting for Indian freedom, a popular concept certainly in Bengal - where the renowned novelist Bankim Chandra Chatterjee's imaginative rendering of the soldier-sadhu culture of that period in his famous novel *Anandamath*, a story about a sanyasi rebellion in the 1870s to rescue India from the clutches of foreign invaders, was based on actual conflicts of ascetic armies against the Company's troops. This proto-nationalist depiction of the sadhu-patriot was countered by the British colonial depiction of the nationalist ascetic as being little more than criminals disguised in saffron robes, a variation of the "thugs" of William Sleeman (creator of the Department of Thuggee and Dacoity - i.e., robbers and thieves in the disguise of saffron).

Colonial suspicions of sadhus and religious sects such as Shaivites and Vaishnavites as fonts of criminal mischief continued throughout the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. In fact to some extent this distrust of holy men as rogues was shared by much of the fast-growing urban middle classes, particularly in Bengal - despite the reverence shown to Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekanand. This distrust was not merely a projection of the British colonialist attitude, but grounded in the history of the ascetics of the Shaiva and Vaishnava sects and their relationship to political power. Notwithstanding this public critique of sadhus, there were at the same time many in Bengal who regarded the image of politically potent asceticism as refracted through the novelist Bankim's eyes and his sanyasi song in *Anandamath* - "Bande Maataram" - was put into music by Sir Rabindranath Tagore and became the unofficial anthem of the swadeshi movement; and, later of a mature nationalism under a very different kind of Hindu ascetic - Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.

Before the mid-19th Century, political sadhus were of two kinds - those who regarded the British as benign rulers (thus lending moral approval to the imperial project) and those who, after 1700, formed themselves into armed mercenary groups - often (but not always) on the British side. Even after the British withdrew from association with ascetic sages, the latter nevertheless remained powerful - and eventually would provide inspiration for Indian nationalism.

Ascetic Military Entrepreneurship, 1750-1850

By the end of the mid-18th Century, with the decline of Mughal authority in Delhi, substantial armies led by either *gosains* or *bairagies* and consisting of multi-caste rank-and-file *naga* (meaning "*nanga*" or naked) soldiery were finding lucrative service in Lucknow (Awadh), Jaipur and Bharatpur. The most famous of them were Anupgiri Gosain and his "elder brother" Umraogiri - as well as Madhudas, later known as "Banda Bahadur" of the *khalsa*. The former two saw service under major powers including the British.

Some of these ascetic armies reached strengths of 20,000 and more, including cavalry, and possessed the latest weaponry - muskets, artillery, siege trains and camel guns. The men were from all castes including shudras - and perhaps even untouchables. These *gosain* forces had a reputation for reliability like the Rohillas and the Sikh *misl*s - hardened, disciplined and effective soldiers. They have been described by a British historian as "rogues who, from going quite naked, close shaved and well rubbed with oil are so slippery that no one can seize them, while they force their way with a dagger pointed at both ends and held in the middle". They were adept at surprise attacks by night and fighting at close quarters.

Some typical exploits

Daring operations were mounted by Anupgiri and Umraogiri during the period 1750-1770, particularly raids on urban fortifications or enemy encampments, often under the cover of darkness.

Relief of a besieged Awadhi army at Allahabad in 1757, when the *gosains* caused havoc in the Afghan camps.

In 1759, Anupgiri and Umraogiri, while in the service of Nawab Shuja-ul-Daula of Awadh, mounted a surprise night attack that devastated a large Maratha force in Rohilkhand;

In 1764, while in the service of the Jat Raja Jawahir Singh, Anupgiri led a band of guerrilla infantry armed to the teeth, into Delhi where their covering artillery fire enabled his naga cavalry to enter the city.

When ascetic armies fought pitched battles against large forces, they did not fare so well, for example :

* R. Montgomery Martin, *The History, Antiquities, Topography and Statistics of Eastern India* (London, 1938).

Rajendragiri's defeat by Afghan forces at Chilkiya in 1752;

The defeat of Anupgiri's force by Hindupat at Tindwari (Bundelkhand) in 1762;

Anupgiri's failure to break through the British lines at the Battle of Buxar in 1764.

Anupgiri's next major exploit was at Bundelkhand where he offered his help to the British "to subdue the recalcitrant Maratha warlords." The British were thus able with sadhu help to add this strategic area of high revenue value to their territories - in exchange for which Anup received a small *jagir* near Kanpur (and a *jaidad* of 22 lakh rupees), which he later converted into a mini-princely state with himself as its Maharajah. There is great irony in the fact that while the British were still engaged in liquidating bands of annual ascetics in Bihar (Baba Gorakhnath and the Gorkhas among them?) they were allying themselves with a leading *gosain* adventurer in Bundelkhand - but this move made strategic sense. Anupgiri not only helped the British occupy parts of Maratha-infested Central India, but also in their acquisition of territory in eastern UP at a crucial juncture - when Lord Lake was setting out to consolidate power westwards, up to Delhi. (The *naga akharas* could be said to have logically led to the Sikh *khalsas* - who eventually became a bulwark of the Company's arms).

After the suppression of itinerant ascetic gangs by the British in the 19th Century, the military function of the *akharas* were more or less rendered obsolete though manifestation of that culture could be seen at the triennial *Kumbh Melas*, which alternated between Hardwar, Nasik, Ujjain and Allahabad. These *melas* had in earlier centuries become the staging ground for the recruitment, mobilisation and mercenary employment of armed *akharas*. An integral part of the staging process during these *melas* was the procession of armed *nagas* in full military regalia to the sacred river for a bath. Sometimes there would be armed clashes between *gosains* and *bairagies* (over precedence; or the rights to tax pilgrims - sometimes with the spilling of blood). In 1796 there was a clash between *gosains* and *khalsa* ascetics from the neighbouring Punjab kingdom of Ranjit Singh.

The Historical Military Ascetic from 1500 onwards

According to Abul Fazl's *Akbar Nama*,* the Emperor in 1567 witnessed a skirmish between two large groups of ascetics at Thaneshwar

* Trans. H. Bereridge : Royal Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1902-1939, vol.iii.

(situated in what is now the popular pilgrimage locale of Kurukshetra in Haryana). They were all shaivites of one stamp or another - many of the combatants being Gorakhnathi yogis - and were fighting for the right to occupy a particular location at the Thaneshwar tank. Abul Fazl writes that Akbar ordered some of his troops to assist the outnumbered faction which, in consequence, emerged victorious. (It is likely that Akbar had begun to take an interest in ascetics as a prime source of political and other information - for did not Kautilya in his *Arthashastra* write : "the King should concern himself first and foremost with the acquisition of Intelligence and avail himself of species from a wide range of occupational walks of life, especially including ascetics"?)

By the Seventeenth Century, the practice of arms would begin to spread beyond the confines of shaivite asceticism - into vaishnavite and *Nanak-panthi* communities - and, what is more, the institutionalisation of arms culture among *sant*- and *bhakta*-oriented religious centres. The most significant examples are the Sikh *khalsas* in the Punjab; and the *Satnami*, *Ramanandi* and the *Nimbargi bairagi* armies in Rajasthan.

As military cultures emerged in the *bhakti* and *sant* communities, some of which combined armed asceticism with demands of religio-political legitimacy, the imperial need was felt to control these ascetic arms. Thus in 1692 or 1693, Aurangzeb issued an imperial decree to authorise five *Ramanandi* commanders "to move freely about the whole Empire with standards and kettledrums without let or hindrance" - presumably in an attempt to bring the ascetics to join imperial service. Similarly, the early 1700s would witness attempts by Jai Singh II, Maharaja of Jaipur, to domesticate (and disarm) the *Ramanandis* in his realm. (It is clear that the attempt to disarm them failed - and the Maharaja subsequently resorted to enlisting *bairagi* commanders such as Swami Balanand and his disciple Mahant Ramakrishna and their thousands as soldier sadhus in his army).

By the early decades of the Nineteenth Century armed ascetics were no longer seen merely as the object of imperial disdain, but were increasingly viewed as a real military and social threat to the British Company's authority. This is made clear by the outbreak of rebellion among the *khalsa* followers of Guru Gobind Singh; and the shared culture of ascetic arms that the *khalsa* imbibed together with shaivite *goswamis* and vaishnavite *bairagies* is underlined by the fact that the leader of the Sikh rebellion after Guru Gobind's death is none other than an erstwhile *bairagi* - Banda Bahadur. (The process of institutionalisation of ascetic arms accelerated with the

decentralisation of Moghul power and the increasing market for military labour)*.

That there was a strong element of mercenaries among the sadhu armies is proved by their willingness to serve regardless of the religious beliefs of their masters or allies (and their willingness to recruit regardless of caste or creed). For their lack of religious fastidiousness, we only have to regard the fact that Anupgiri and Umraogiri's success in the latter half of the Eighteenth Century was not predicated to a marked disregard on an overriding religious identity in the pursuit of war and politics : thus, the *gosains* allied themselves to the Mughal emperor, the Nawabs of Oudh and the British, while turning their backs on the one military force that is held up as the main 18th Century representative of resurgent Hinduism - the Marathas. In the Battle of Panipat of 1761, when Ahmed Shah Durrani dealt a heavy blow to Maratha fortunes in north India, the *gosains* contributed in a major way to the slaughter of Daulat Rao Shinde's army* -- despite the derisive remarks of the Afghan that he could not countenance the presence in his camp of "naked sadhus parading around with their genitalia in full view of all to see!"

* Seema Alavi, *The Sepoy and the Company : Tradition and Transition in Northern India 1770-83* (Delhi 1995); and H.A. Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy* (Cambridge, 1990).

* Ghulam Naqawi, *Imaad-ul-Saadat* (Lucknow : Nawal Kishore, 1864).

Chinese Assertion of Territorial Claims

The Mischief Reef : A Case Study

B RAMAN

China has on-going disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei regarding conflicting claims of sovereignty over different islands in the Spratly group in the South China Sea, but its assertion of claim over the Mischief Reef at the expense of the Philippines is an educative case study of how China doggedly pursues its irredentist territorial claims by stealth, if possible, and by other means, including force, if necessary.

The Spratly group consists of 12 main islands and 390 islets, banks, reefs, shoals and cays, of which only 33 permanently rise above the sea and only seven of these have an area of more than 0.5 sq kms. The islands and other features lie in an area of about 400 nautical miles from East to West and about 500 nautical miles from North to South. The sea areas contained by these features constitute about 38 per cent of the South China Sea. According to legal experts, the 33 features, which are permanently above the sea, would be entitled, under international law, to have 12 nautical miles of territorial sea, while 26 of these could have Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf claims. None of the other features could have any such entitlement since they are not permanently above the sea.

Widely conflicting estimates of huge oil and gas deposits in the area, which could make it as rich as the Kuwait region, are yet to be proved by exploration. Amongst those to have made such claims are the Chinese Ministry for Geology and Mineral Resources (oil and gas reserves of 17.7 billion tonnes as against Kuwait's

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13 billion tonnes), some scientists of the Russian Research Institute of Geology of Foreign Countries (at least 10 billion tonnes), Ji Guoxing, Director of the Asia-Pacific Department of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (10 billion tonnes of oil and 25 billion cubic metres of gas) and the book (author anonymous) *Can China's Armed Forces Win the Next War?* (35 billion tonnes).

Amongst the skeptics doubting these estimates is EF Durkee, General Manager of EF Durkee and Associates of Manila, who had worked as technical adviser to the Crestone Energy Corporation of the US during its negotiations with Beijing in 1992 on exploration rights. Durkee wrote in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* of 9 March 1995, as follows: "Though media and politicians love to talk about oil in the Spratlys, there is not one shred of evidence to support the claim. Other than a small amount of gas and a few barrels of condensate produced at Sampaquita 1 and 3A in 1976 in the Reed Bank within Philippine territory, there have been no reported hydrocarbons ever produced from the Spratly islands area. If the objective is gas and oil, the Spratlys are hardly worth the risk of war."

Many analysts are agreed that prospects of oil and gas are not the main motive for the Chinese policy with regard to the Spratlys. A more important factor is China's irredentist impulse and its desire to prevent any sea-borne threat to South China from the South China Sea. Its irredentist motives are evident from its description of the islands as historically having belonged to China and its description of the South China Sea as "China's historical waters."

Its readiness to use force to protect its right was reflected in the debate on the passage of the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone" in the National People's Congress in February 1992. During the debate, the Chinese authorities reiterated China's historic claim over the entire Spratly group and underlined China's right to use force to evict any "trespassers".

China has been pursuing a policy of calculated ambiguity. It

has never spelt out in detail what exactly it claims – only some islands or all the islands, the South China Sea itself as its territorial waters, does it look upon the Spratlys as an archipelago belonging to it? If so, what happens to the air and sea navigation rights of other countries? The absence of clear-cut answers to these vital questions has added to the concerns of not only the regional countries, but also others outside the region.

Before 1994, China followed a two-pronged policy in the assertion of its claims. In asserting its claims vis-a-vis Vietnam, it used polemics, often accompanied or followed by ground action to enforce its claims. Vis-a-vis the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, it restricted itself mostly to verbal reiteration of its claims without any ground action to the detriment of these countries.

This was the period (particularly in the 1980s), when the Philippines still had close military relations with the US and the latter enjoying base facilities in the Philippines, China was developing its economy for which it was dependent on investment flows from the overseas Chinese of the region, it was trying to strengthen its relations with the ASEAN countries and allay their fears of China and the prevailing atmosphere in the US was still strongly distrustful of China. The Chinese leadership was still scrupulously adhering to Deng Xiao-Ping's 1989 advice to "fear no one, antagonise no one, avoid excessively provocative statements or actions, assume a low profile and don't take the lead."

The post-1994 period has seen a more confident China, aware of its growing economic and military strength and willing to use that strength in pursuit of its geopolitical objectives. This confidence has been bolstered by the toning down of the anti-China reflexes of the US Administration though not yet of the Congress and by the recent weakening of the economies of the ASEAN countries and its impact on their military capability.

This new-found confidence has been reflected in the Chinese readiness to advance their claims vis-a-vis the Philippines by ground action too, if necessary, unmindful of adverse international reactions. In the last week of January 1995, the Captain of a

Filipino fishing boat reported to the Manila authorities that some Chinese, who had occupied the Mischief Reef claimed by the Philippines, had detained him and his boat when he went there for fishing and released them after a week. Subsequently, the Mayor of the Pag-asa island confirmed the presence of the Chinese and reported that when he went there, as ordered by Manila, for verification, his boat was driven away by some Chinese ships stationed there.

On 2 February 1995, the Filipino Government sent a naval ship and an aircraft for verification. Thereafter, the then President Fidel Ramos announced on 5 February 1995, that the Chinese had illegally occupied the Reef and described their action as inconsistent with international law and principles of good relations. He also announced that Manila was lodging a protest with Beijing.

Reacting to Manila's allegations, Chen Jian, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said: "Structures had been built on the Reef by China to ensure the safety and lives as well as the production operations of the fishermen who work in the waters of the Nansha (Spratly) Islands. The Chinese side never detained nor arrested any Filipino ship nor established any military base on the Meiji (Mischief) Reef."

Nguyen Mahn Cam, the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, was on a visit to Manila when Ramos announced the Chinese occupation of the Reef. Without specifically referring to the Reef, a joint Filipino-Vietnamese statement on 6 February 1995 urged restraint and the Vietnamese Minister told Manila pressmen that the dispute should be settled peacefully and that "no one should do anything to make the situation more complex." Roberto Romulo, the then Filipino Foreign Secretary, said: "Whoever resorts to force or aggression in that area is the first one who loses all moral and legal right to make a claim."

The Chinese action created alarm amongst the ASEAN member-countries because this was the first time that China had unilaterally changed the status quo at the expense of a claimant other than Vietnam and covertly established its presence in waters

and in an area claimed by the Philippines as falling within its Exclusive Economic Zone. The Mischief Reef, which the Philippines calls the Panganiban Reef, is 150 miles west of Palawan, the Philippines' nearest land mass, and 620 miles South-East of China. The Pag-asa island of the Spratly group, which is under the administrative control of the Philippines since 1973, is 135 kms to the North-West of the Reef.

On 15 February 1995, Ramos ordered the strengthening of Filipino military forces in the remaining areas claimed by his country and the intensification of aerial surveillance over the area. After a meeting of his National Security Council the same day, he said that the Philippines would exhaust all diplomatic options and added: "As part of this diplomatic effort, the Philippines has put forward as an interim measure the concept of stewardship. Each disputed island should be placed under the stewardship, meaning the primary responsibility, of the claimant country closest to it geographically, on the understanding that the steward country accommodates the other claimants' need for shelter, anchorage and other peaceful pursuits."

In an apparent attempt to project the issue as a multilateral problem, Ramos said that "the issue is of concern to all countries interested in the long-term stability of the South China Sea and the East Asian region as a whole." According to him, by building military structures on the Reef, China had unilaterally changed the status quo and confronted the Philippines with a fait accompli. He also revealed that in response to Manila's protest, Beijing had claimed that the occupation of the Reef was "ordered by low-level functionaries acting without the knowledge and consent of the Chinese Government."

This gave rise to speculation that the PLA (Navy) might have acted on its own without the knowledge of the political leadership, but this was proved wrong by a statement of Qian Qichen, the then Chinese Foreign Minister, on 10 March 1995, which clearly showed that the political leadership approved of the occupation. He said: "Ours is not a military activity and will pose no threat to other countries. Chinese fishermen have been traditionally fishing

in the region and shelters have been built to protect them. China has had sovereignty over the islands since ancient times and there were no disputes. Just in the late 70s, some countries made claims over the islands. China has shown restraint and is willing to develop the region in a co-operative way, setting aside disputes."

A team of Filipino officials led by Rodolfo Severino, Under Secretary in the Foreign Office, was sent by Ramos to Beijing for talks with the Chinese authorities on 22 March 1995. On his way, Severino went to Singapore for meeting his ASEAN counterparts. They issued a joint statement expressing "their serious concern over recent developments which affect peace and stability in the South China Sea." The Beijing talks failed. Severino said after the talks: "The Chinese continued to maintain their position that these structures are wind shelters for their fishermen. We believe that this has set back the moves towards confidence-building since 1990." Commenting on the failure, Ramos said on 23 March 1995: "They (the Chinese) are saying, we are a big country and if we are trying to send some additional ships, that is for our coastal defence. But, maybe, that should not just be taken as a simple explanation. Maybe, it could be used for South China Sea intervention. But, I hope they stay within what they are telling us."

After the failure of the Beijing talks, the Filipino Navy removed the markers on a number of reefs, atolls and other features in the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone which had been put up by the Chinese, though they had not set up any physical presence on those features. It also started intercepting Chinese fishing boats intruding into the Filipino zone. Reacting to this, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Office warned at Beijing: "This action will do no good to a settlement of the issue nor will it harm China's sovereignty." In an interview to the *Far Eastern Economic Review* of 6 April 1995, Ramos said: "I will not hesitate to take the necessary protective measures for our territory."

At the instance of China, a meeting of Chinese and ASEAN Foreign Office officials was held at Hangzhou in China on 3-4 April 1995 to discuss measures for reducing tension. Rodolfo Severino,

who represented the Philippines, claimed after the meeting that Chinese officials said for the first time that they were planning to modify their claims to ownership, not of the entire sea, but only of the islands, reefs and other physical features in the sea. He then pointed out: "Under international law, a country can claim sovereignty over the waters 200 kms from its land. The territorial claims around one reef, for instance, would still overlap with our territorial boundary and some of them would come very, very close to Palawan."

Qian Qichen, who was in Europe at the time of the Hangzhou meeting, told pressmen at Bratislava on 4 April 1995, that China wanted to end the controversy and called for common use of the islands. He added: "China's standpoint is that we want to abandon the controversy and manage the islands together. China has built on these islands civilian structures with no military character at all. They were built only to accommodate the work of our fishermen."

Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore was in China on a bilateral visit in May 1995. According to the Singapore authorities, he had raised with the then Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng on 11 May 1995, the question of sovereignty and navigation in the South China Sea and they had discussed whether sovereignty covered not only sea lanes, but also the air space.

While the Singapore officials did not indicate what was the Chinese response, the Xinhua news agency quoted Shen, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, as stating as follows on 18 May 1995: "On the issue of the navigation rights in the South China Sea, the Chinese Government holds a definite and clear-cut position, namely, China's action to safeguard its sovereignty over the Nansha (Spratly) Islands and the relevant maritime rights and interests will not affect navigation through and the freedom and safety of flights over the international waterway of the South China Sea in keeping with the international laws."

There was fresh tension on 13 May 1995, when the Filipino Defence Ministry officials arranged a visit to the vicinity of the Mischief Reef on board a naval vessel for a party of 38 local and

foreign journalists. The aim was to show them that contrary to its stand that there were no military structures on the Reef, China was actually constructing military-like fortifications on the Reef similar to those which it had constructed in the past on the Johnson and Subi reefs. When the Filipino naval ship was 10 kms from the Mischief Reef, two Chinese frigates from the direction of the Johnson Reef, about 100 kms to the West, blocked its passage.

On 15 May 1995, Guan Deng-Min, the new Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, handed over to Ramos a letter from President Jiang Zemin proposing that China and the Philippines jointly develop some of the Spratly islands and undertake projects such as research, environment protection, rescue operations, disaster prevention and fisheries. A Manila Foreign Office spokesman said that Ramos told the Ambassador that talks on any such projects should include other claimants too.

Apparently, Jiang's conciliatory letter had been sent from Beijing before the incident of 13 May 1995, because on 16 May 1995, Beijing reacted strongly to Manila's action in taking journalists to the vicinity of the Mischief Reef. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman warned that "any similar action could result in serious consequences. We advise the other side not to misinterpret China's restraint, but, instead, to return to the correct path of negotiations to resolve the dispute."

When the Mischief Reef dispute came to the fore in February 1995, the Clinton Administration reacted cautiously and confined itself to a reiteration of its long-standing policy on the South China Sea. The State Department said: "The US strongly opposes the threat or use of military force to assert any nation's claim. The US takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims and is willing to assist in the peaceful resolution of the dispute."

On instructions from Manila, the Filipino Embassy in Washington contacted many Congressmen and lobbied for a stronger expression of US support. In response to this, in March 1995, Benjamin Gilman, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, tabled a resolution warning China against using force

or intimidation in the Spratly area. The resolution added that the "right of free passage through the South China Sea is in the national security interests of the US" and called on Clinton to review the defence requirements of the "democratic claimants." Gilman said: "In order to avoid a future confrontation that we might lose, we had better shore up the defences of our democratic friends and allies in the region."

In a slightly stronger reaction on 10 May 1995, the State Department said: "The US would view with serious concern any maritime claim or restriction on maritime activity in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law." Later, while talking to pressmen at Tokyo, Joseph Nye, then US Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security, said: "If military action occurred in the Spratlys and this interfered with the freedom of the seas, then we would be prepared to escort and make sure that navigation continues." The Spratly islands are strewn across sea routes through which 25 per cent of the world's shipping passes, including oil supertankers for Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. A Pentagon study explained the US position as follows: "The US takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims. Our strategic interest in maintaining the lines of communication linking South-East Asia, North-East Asia and the Indian Ocean makes it essential that we resist any maritime claims beyond those permitted by the Law of the Sea Convention."

The dispute became the subject of intense discussions by various experts in the US, including a series of panel discussions organised by the congressionally funded US Institute of Peace. The views of the experts could be summed up as follows:

- (a) Energy requirement was not China's principal motive. The need to make foreigners recognise its sovereignty was a more important factor. Even if China did not need the oil and gas of the South China Sea, its position may not change.
- (b) In Chinese perception, control over the South China Sea would constitute effective forward defence against intrusions that had historically come from the Southern seas. They view the South China Sea as a necessary component of an inner

defence zone against military intervention from the South-East. The thrust of China's rapid reaction ground forces is primarily towards Southern China.

(c) The Chinese policy enjoyed the support of the political leadership and was not the result of rogue action by the PLA as believed by some.

(d) China's continued dependence on foreign investment flows would rule out any adventurist action to enforce its claims in the near future.

(e) In Chinese perception, time was on their side and reunification of Taiwan was a more important priority and they could, therefore, afford to wait.

There were two significant developments in July 1995. Before the meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) at Brunei, Ali Alatas, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, visited Beijing on 19 July 1995, to discuss the South China Sea developments. This was the first visit by an Indonesian Foreign Minister to China since the two countries restored diplomatic relations in 1990.

Towards the end of July 1995, a contingent of US navy commandos arrived at Puerto Princesa, the headquarters of the Philippines Western Military Command, to train Filipino troops stationed in the Spratly group islands under its control. A joint study was undertaken of Manila's defence requirements in the light of the new situation in the South China Sea and as to what extent the US could meet them.

A proposal was mooted by a group of Filipino Congressmen, including Jose de Venecia, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, that the Philippines should again invite US naval ships in the region to come to the Subic Bay for repairs and re-fitting. The Ramos Government did not, however, accept it. These indications of a possible revival of active military co-operation between the US and the Philippines seemed to have had a sobering effect on Beijing. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers, who had gathered at Brunei for the ARF meeting from 28 July to 1 August 1995, were pleasantly surprised to find Qian Qichen giving indications of less rigidity. Firstly, he expressed China's readiness to

discuss the issue with all the ASEAN claimants, thereby reversing its previous insistence that it would discuss this only bilaterally with each claimant. Secondly, while reiterating China's claim of "indisputable sovereignty" over the Spratlys, he indicated that China would be willing to recognise international laws, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas, as a basis for settling the differences. At the same time, he opposed the involvement of non-ASEAN outside powers in the negotiations.

Commenting on this, Domingo Siazon, the then Filipino Foreign Secretary, said: "I would not call it a concession. However, I think China is now having a position of opening the door to a possible political compromise. That was not the case when claims were based only on historical rights." Ali Alatas said: "On the basis of the UN Law of the Seas, there is no more guessing how you draw lines for an Exclusive Economic Zone or a continental shelf. There are no more disputes over what are considered the lines of an archipelago state." A US State Department spokesman said: "The tone of China referring to international law and the Law of the Seas gives greater possibility of trying to find a diplomatic solution, even though china hasn't changed its fundamental position on its sovereignty claims."

In a further positive development, Manila and Beijing announced on 10 August 1995, that they had reached a "Code of Conduct" for resolving their dispute peacefully. They stated that while joint review committees would be set up under the Code to review possibilities for joint development and management of the islands, China would be setting up a panel to review "legal rights" to the islands. However, China declined to sign the protocol to the Agreement on the Creation of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South-East Asia which was concluded at the ASEAN summit at Bangkok in the second week of December 1995. Its objection was to the inclusion of the Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf claim areas of the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam in the Treaty area. China thereby made it apparent that its agreement to discuss the Spratly issue with the ASEAN members on the basis of the Law of the Seas and other international laws should not lead to an assumption that it had accepted or would accept the claims of these four ASEAN countries.

The matter rested there during 1996 and 1997, without any significant forward movement in resolving the dispute. In 1996, China was preoccupied with its confrontation with Taiwan and its sequel. This and the various controversies regarding possible flow of Chinese political contributions during the US elections of 1996 revived the distrust of China in the US. However, since the middle of 1997, China has managed to improve its image in the US and Clinton's visit to China last year marked the implicit recognition by the Clinton administration of China's political primacy in this region. The weakening of the economies of the ASEAN countries and its impact on their military capability and political stability, the emergence of signs of differences amongst the ASEAN member-countries on various issues and the preoccupation of the usually China-hostile conservative members of the US Congress with the impeachment of Clinton constitute the setting against which one has to see the renewed activism of China in the South China Sea since October 1998.

In the last week of October 1998, a Filipino military surveillance aircraft reportedly noticed many Chinese ships, including four naval supply ships, off the Mischief Reef, with about 100 workers busy constructing what the Filipino authorities suspected was a landing strip for aircraft. Rejecting Manila's allegations of construction of new military structures on the Reef, Beijing claimed that it was only replacing the temporary shelters for fishermen constructed in 1995 with permanent ones.

President Joseph Estrada announced on 10 November 1998, that he was sending additional forces into the area to monitor the Chinese activities and instructed the Navy and the Air Force "to block exit and entry points" to the disputed area without getting involved in a military confrontation. A spokesman of the Philippines Government announced on 30 November 1998, that their Navy had seized six Chinese fishing boats in Filipino waters and arrested 20 fishermen. Manila rejected a Chinese demand for the release of the fishermen and said they would be prosecuted for trespassing into Filipino territorial waters.

During a tour of the East Asian region in the beginning of

December 1998, Admiral Joseph Prueher, Commander of the US forces in the Pacific, said that the US was closely watching the developments and added: "If nations feel like they have a strong card to play, they will try to do it, when they think they can get away with it. This is perhaps what China is trying to do in the Mischief Reef." Apart from this, in contrast to 1995, there has hardly been any strong reaction either from the US or from other ASEAN countries preoccupied with their economic and social problems. Dr. Mahatir Mohammad of Malaysia has apparently not forgiven Estrada for sympathising with Anwar Ibrahim, his sacked Deputy Prime Minister. China had contributed to Thailand's rescue package in 1997 and hence Bangkok was not in a position to react. Anyhow, even in 1995, Bangkok avoided strong reactions. Singapore seems to be skeptical of the allegations of Manila and declines to see Beijing's fresh activity as encouraged by the pre-occupation of the ASEAN countries with their economic woes.

Thus, the only important foreign personality who has strongly come out against Beijing so far is US Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, a senior member of the House International Relations Committee. After flying over the area in a Filipino aircraft on 10 December 1998, he described the fresh Chinese activities in the Reef as alarming and sinister and strongly condemned the silence of the Clinton Administration on the development.

Latest reports indicate that China has gone back on its 1995 promise to discuss the dispute with all the ASEAN claimants and has reverted to its original stand that it would discuss only bilaterally with each claimant. It seems to be even dragging its feet on its 1995 proposals for joint development of the disputed islands.

Expressing the frustration of the Manila authorities, Blas Ople, Chairman of the Philippines Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in an interview to *Newsweek* of 21 December 1998: "Great powers, very often, probe for soft spots. They determine whether they can make some gains at very little or negligible cost. Throughout history, that is how great powers have conducted themselves. China is no different."

The Role of the United Nations in the Changing World Order

PART I

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International organisations are a prominent feature of the contemporary international political landscape. They are an important means of arranging the functioning of the state-based international system more satisfactorily than had proven to be the case in conditions of international anarchy. On the one hand, they can be regarded as a step towards the establishment of a world government which would transcend the state system. On the other hand, international organisations are set up and managed by nation-states and the sovereign state remains the basic entity of international relations. Thus international organisation can be viewed as merely an agreement by, of and for states to engage in regular consultation and establish joint machinery for the formulation and implementation of collective decisions.

Few issues in today's world lie totally outside the scope of one international organisation or another. There has been a spurt in the number and types of international organisations in the second half of the Twentieth Century. The number of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) climbed from 37 in 1909 to 123 in 1951, and 6,115 in 1997; the number of non-government organisations (NGOs) increased from 176 to 832 and 40,306 in the corresponding period. They have added greatly to the institutional complexity of international relations.

The problem of peace and order is not new. Napoleon Bonaparte imposed temporary order and unity on Europe through conquest. The other European powers set up an alternative Concert System in reaction to Napoleon's ambitions. They did this by

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transforming the original impulse, of a military alliance for the single purpose of defeating Napoleon, into the longer-term political goal of preventing a similar domination of Europe by any one power in the future. The Concert of Europe was the most comprehensive attempt until then to construct new machinery for keeping the peace among and by the great powers.

The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 signalled the broadening of international relations in participation and agenda. They pointed to an emergent extra-European international system, in the management of which the lesser powers would demand a say; and, with their emphasis upon mediation, conciliation and inquiry, they demonstrated a rationalistic and legalistic approach to the problem of international disputes.

The two major international organisations of the Twentieth Century have been the League of Nations after the First and the United Nations after the Second World War. The chronological linkage to the two world wars is not just coincidence. In both instances, people horrified by the destructiveness of modern wars decided to create institutions for avoiding a repetition of such catastrophes.

The League was the first permanent, general-purpose international organisation to embrace the full international community. Yet even the League was built around Europe as the core of the international political system. It accepted the sovereign state as the central unit of international affairs, with the great powers as the dominant participants. It did not challenge any of the fundamental principles of the traditional multistate system.

The League began as the embodiment of humanity's aspirations for a better world. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 presented the League with its moment of greatest triumph: for the first time, the international community, acting through institutionalised channels, had condemned aggression, identified the aggressor and imposed sanctions. But Ethiopia also stands as the symbol of failure to realise the high hopes held of the League at its creation, for the aggressor nation secured its ends through the means of its choice, namely conquest, in 1936.

The United Nations

The League was killed by the Second World War; its legacy of international organisation lives on in the United Nations. The most important part of the legacy was the concept, by now firmly entrenched, yet revolutionary in 1919, that the community of nations has both the moral right and the legal competence to discuss and judge the international conduct of its members. In particular, both the League and the UN embodied the idea that aggressive war is a crime against humanity, with every state having the interest, right and duty to collaborate in preventing it.

The UN was modelled closely on the League. While many of the UN Charter provisions were borrowed directly from the League Covenant, others represented substantial codifications of League procedures or logical developments of nascent League ideas. Seemingly the most significant advance from the League to the UN lay in the area of enforcement machinery. The UN incorporated the League proscription on the use of force for national objectives, but inserted the additional prescription to use force in support of international, that is UN authority. As proof of the added potency of the new organisation, the UN Security Council was given the power to decide whether international peace was threatened, whether sanctions were to be imposed, and, if so, then the nature of the sanctions, including military force. Most importantly, such decisions by the Security Council would be binding upon all the members of the United Nations. Force, it was said, would henceforth be put to the service of law, for the Security Council was being established as the equivalent of a supreme war-making organisation of the international community.

The 1990s began with hopes that Cold War acrimony between the superpowers was giving way to a new world order harmony. As the cohesiveness of the familiar power blocs declined, so the role of the United Nations gained greater coherence and its actions gathered fresh momentum. The phrase 'New World Order' was used by Mikhail Gorbachev in an address to the United Nations on 7 December 1988,¹ and given much wider international currency by George Bush in the Gulf War. The war produced the rhetoric

of a new world order; the UN played a pivotal role in the Gulf War; but it did not occupy centre stage for long.

The United Nations reflects rather than creates the existing world order. The UN Charter specifies two major means to the chief goal of maintaining international peace and security, namely pacific settlement of disputes (chapter 6) and collective enforcement (chapter 7). UN resolutions are today the most commonly cited and immediately acceptable code of conduct and metric of state compliance with internationally prescribed behaviour.

THE UN RECORD

The end of the Cold War does not mean that the idea and possibility of war have been eliminated from international relations. The frequency of war may decline as its cost goes up, and the dangers posed to humanity as a whole may diminish as the overlay of superpower rivalry is removed from regional conflicts. Human societies will still be divided by disputes over beliefs and interests and as long as there are organised polities prepared to support rival groups, war cannot be ruled out. Indeed as the shroud of the Cold War lifted from the world, the multitude of national and ethnic fault-lines stood out with greater clarity.

Collective Security

The United Nations was established in the belief that international security cannot be maintained other than by an international organisation which is prepared to use force if necessary to enforce community edicts. When faced with a threat to world peace, the UN can adopt any of six possible courses of action. First, it can choose to do nothing. Cynics might say that indeed the organisation is very skilled and experienced in this particular course of action, that the United Nations exists so that nations who are unable to do anything individually can get together to decide that nothing can be done collectively. Yet, previous UN inactivity owed more to rivalry and tensions between the major powers which incapacitated UN ability to deal decisively with crises.

Second, the United Nations can adopt resolutions under Chapter 6 for resolving an international dispute peacefully. While the UN cannot compel member states to implement Chapter 6 resolutions, the normative principle of the primacy of peaceful over forceful means has become firmly entrenched. If force is used, the UN can move to graduated shades of escalation under Chapter 7. Its third course of action is the imposition of economic sanctions under Article 41: measures 'not involving the use of armed force'. Giving teeth to the implementation of sanctions under Article 42 represents the fourth course of action.

The fifth course is full-fledged military action if the United Nations decides that sanctions are proving ineffectual and stronger measures are necessary. On 29 November 1990, the Security Council adopted Resolution 678 which authorised the assembled multinational troops to use force if necessary to evict Iraq from Kuwait if Iraq had not withdrawn by 15 January 1991. The most important long-term significance of UN actions in the Gulf lay in the crossing of the conceptual Rubicon by authorising enforcement of sanctions, and then military eviction of the aggressor, by troops not even nominally under UN command (as they had been in Korea in the 1950s). As in Korea, the advantage of the procedure was that it allowed the United Nations to approximate the achievement of collective security within a clear chain of command necessary for large-scale military operations. The cost to the United Nations was that the Gulf War, like the Korean War, became identified with American policy over which the organisation exercised little real control.

Peacekeeping

The sixth course of UN action is to establish a peacekeeping force. The range of activities which are only loosely covered by the aggregative term 'peacekeeping' demonstrate the notable flexibility and responsiveness that has come to characterise UN operations. The cardinal distinction between collective security and peacekeeping lies in their reliance upon force and consent, respectively. UN peacekeeping has in many ways been a reversal of the use of great powers-led military troops as envisaged in the

Charter. Peacekeeping has no clear basis in the Charter, falling conceptually somewhere between pacific settlement and collective enforcement. Peacekeeping troops generally come from middle and smaller powers, they are lightly armed, they are placed between belligerents rather than against an opposing enemy, and they are told to negotiate rather than fight.

Arms Control and Disarmament

An enduring system of general security for everyone is unlikely to be achieved without major progress on arms control and disarmament and the development of confidence-building measures. Some of the world's lesser powers have discharged their responsibilities by such means as nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America, the South Pacific, Africa and Southeast Asia. The superpowers have followed suit by concluding historic agreements on eliminating and reducing intermediate and strategic nuclear forces.

In many of these developments, states have been helped by the collective expertise of the United Nations and its legitimising approbation. It sponsors empirical and analytical research on the causes of arms buildups, the severity of the problem, its opportunity costs for alleviating many of the world's other problems and possible ways out of the arms trap. Informational activities are complemented by promotional measures which set out appropriate standards of international behaviour. The UN can also be used for the purposes of enhancing transparency and verification. The discovery of the extent of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme in violation of its NPT and safeguards obligations highlighted the need for even more rigorous and intrusive safeguards regimes for controlling biological, chemical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. The UN does not get enough recognition of the fact that its inspectors destroyed more Iraqi weapons between 1991 and 1998 than did the multinational forces in the Gulf War.

All the strengths and assets of the organisation — authority, legitimacy, norm-generation, technical expertise and administrative impartiality — can be harnessed in the cause of arms control and

disarmament. After the series of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, for example, the United Nations was the forum of first choice for all sides seeking to lift the nuclear threat from the world through calls for non-proliferation and disarmament. For the United Nations to function effectively as a law-enforcing collective security organisation, states must accept two propositions regarding their own abilities to dispose of power. First, states must renounce the unilateral use of force for national purposes. Second, they must nevertheless be prepared to use force on behalf of, as directed by and for the goals of the United Nations. States have been notably reluctant to satisfy the two conditions.

Peacemaking

The UN record in the field of pacific settlement is similarly qualified. On balance, the organisation has helped states to behave less conflictually, to form habits of cooperation, to develop shared norms and perceptions.² That is, while the United Nations cannot honestly be said to have kept the world at peace, the Security Council has nevertheless played a peace-influencing role, and the General Assembly too has undertaken a peace-shaping role.

Yet at times the major political organs of the United Nations give the impression of being more interested in finger-pointing than problem-solving. The excessive politicisation of issues produces a plethora of resolutions full of exaggerated rhetoric: a UN resolution becomes the alibi for inaction.

A promising development has been the use of UN auspices for implementing multilateral agreements and supervising free and fair elections. The comprehensive operations in Namibia and Cambodia, as well as UN missions in Central America, Western Sahara and Somalia, reflected a trend towards a more clearly political orientation of UN involvement in efforts at tension-reduction and conflict-resolution. UN activities moved beyond the conflict-localising characteristic of peacekeeping operations and towards a peacemaking role. This is especially so because, contrary to first impressions, the conduct of elections is not a one-off act but a multifaceted and ongoing process. Electoral legislation has to be drafted to the satisfaction of all contending parties; candidates and

groups must be able to compete in conditions of rough equality; voters must be protected from pressure tactics and intimidation; individuals and factions must be socialised into a code of conduct appropriate to the election process; and the logistics of holding elections can be a major undertaking under conditions of inadequate communications and transportation.

UN assets and qualifications for peacemaking remain what they have always been: its authority and impartiality as a third party representing the entire international community.

Human Rights

Fifty years ago, conscious of the atrocities committed by the Nazis while the world looked silently away, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On par with other great historical documents like the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the American Declaration of Independence, this was the first *international* affirmation of the rights held in common by all. The Universal Declaration is both the embodiment and proclamation of the human rights norm. The 1966 Covenants added force and specificity, affirming both civil-political and social-economic-cultural rights without privileging either. Together they mapped out the international human rights agenda, established the benchmark for state conduct, inspired provisions in many national laws and international conventions, and provided a beacon of hope to many whose rights had been snuffed out by brutal regimes.

The UN has been impartial and successful in a standard-setting role; selectively successful in monitoring abuses; and almost feeble in enforcement.³ Governments usually subordinate considerations of UN effectiveness to the principle of non-interference.

The modesty of UN achievement should not blind us to its reality. The Universal Declaration embodies the moral code, political consensus and legal synthesis of human rights. The world has grown vastly more complex in the fifty years since. The simplicity of language belies the passion of conviction underpinning them: its elegance has been the font of inspiration down the decades, its provisions comprise the vocabulary of complaint. Activists and

NGOs use the Declaration as the concrete point of reference against which to judge state conduct. The Covenants require the submission of periodic reports by signatory countries, and so entail the creation of long-term national infrastructures for the protection and promotion of human rights.

UN efforts are greatly helped by NGOs and other elements of civil society. NGOs work to protect victims and contribute to the development and promotion of social commitment and enactment of laws reflecting the more enlightened human rights culture. Between them, the UN and NGOs have achieved many successes. National laws and international instruments have been improved, many political prisoners have been freed and some abuse victims have been compensated. The UN has helped also by creating the post of a High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Should the UN intervene to enforce human rights? In practice, the legitimacy of intervention turns upon the answer to questions about the four main elements involved in any act of intervention: actor, act, target and purpose.⁴ The most immediately acceptable justification for intervention is the collectivist principle: not why intervention was undertaken, but *who* authorised the decision to intervene. Since 1945, the most widely accepted legitimator of international action has been the United Nations.

(To be concluded)

Notes

1. Mikhail Gorbachev, 'Address to the UN General Assembly', *Soviet News* 6455 (14 December 1988), p. 459.
2. See K. J. Holsti, 'Paths to Peace? Theories of Conflict Resolution and Realities of International Politics', in Ramesh Thakur, ed., *International Conflict Resolution* (Boulder and Dunedin: Westview and University of Otago Press, 1988), pp. 105-32 and H. K. Jacobsen, *Networks of Interdependence* (New York: Knopf, 1979).
3. Jack Donnelly, 'Human Rights at the United Nations 1955-85: The question of Bias', *International Studies Quarterly* 32:3 (1988), pp. 275-303.
4. Ramesh Thakur, 'Non-Intervention in International Relations: A Case Study', *Political Science* 42 (July 1990), p. 29.

Origin of the Custom of Colonels of Regiments

MAJOR GENERAL D K PALIT, VrC (RETD)

I was recently asked by the Colonel of our Regiment if I knew the origins of the custom of regiments having a "Colonel of the Regiment". I was not able off-hand to give him a satisfactory and authoritative reply, so I set about inquiring into the matter. As the custom obviously started in the British Army, I consulted an old regimental friend in England, who is knowledgeable about British military-historical matters and regimental lore.

It turns out that the custom is in fact as old as the British Army itself (that is, the Standing Army of Britain, as distinct from the temporary and *ad hoc* "levies" raised by feudal overlords in the old days to support the King's dynastic wars – a practice that prevailed up to the end of the Sixteenth Century). It was the Thirty Years War in Europe, which started in 1618 when the Protestant nobles of Bohemia combined to revolt against the Catholic Holy Roman Emperor, that changed the old order. For the first time a war was a *religious* rather than a *dynastic* war – that is, with no feudal undertones – and the generals on both sides began the custom of raising professional units instead of the old feudal levies. These professional regiments were commanded by Colonels, with captains under them in charge of wings and companies.

When the Civil War started in England in the 1630s, both King Charles I and his Parliamentary antagonist, Oliver Cromwell, copied the new European system – particularly the latter, who thereby raised the "New Model Army" that finally defeated the King's forces – leading eventually to the beheading of Charles I and the establishment of a parliamentary republic in England called "The

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Commonwealth", which lasted for fifteen years (till Cromwell's death).

In 1660, the young prince, now King Charles II, returned from exile and was restored to the throne by the Commonwealth Army. That Army was subsequently disbanded (except for one regiment – "Monk's Regiment", today known as The Coldstream Guards). Later, when Charles II needed to raise an army for the Dutch wars and for the garrisoning of Tangier, he continued with the new system of raising professional regiments – and thus began the Standing Army of Britain (as we know it today). He issued commissions to suitable persons of standing and wealth as Colonels – authorising each of them to raise and maintain at their expense a regiment of troops. These Colonels were required to provide their regiments with 'furnishing and sustenance' at their own cost. Most of these new regiments were known by the names of their Colonels – for instance, "Howard's Regiment". When there were two regiments of the same name, distinction was made by recourse to the colour of their facings – as, for instance, "The Green Howards" and "The Buff Howards" (the latter later came to be known as the "Buffs").

As David Ascol commented in his *Companion to the British Army – 1660 to 1983*.

Given the spirit of the times, this was a hazardous decision and a licence for malpractice, for in effect the Colonels literally owned their regiments and, with a few exceptions, made a handsome profit out of their investment.

It was not long before the Colonels further organised their "businesses". First, they appointed a Lieutenant-Colonel to actually carry out the day-to-day business of command (on their behalf); and he also provided them with a clerk to manage the administration. The latter later became known as the "Regimental Agent", a system that in fact continued, till the start of the First World War (1914). One of the best known among these agents was Cox and Kings, and later – Lloyds Bank.

A Royal Warrant of 1751 required these regiments to be

numbered by seniority. Then in 1785, as a consequence of obstructionist moves by some of the Colonels, the Commander-in-Chief introduced a purely arbitrary scheme whereby county areas were allotted to regiments for their recruitment. This system continued for nearly a hundred years when it was replaced by an equally arbitrary scheme in the Cardwell reforms of 1871-72, which chipped away much of the Colonel's powers – including the licence for the purchase and sale of commissions. By the time of Queen Victoria's reign, the Colonel had become little more than an honorary officer known as the "Colonel of the Regiment", one of whose main functions was the vetting of young gentlemen desirous of joining "his" regiment as officers. Under that tradition, a Colonel-of-Regiment was not required to have served in that Regiment. In fact he could be from another Service altogether. For instance, Admiral Mountbatten was appointed Colonel of Regiment of the Life Guards.

The custom was that when acting in the capacity of Colonel-of-Regiment, he wore regimental uniform and head-dress, with Colonel's badges of rank – but no red tabs. This practice, alas, is not always followed today, certainly not in the Indian Army. I well remember once, many years ago, sharing an overnight cabin on the ferry from Harwich (UK) to the Hook of Holland with a Brigadier of the General Staff. Next morning, when dressing for breakfast, I noticed that he was wearing the dress of the 14/20 Hussars, with Colonel's badges of rank but not wearing red tabs. It turned out that he was going to Germany to visit the Regiment, of which he was Colonel. Later, when I became Colonel of the 9th Gorkhas, I meticulously followed this custom, even at Mess functions, when more often than not several younger guests would have appeared to outrank me!

In the armies of the East India Company and, later, in the (British) Indian Army, the position was entirely different, because the Government (H.E.I.C. or the Crown) provided all the maintenance and there was no organic or financial requirement for a Colonel of Regiment. Nevertheless, the custom was instituted in 1903 by an Order of the Commander-in-Chief "sanctioning the appointment of distinguished officers of the Indian Army as Honorary Colonels of Native Regiments". The selection was done by the

Regiment itself – the only democratic function in the Army (because all regimental officers have a say in the matter – more or less by "vote"). In the Indian Army the system of having Colonels-of-Regiment would appear to have been *permissive*, rather than *obligatory* as in the British Army. For example, my Regiment, 9 GR, did not elect a Colonel-of-Regiment after the death of our first Colonel, General Sir Beauchamp Duff, who died in 1917. 9 GR did not have a Colonel till the appointment of Major General Sir WLO Twiss in 1930. In the post-Independence Indian Army, Colonels of Regiment are a recognised appointment requiring government sanction.

Yardsticks for selecting Colonels vary from unit to unit and from time to time. Some prefer to appoint only officers of high rank even if they do not belong to the Regiment – or even to the same Army – on the dubious ground that it is better to have a "Friend at Court" than a regimental "work horse". For example, the CO of 28th Punjab (of the pre-war British Indian Army) later renumbered 4th/15th Punjab, when the appointment of Colonel of his Regiment fell vacant, asked his GOC-in-C (Western Command, Quetta) General Sir Torquil Matheson of the British Army to be the Colonel of Regiment.* Incidentally, this sycophantic gesture backfired a few years later when the 4th/15th was threatened with amalgamation with the 37th (1st/17th) Dogras (as a proposed measure of economy). General Matheson – by then living in the UK – was too far out of reach of Simla to intervene. (In the event, the disbandment was averted not by the Colonel of the 4th/15th but by the Prince of Wales, Colonel in Chief of the 1st/17th Dogras).* The selection of its GOC-in-C by the 28th Punjab was all the more surprising because the same unit had earlier insisted (against Army HQ advice) on appointing a *Lieutenant-Colonel* as its Colonel because the latter lived in Camberley, from where he conveniently could (and did very successfully) select a long line of wealthy and well-thought of cadets from Sandhurst for the Regiment – one of the Colonel's main functions in the British era.

* Major General DK Palit, *Major General A A Rudra : His Service in Three Armies and Two World Wars* (New Delhi, Reliance Publishing House, 1997).

In the Indian Army of today, Colonels of Regiments have much more to do – a number of time-honoured functions, provided of course that they are willing to do them (which they don't have to). Firstly, they can be useful in advising the Regimental Centres and the Battalions regarding administering their funds (which, in today's circumstances, can sometimes be quite substantial). Commanding Officers often seek their assistance in such matters as postings of their units to field or peace areas, transfer of officers (particularly on compassionate grounds), postings of suitable cadets from the IMA and the OTS. Although it is not laid down anywhere, a Colonel of Regiment can write directly to or call on a PSO, at Army HQ (or even the Army Chief) on regimental matters. I remember once, as a Brigadier (and Colonel of 9 GR), I took leave from NEFA and came to Delhi to confront the Military Secretary on a blatant case of misposting of newly promoted COs to the wrong battalions; and I won my point and succeeded in having them correctly re-posted.

Similarly, officers of the Regiment, senior or junior, have the traditional right to see or write directly to their Colonel on personal matters, provided that they inform their COs; and they must address the Colonel as "My Dear Colonel", however exalted the latter's actual rank.

Interestingly in the immediate pre-Second World War period, each battalion of the various infantry groups (regiments) had its own Colonel – a sort of Colonel-of-Battalion one might have called them. This anomaly arose from the fact that before the grouping of units into "regiments" in 1922, each "battalion" was in fact a regiment on its own – and could have its own Colonel-of-Regiment. Those who did were allowed (post-1922) to retain their Colonels up to Independence.

I do not know when the custom started of arms and services other than infantry and cavalry having Colonels Commandant – but they of course do have them now, though the relationships between them and the corps or units can not be anywhere near as intimate and personal. This is not only because of the vastness of numbers involved, but also because with rare exceptions a Colonel Commandant would not normally have served in any one particular

unit throughout his early career as we do in the infantry. Furthermore, it has now become the practice for some corps and services to have more than one Colonel Commandant.

The appointment of British and foreign royalty as Colonels-in-Chief of the British infantry and cavalry units seem to date from the reign of Queen Victoria – but the origin of this custom, as also of certain regiments being called "Royal" or "Somebody's Own" (both British and Indian Army units) appears to be shrouded in mystery and would require much more research. My first (pre-World War II) unit, for instance – in full title – was Fifth Battalion (130th) King George V's Own Baluch Regiment (Jacob's Rifles) – very grand in title – and indeed by fame; but it was *not* a Royal battalion (like, for instance 5th Royal Battalion 5th Maratha Light Infantry). Nor was King George V, even while he was alive, our Colonel-in-Chief. In fact, as far as I recall, the only Indian Army regiments that ever had a Colonel-in-Chief were the 16th Light Cavalry (King George V) and 37th Dogras (Edward, Prince of Wales, later King Edward VIII).

ARTICLES FOR THE USI JOURNAL

1. Members are welcome to forward articles pertaining to national security and defence matters for publication in the USI Journal. Articles should preferably be around 2,500 words. These should be forwarded in duplicate in double space on A-4 size paper, along with a floppy disk (1.44 MB diskette), IBM Compatible, on MS Word for Windows 97. The articles should be sent to the Editor, United Service Institution of India, Rao Tula Ram Marg, Post Bag No. 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057. Alternately, articles may be sent through e-mail on dirusi@nde.vsnl.net.in. The Editor reserves the right to make alterations.
2. The full name and address of the author along with a brief Curriculum Vitae should be given. Serving officers should enclose no-objection certificate signed by their immediate superior for publication of their articles.
3. The author will receive a copy of the issue of the Journal in which his article appears along with three offprints. A suitable honorarium will also be paid after the article is published.

Leadership*

LT GEN K CHANDRASEKHARAN, AVSM**

The Army Training Command has produced a remarkable book for officers, titled "Leadership". It is a synthesis of wisdom from the great heritage of the Indian civilisation and modern findings about this unique human capability. Indeed, it convincingly elaborates the famous conclusion of Field Marshal Slim : "Whether you lead five men or five million men the essentials of leadership are the same."

The theme of the book is the expansion of 'Mahavakya' (the eternal truth) on leadership; TO BE : TO DO : TO SEE : TO TELL. "TO BE" is in fact the beginning and the end of leadership. Consequently, not only does the book place great emphasis on character but explains how it is within the reach of everyone to reshape and strengthen our character. The theme of the book is that an officer of our Army has to be a man of character. To be a person of character and to act without any selfish motive is the starting point of good and effective leadership. The foundation of leadership depends on our character and character is by far the biggest component of leadership.

The book is laid out in two parts. Part I, of eight chapters, deals with what leadership is, its foundation, functions and potential for it and how to reinforce and strengthen it. Part II focusses on leadership in higher command, in Chapter 9 and 10.

The main impact of a leader is to get the best out of people he leads and achieve a mission, whatever be the conditions. This capability depends on what the book calls the 'Universal Inner Structure of Good Leaders' and is composed of character and knowledge. The book frequently extols the famous virtues like the "Mahavakya" and Field Marshal Chetwode's famous words, which have become the Indian Army's Credo – country and the men being placed before self. Examples from Indian Army's history abound throughout, including Indo-Pak Wars of 1947-48, 1965 and 1971. Also, very illustrative diagrams are used to explain key issues.

**Leadership*. By HQ Artrac (HRD Sec) (Simla : ARTRAC Press (P & D Sec), 1999), pp. 248, Rs 150.00.

** Lt Gen K Chandrasekharan is the Managing Director AGI, New Delhi.

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Two time-tested techniques have been explained to reshape ourselves for higher potential. One is to study (not merely read) great lives and analyse how they became what they were. Mention is made of three men from different backgrounds in three continents who showed no leadership potential in their youth. Yet, by self effort they left an indelible mark on mankind : Gandhi from the business community in India, Churchill a scion of English aristocracy and Benjamin Franklin of America. The second is the technique of maintaining a diary for self development.

Part II of the book, dealing with higher command, is a long overdue input for Brigadiers and Generals. It is specially tailored for a democracy in a developing country as India is. As such, it is timely.

This book is as relevant for a cadet or Lieutenant as it is for a General. Its uncomplicated directness and crisp examples will capture the imagination of the most seasoned of executives in any walk of life as well as young sceptics. The book delivers a passion for leadership through the lens of conceptual clarity. It is an excellent text for leaders and those who want to be.

This is a book not only for the officer in the uniformed fraternity but for all, to develop inherent leadership qualities.

NOTE

Reference: *USI Journal* Jul-Sep 1999

Review Article of the book, *Burma 1942: The Japanese Invasion -Both Sides Tell the Story of a Savage Jungle War.*

By Ian Lyall Grant and Kazuo Tamayama.

The Book is for a special price of £20.00, postage free by surface mail (plus £ 5.00 for air mail) for those who fought in the Far East, and their close relatives or served in the Army, Navy or Air Force. If payment is not in Sterling, the £5.00 is to be added for bank charges.

Fidelity and Honour - The Indian Army

LIEUTENANT GENERAL A M VOHRA, PVSM (RETD)

This book was first published in 1993 and was reviewed in the Jan-Mar 1993 issue of this Journal. Since more than six years have elapsed, it would be justified to review the book as a whole rather than only the postscript covering important national security developments in the intervening period.

This is an extensively researched and well written book. The author has commendably achieved what he set out to do - to write the story of the Indian Army from the 17th to the 21st Century. The Epilogue covers many poignant issues, not the least among these being the image of the Indian Army among our political elite since some years before independence. The author quotes Jawaharlal Nehru in his Autobiography (1936) that the Indian infantry are of "as much use today as the Roman phalanx." Fortunately, with the assumption of responsibility, he changed his earlier academic impression as can be seen from Louis Mountbatten's statement "I asked Nehru if he agreed that the Army was the final guarantor of law and order, and that the morale and discipline of the Army was of the greatest importance. He agreed." In this context the sober and considered views of Wavell, quoted by the author, deserve to be mentioned. Before his departure in March 1947, he said, "I believe that the stability of the Indian Army may perhaps be a deciding factor in the future of India. It has shown how all communities may work together to meet a common danger with comradeship and devotion."

Lt Gen Menezes has surveyed the 'Early Beginnings' and 'The Presidency Armies'. He deals comprehensively with the 1857 mutiny, which he feels "should be more appropriately referred to as the Indian Uprising of 1857" as a segment of the civil population was also involved. He dwells on the change in the role of the Army in Kitchner's time - to guard the frontiers against external aggression. The part played in the two world wars is dealt with to bring out the distinguished role of the Indian divisions.

Fidelity and Honour - The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty First Century. By Lt Gen S L Menezes, (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 655, Rs. 350.00, ISBN 019 565047 6

Lt Gen A M Vohra is a former Vice Chief of the Army Staff and a well known defence analyst. Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No 538, October-December, 1999.

The present "Oxford Indian Paperback", with a postscript covering important national security developments during the period 1993 to 1999, adds to the value of this masterly survey of "The Indian Army" from the Seventeenth to the Twenty First Century.

In narrating the developments of the Indian nuclear deterrent, Menezes traces India's effort since 1954 to free the world from the menace of nuclear weapons when its call to ban testing was ignored. Subsequent developments made Pokhran I necessary. He points out that global political power today rests on the salience of nuclear weapons. Therefore India had to break out of non-proliferation regime before September 1999 by when it was expected to sign the CTBT. He states that although the Indian polity has greater congruence with the USA than either China or Pakistan, the US can trust China with nuclear weapons but not India. As a matter of fact, the USA could not but accept China as a nuclear weapon power and has given up the call for a roll back by India, and has adopted the objective of strategic restraint.

The second development analysed is the establishment of the NSC and its support elements; the JIC (to be augmented for its additional role), the Strategic Policy Group and the Strategic Advisory Board. It is to be hoped that in course of time, various elements will refine their working relationship to serve the NSC suitably.

The third aspect covered is the integration of Defence Headquarters with the MOD (Ministry of Defence). Menezes recounts how in 1952 the then Defence Secretary made the three Chiefs report directly to the bureaucracy instead of to a political authority; civilian control came to mean 'Civil Service Control'. The matter of integration is yet to be resolved hopefully based on the principles that the three Chiefs will have free hand in managing the Services with their integrated finance. Secondly, matters requiring political approval will be taken up directly by them with the Minister; the role of Defence Secretary restricted to budgeting, provisioning, parliamentary questions and such other matters that the Department of Defence dealt with in the days of the Raj.

The author also covers the Kashmir problem and hopefully suggests that the logic of nuclear deterrence should facilitate an alliance or a confederation. This rational but hopeless conclusion may not have seen the printer's ink if the book had gone to the publishers after the Kargil saga of the Indian Army.

Government and People in Russia*

BRIGADIER SUBHASH KAPILA**

Russia has loomed large in international affairs for the better part of this century. The disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union and the economic woes of the New Russia, should not lull anyone to conclude that Russia stands written off from global affairs. It still retains sizeable strategic and tactical military might and the potential to challenge the current unipolarity prevailing in world affairs. The study of Russian history becomes relevant here in order to probe if some lessons can be drawn to provide insights on Russia's future. In this context John Gooding provides useful inputs on Russia's historical developments. The author has wisely chosen the period 1801 to 1991 as the focus of study of Russian history as the developments in this period have changed not only Russian history but the history of global affairs in recent times.

There are four historical milestones in Russian history that are worth noting : firstly, Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812, who after occupying Moscow was forced to retreat ignominiously. In its wake, in 1814, Russian forces under Tsar Alexander marched westwards to liberate Europe and wound up occupying Paris. The author brings out that it was the generation of 1812 which left Russia to liberate Europe and thereafter returned to Russia to liberate their country from the centuries-old stupor. The second milestone was the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917. This Revolution not only stirred Russia into drastic social and economic changes, but also put Russia on the road to power and provided inspiration to many others to follow suit. The third milestone, the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, proved the age-old adage that history repeats itself. Like Napoleon, the German armies surged towards Moscow inflicting death and destruction and like Napoleon's armies had to beat an ignominious retreat by 1943. It is significant that Russia bore the maximum brunt, far more than any Allied power, with 25 million people killed, another 25 million rendered homeless, destruction of 32,000 industrial enterprises, 65,000 km of railway line, 1,700 towns and 70,000 villages. Despite this stupendous loss, Russian armies

Rulers and Subjects : Government and People in Russia, 1801-1991. By John Gooding (London : Arnolds, 1996), pp. 387, Price not indicated, ISBN 390-61405 (pb).

****Brig Kapila specialises in analysis of Asia-Pacific policies and strategic issues.**

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were once again to surge into Europe and liberate the German capital in August 1945. The fourth milestone was the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, after being a super power for nearly 50 years. The reasons were not external but internal. The Cold War had sapped the country's economic strength. The author vividly covers all these epoch-making events in eleven chapters in an imaginative manner and in a style which makes easy and fascinating reading. It is a difficult task to shed weighty reading from historical accounts. This book does succeed in doing so.

John Gooding makes some useful observations in the concluding chapter. According to him the fall of the Soviet Union ushered in one of Russia's dark ages. Also, within a century Russia has overthrown not one but two value systems, Christianity and communism, and at the end of the century finds itself in a moral no man's land. He significantly highlights that democrats in Russia had become extremely unpopular as their hopes to make the transition to democratic politics stood dashed. Western nations would probably like to note this contention of the author. The Russian democrats are held responsible for the humiliating loss of status and territory which had pushed Russia to boundaries that resembled those of Seventeenth Century Muscovy. The author further prognosticates that Russia can only be free if sufficient number of Russians value freedom and accept the necessary limits upon it – as of now it presents a picture of a society that is badly fractured and at war with itself. He concludes with the pious hope that the Russians in the Twenty First Century would have freer and more fulfilled lives than their predecessors. Like a good historian his conclusions on Russia's future are more pious than bold. As a military reviewer, I would be failing in my duty if I did not make an attempt to draw some bold lessons for Russia's future from the fascinating historical coverage in this book. Very briefly, in my view, the lessons that need to be noted by policy planners are :

- (a) Twice in this time span of 1801-1991, Russia after suffering great devastation had the resilience to rise and march into the heart of Europe to influence events there in a significant manner, both politically and strategically.
- (b) This time round Russia is not so devastated and has a strong potential to rise again and influence European and global events significantly.
- (c) Gorbachev and Yeltsin for personal political survival had to depend on US's and West Europe's grudging economic support and, therefore, acquiesce to their pressures. Matters can not get any worse

for the Russian masses. This would throw up more nationalistic leaders not susceptible to US/West European pressures. The strategic might of the Russian military machine lies intact and available for more assertive and forceful diplomacy towards such leaders.

(d) Western nations cannot expect a democratised Russia on the Western model. If they have accepted the limited democratisation in China, they would have to accept similar standards in Russia. In any case, as the author brings out, democrats stand totally discredited in Russia.

We may, therefore, accept a resurgent and assertive Russia, early in the next century, despite dismal Western predictions. China, despite all optimistic Western predictions, cannot replace Russia as a super power. It is Russia which is Eurasia, not China.

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Short Reviews of Recent Books

Security Without War : A Post-Cold War Foreign Policy. By Michael H Schuman and Hal Harvey (Boulder, Co : Westview Press, 1993), pp. 318, \$ 18.95 (Pbk), ISBN 0-8133-1884-X.

Both, Schuman and Harvey, have co-authored this enormously path-breaking and deeply researched book that redefines national security radically. The writers urge the United States to move on from its outdated foreign policy paradigm, based on war and militarisation, bilateralism and primacy of states, to a policy firmly established on new settings of security-thought in the post-Cold-War setting. Five principles that the authors have formulated, are : ● A perception of shared and multi-dimensional threats; ● Emphasis on conflict preclusion and resolution; ● Making security policies non-proactive; ● Favouring multilateral approaches; ● Promotion of representative policies.

The first three are discussed in detail. The security planners need to take into reckoning the disposition of threats, and conflict resolution should be given priority over employment of military force. Nations should avoid proactive expediciencies that lead to arms races. Stronger international codes and institutions have been mooted to this end. Probity of the three new types of military strategy--non-proactive defence, collective-security and nuclear disarmament are discussed in subsequent chapters. It has been cogently argued that a policy emanating under these parameters can enhance US interests and perhaps even global security, at considerably lower costs. This remarkable study also explains how military, political, economic and environmental security interests are intertwined, and how the *inter se* playing up or down of any of these can threaten a nation's safety. Accomplishing security without war requires supplanting militarism with participatory democracy; resource-exhaustion with cost-effective use; unilateral coercion with a multilateral concert; and sabre rattling with robust defence.

This new approach for global management of conflicts will stimulate military strategists, career-diplomats, economists and ecologists, the world over. About time they came up with an alternative to war. Saner options are available to the primordial club or its modern-day substitutes; they should go for these.

Lieutenant Colonel A K Sharma (Retd)

The New Interventionism 1991-1994 : United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia. *Ed by James Mayall (U K : Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 238, £ 13.95 (Pb), ISBN 0-521-55856-5*

A great deal has been written about UN peace-keeping operations. What distinguishes this book is that apart from the experience, it covers basic issues like sovereignty, use of force, intervention, international society and special responsibilities of great powers in this context. The contradiction of course is that while some advocate non-interference in domestic affairs of states, there are others who argue for an objective international order. It is against this backdrop that UN intervention in the three countries has been discussed. The intervention in Cambodia was a relative success at an exorbitant cost. The situation in Somalia, according to one author, was beyond any experience that the UN had acquired in peace-keeping operations and hence beyond its competence, and the outcome could not have been other than what it was.

An extremely thought provoking book not only on peace-keeping operations but also on the workings of the UN and the rationale of intervention.

Air Marshal K D Chadha (Retd)

Income Inequality and Poverty during the Transition from Planned to Market Economy. *By Branko Milanovic (Washington D.C : The World Bank, 1998), pp. 237, \$ 30.00, ISBN 0-8213-3994-X.*

A good book describing the situation during the transition phase post communism in countries ranging from the Czech Republic in the West to Russia in the East. The book examines the real income of the population, the inequality with which incomes and expenditures were distributed and the problem of poverty. It also attempts to ascertain the reasons for these changes. An attempt is made to analyse the inequality in income and expenditure distribution and the change in relative positions of different groups during the transition. While inequality rose everywhere, the exact change was different among countries. The author tries to assess what happened to poverty under the twin impact of declining incomes and growing inequality. Two measures of poverty are used to study this aspect: the headcount index and poverty deficit. Social policy issues related to transition are discussed. The choice lies in the OECD concept which says income below poverty line is a sufficient condition for social welfare assistance, and the gap between the poverty line and income be filled with cash. The

second concept of social assistance is what already exists in transition economies. Finally, the author has a look at what may lie ahead. Poverty in transition economies has risen dramatically. Will the turnaround in growth, which has already taken place in Eastern Europe, Central Asian countries, Russia and Ukraine, eventually pull most of the current poor out of poverty? Or, will those who have become poor during the transition remain poor? Most countries except the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, will not reduce poverty headcount to 10 per cent of the population until well into the next century. Poverty thus appears to be here to stay in transition countries. The book should be read thoroughly in order to understand the problems involved in transition economies.

K S Chowdhury

Anticipating Ethnic Conflict. By Ashley Tellis, Thomas S Szayna, James A Winnefeld (Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 1997), pp. 118, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-8330-2495-7.

Within the larger paradigm of civilisational wars, ethnic conflicts represent the many flashpoints that dot the World's conflictual landscape be it East Timor, Afghanistan, Kurdistan, Ireland, Basque or, nearer home, Kashmir. Man is ordained by ethnic preternaturalism, thus continually fragmenting mankind into creeds and castes. Proliferation of information and communications has heightened rather than eroded ethnic difference viciously regurgitating the cud of historic antagonisms. Kosovo being the most recent manifestation of this phenomenon. Predicting ethnic conflicts has thus assumed great importance as anticipation enables prevention. The authors provide a very effective model for anticipating politico-communal wars.

The synthesised dilations of a project, "Ethnic Conflict and the Processes of State Breakdown -Improving Army Planning and Preparation", the purpose of the study was threefold; understanding the logic and dynamics of ethnically based violence; providing conceptual framework of ethnic grievances and group mobilisation leading to violence; and identifying means for long range assessment of ethnic strife. The study has adopted a novel approach as it assumes that human behaviour in collectivities is rational and not irrational, ethnicity is not a given but a constructed social phenomenon, modernisation acts as a catalyst to construct ethnicity and can also be used as a tool for political mobilisation.

The authors have developed a very credible three stage model of the ethnic conflict process. The first stage is said to comprise of group definition

or assessing potential for communitarian strife. The second stage is group mobilisation or transformation of this potential into likely conflict, while the third stage is that of strategic bargaining or analysing interaction of the state and mobilised group as likely strife turns into explicit conflict.

How a conflictual situation generates into actual strife is discussed through the medium of a strategic bargaining model, the theoretical basis of which is also included as an appendix. A series of questions and guidelines ground and coded by numbers and letters for ease of reference are also provided for practical utilisation of the model by security analysts. A spot check of the questions with reference to the conflicts in Kashmir and Assam proves the veracity of the model.

This slim booklet needs to be studied in detail, its precepts imbibed and the model adopted by security planners in our country for it provides an effective tool for anticipating ethnic conflicts in which our country is unfortunately mired over the decades.

Colonel Rahul K Bhonsle

Indo-British Review A Journal of History. Vol XXIII, No. 2. Theme : Indian Armed Forces. By Indo-British Historical Society, Madras, 1999. *Extrance cum Registration fee Rs. 500.00. Annual by Sea Rs 500.00; Per Copy Rs 150.00.*

The special issue of the Indo-British Review covering the role of the Indian Armed Forces in fifty years of nation building deserves fulsome praise for the wide and deep canvas of story-telling. The progress of the Armed Forces, or at times the lack of it, has been charted by eminent soldiers who have lived it. The erudite and immensely readable essays are both an honest record of military events and, importantly, are suggestions for the betterment of the apolitical Armed Forces on the threshold of a new century with hitherto unknown challenges.

The tone is set by Lt Gen Thapan asking the basic question: why read history? Though accounts of the Armed Forces' fortunes have been written by those associated with its moments, the General makes an appeal for a dispassionate record of military history for posterity. This is followed by incisive presentations on the many wars fought and won, the only war lost to China, the heroism displayed by individual Services, the commendable United Nations peacekeeping contributions, and the upheld traditions and customs which give a singular identification to the Armed Forces. Subjects like why the Armed Forces are no longer an attractive vocation, and a need to re-think higher defence management have been

tackled maturely. In short, the special addition is a must for professionals, Defence journalists and those interested in the Indian Armed Forces. A must for any Defence library.

Lieutenant General V K Sood (Retd)

Restructuring Military Education and Training : Lessons from RAND Research. By John D Winkler and Paul S Steinberg (Santa Monica CA: Rand, 1997), pp. 84, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-8330-2517-1.

This is a distillation of two decades worth of studies on US military training, mainly covering individual training, but also with implications affecting collective field training. The aspect of downsizing, economy, the repeated changes and ill defined military roles, are common to all democratic forces; there is much to be learnt from studies aimed at reduced expenses, sustained efficacy and maximum availability of trained man years (TMY) on the job. Four main techniques are suggested: ● Consolidation of commonalities to eliminate overlaps in individual occupation, specialities and ground function; ● Out-sourcing training, where confirmed as efficient and economical; ● Redistribution of responsibilities and resources, particularly where doctrines and tasks are stable; ● Using and developing high technology to simulate and replicate combat conditions, which seems to have distinct future potential even though present quality needs much improvement.

Some lessons emerge. What appears obvious does not always work out. Small group and leadership development, vital for the military, does not always emerge from standardised systems. High tech replication of war action seems to have great possibilities for large scale field training, including two sided reactive exercise and gun fire simulation. The warning is that subjectivity and assumptions must be eliminated, and nothing should be taken for granted. Current and proposed policy implementation needs to be clinically tested with comparison of controlled and uncontrolled groups. All factors, including logistics, administrative, and support, need to be holistically studied for optimised evaluation. HRD, personal ambitions, opportunities, choices; recognition and rewards are somewhat thinly covered. These are essential ingredients to develop that military "bonding" and "unit spirit" which change a bunch of individuals into a team in actual war. Surely, we need more from RAND on this vital aspect.

There is an effective summary of the details in the book, which itself is precise, terse and complete. It is worth a study by military and other professionals looking towards the future of armed forces' development.

Tindi

Strategy, Force Planning and Diplomatic/Military Operations. By Gwyn Prins (London : *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 1998), pp. 52, Price not indicated, ISBN 1-86203-072-3.

The monograph is one of the early products of the International Security Programme at the Chatham House. The outcome of a study commissioned by the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) of the academic Gwyn Prins, it is evidence of the cross-fertilisation that takes place in modern democracies between the intelligentsia and the establishment by means of interpenetration by liberal lateral induction and exit. For instance, Prins is with the RIIA while being also associated with the Office of the Secretary General NATO and the DERA as Senior Fellow. From such interaction both practitioners and theoreticians stand to benefit, as indeed does the process of policy formulation – the former by being exposed to objective and fresh perspectives and the latter enabled to offer with conviction born of engagement with reality.

Prins's unconventional recommendations are notable. Such perspectives are unlikely to be generated through official channels. To obtain them there must exist an impetus to farm out such topics for input. It is only then that the decision maker can be aware of the options – an awareness that is likely to be denied by the contending official agencies due to bureaucratic politics of self interest. The study deems the distinction between 'high' and 'low' intensity war as one that is contrived and self serving for the forces. He recommends a change in military posture to the low intensity end of the spectrum of war. This idea has relevance for the official hierarchy in India. The study, as many of this genre, provides a rationale for the UK for continued engagement through developing an effective peacekeeping posture– thereby projecting into the next millennium its past Great Power status. It would not be cynical to remind them that the Union Jack is history –besieged as it is with the more pertinent claims of powers, amongst which figures what was once the 'brightest jewel' in the British crown.

Major Ali Ahmed

Army Forces for Operations Other Than War. By Ronald E Sortor (Santa Monica, CA : *Rand*, 1997), pp. 118, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-8330-2525-2.

This RAND Corporation Report is sponsored by the United States Army to examine the requirements of Army forces for operations other than war. This is a follow up on a similar study carried out earlier on the requirement of Army forces for major regional contingencies (MRC).

Because of its many capabilities the Army has historically been called upon for various tasks in operations other than war (OOTW) such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, response to riots and insurrections and refugee resettlement-both domestic and foreign-along with peace enforcement and restoration of order in foreign countries and other such limited military operations which do not amount to warfighting. In recent years, demands for OOTW have increased both in number and in size. Therefore, a necessity appears to have been considered by the US Army to examine whether such commitments can continue to be tasked as secondary to its primary role without the forces required for OOTW being provisioned for separately in the Army's force structure.

The author has also carried out a detailed examination of how these commitments impinge on the Army's primary role of meeting its commitments for one or more MRCs especially if they occur simultaneously with any OOTW commitments. The data examined and the results obtained have been well illustrated in various tables and figures. The American propensity for use of abbreviations is apt to create difficulties for the non-American reader without constantly referring to the glossary.

Major General Samir Sinha (Retd)

Preparing the US Air Force for Operations Other Than War. By Alan Vick, David T Orletskey, Abram N Shulsky and John Stillion (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1997), pp. 205, Price not indicated, ISBN, 0-8330-2492-2.

From the title of the report, one would imagine that the Study would aim at finding ways and means, including training and doctrines, by which the USAF could undertake these missions in a more efficient and cost effective manner. Unfortunately, this is not so. Further, with so much effort required for these operations, the crew have to be away from their homes for extended durations. This has adversely affected the total effort available for training and maintaining the requisite operational efficiency. After considering an increased force level as not a feasible option, the Study has suggested three possible solutions. Firstly, to accept a slightly lower standard of combat readiness especially after considering expected threats and warning times available. Secondly, to allocate a greater percentage of the USAF in active component, where it can assist more readily with peace operations. And thirdly, to influence the demand side of the equation by seeking to limit the number or size of the commitments to peace operations. The first two alternatives are not acceptable to the Department of Defence and hence the Study has recommended the third option. Considering the ever increasing policing role that the US has been playing, this demand is bound to increase, and hence this suggestion does not seem to be ideal.

The first option is probably the solution to the USAF's dilemma and given the unipolar situation, the US is not likely to be confronted with any major threat in the coming years.

An interesting theory which has been put forward is that it takes aircrew up to three months to become operationally fit after their return from routine peace-keeping duties! There is no doubt a requirement for additional training to regain operational status, but a period of three months for an USAF's pilot, flying at least 25 hours per month, does seem excessive. All the same, our Air Force planners need to look closely at this aspect. The report has not touched on the philosophy and doctrine for employment of air force in MOOTW, which is perhaps more vital for proper employment of available resources in an efficient and cost effective manner—a subject that needs to be looked into by the IAF too.

Air Marshal Bharat Kumar (Retd)

Tip of the Spear : US Marine Light Armor in the Gulf War. By G J Michaels (Annapolis, Md : Naval Institute Press, 1998), pp. 253, \$ 29.95, ISBN-1-55750-599-3.

The book is a gripping first hand account of the combat experience of 1st Light Armoured Infantry Battalion in Kuwait during Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. The narrative covers the intensive reorientation programmes, the rigours of terrain and climate, the forging of self reliant leadership at the level of a combat subunit and the execution of special missions in the war. The professionalism, organisation and employment of the elite US Marines are specially brought out. The excellence of the book lies in its projections on diverse aspects of soldiering, namely the human factor, junior leadership, the versatility of the combat vehicle and real-time depiction of the battlefield environment of the Gulf War. Replete with events and anecdotes, the book makes interesting reading.

Major General S K Talwar (Retd)

China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century. By Kenneth W Allen (Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 1997), pp.249, Price not indicated.

The modernisation of Chinese forces and its economic development are the twin engines to propel its march towards super power status. Post Gulf War, having fully understood the importance of air power in any future conflict, the Chinese accordingly laid special emphasis on the modernisation and upgradation of its Air Force. The book is based on the study sponsored

by Rand Corporation on the future developments in People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) as it moves toward the 21st Century. The analysis in this book is based on the information available in mid 1995.

The PLAAF is a large, diverse and rather neglected arm of the Chinese Armed Forces. Most of the Chinese aircraft are of early sixties vintage. During its history of last five decades, the PLAAF claims to have shot down over 1474 aircraft and damaged another 2344. However, only about 200 of the engagements occurred during air to air combat. Virtually all the PLAAF's combat operations took place against US Force during the Korean and Vietnam wars. The PLAAF did not, however, get involved in the Sino-Vietnam War in 1979. Thus the present generation of the Chinese pilots lack combat experience. The lack of a unified Air Defence System, non availability of aerial refuelling capability as well as lack of early airborne warning aircraft, make the PLAAF's effectiveness highly suspect in its offensive counter air role.

China's future Air Force fighters, besides SU-27 upgrade, basically consist of F-10 having operational capability equivalent to F-16. This aircraft is expected to be operational around 2005. China is bringing in foreign technology not only from Russia and Israel but many other sources as well. The purchase of IL 76 aircraft has considerably enhanced its strategic airlift capability. China's aviation manufacturing infrastructure is also in poor state. Air power is capital intensive form of military power. Thus challenges facing the leadership of the Chinese Air Force in the coming decade is formidable. The emphasis is to improve quality. Chinese fighter aircraft will be reduced from 4297 in 1994 to 2344 in 2005. PLAAF will see a slight increase in its ranks because of Chinese goal of boosting aerial power projection. It appears that the rate and scale of growth of Chinese Air Force will remain incremental and demonstrably insufficient to radically alter the regional air balance. It may be only after 2025 that the Chinese air power could emerge as a potent force to support China's global aspirations. India can ill afford to ignore these developments. Presently China's share in the world Defence expenditure is 4.16 per cent against a mere 1.11 per cent by India. If the Indian Air Force has to retain its operational edge, India's Defence expenditure and modernisation of its armed forces needs to be addressed without any further delay.

The Book provides interesting inputs to China watchers and is recommended to be studied by our Armed Forces officers as well as strategic thinkers.

Lieutenant General C K Kapur (Retd)

Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean. *Ed by Ian O Lesser and Ashley J Tellis (Santa Monica: Rand, 1996), pp. 107, Price not indicated, 0-8339-2383-X.*

This is yet another project undertaken by Rand with the two authors analysing the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). With the additive of facts and figures, Lesser and Tellis discuss the motives for acquiring WMD along with the means for delivery of weapons by countries such as Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Iraq and Iran. The implications and concern of the United States policy makers and strategists about the proliferations and security in the region has been well articulated. In the light of the ramifications of proliferation, the Allies in Europe may be reluctant to support US for its actions for the containment of spread of WMD. Maybe the answer lies in having a permanent force in the Mediterranean for the purpose of assurance and as a deterrent to potential operations in the Gulf.

An informative book with up to date and reliable information on WMD and delivery systems of the countries around the Mediterranean. Of interest to research scholars and a good addition to all libraries.

Commodore R P Khanna (Retd)

Mediterranean Security-New Issues and Challenges. *Ed by F Stephen Larrabee and Carla Thorson (Santa Monica CA: Rand, 1996), pp. 39, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-8330-2384-5*

Rand has done yeoman service to the policy makers by undertaking research projects to improve public policies. One such contribution is the international conference it organised with the support of NATO office of information to focus on new issues and challenges to Mediterranean security. The conference was of significance as it was attended by ninety government officials, academics and specialists representing NATO and the non NATO Mediterranean countries and international organisations. The deliberations at the conference included an in depth analysis of the threats to the region such as social and economic disparities, growing population, migration, ensuing depletion of resources especially water, Islamic extremism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The last issue is of special concern to the strategists and policy makers of the USA. Rand has already prepared an exhaustive report on the subject. Though the focus of the conference was Mediterranean security, its findings are equally applicable to most of the countries in Asia as they are fighting the same problems in particular economic disparity, illegal migration, poverty and negligible basic facilities like potable water and electricity.

A succinct and to the point publication, this paper would be of much interest to us in particular, faced as we are with the very same daunting challenges if not more. A good reference report for all research scholars.

Commodore R P Khanna (Retd)

The Gulf Tanker War: Iran and Iraq's Maritime Sword Play. By Nadla El-Sayed El-Shazly (UK : Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998), pp 403, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-333-7-1642-6.

This meticulously researched book explains the reasons for the Tanker War, the strategy adopted, and surveys the regional and international response. The author has dealt with the two most progressive nations who decided to confront each other in the battle for supremacy over one another. Though both are Islamic nations, Iran is basically a Shia majority country and Iraq Sunni; Iran is an Islamic Republic, Iraq is not so. In the game of superiority, Iraq had the support of the US and Britain, who were her main suppliers of arms while Iran was sustained by the erstwhile USSR. The intermediate objectives that underlay Iraq's justification for the conflict were: • to weaken Iran's economy by reducing its oil exports: • to internationalise the war, and • to physically exhaust Iran and get her to sign a peace treaty. Iraq did not succeed in these objectives.

Iraq demanded that Iran relinquish its sovereignty over the area around Shatt-al-Arab and the three Islands in the Gulf thus getting control of both banks of the Shatt and reinforcing its security. Saddam however was unable to exploit the chaos inside Iran namely, a declining economy, a disintegrated military and a political system wrought by schisms. He also failed to perceive the psyche of the Iranian masses and underestimated the strength of the Iranian revolution.

The author points out to the fact that Iran and Iraq are still embattled in a caustic ideological struggle. The book has a number of useful appendices, and details the losses incurred. This is a book that could be of enormous use as a guide for naval and air battles of the future

Brigadier Yash Pal Dev (Retd)

Tibet, India and China : Critical Choices, Uncertain Futures. By Rajesh Kadian (New Delhi : Vision Books, 1999), pp. 232, Rs. 325.00, ISBN 81-7094-332-9.

The author has tried to compress the complex geo-strategic, ethnic and religious question and contemporary history of Tibet into a small and

readable book. He has sought to explain in brief how Tibet, a natural buffer, was caught between the rapidly expanding spheres of influence of Tsarist Russia, Manchu Empire in China and British Empire in India; especially since the middle of the 19th Century. Series of bilateral and multilateral treaties were signed, without Tibetan participation, so as to reach some equitable solution to the complex regional problems.

The complexities of the 19th Century politics were further compounded after the communist regime in China began its policy of imposing strong central authority over the far-flung areas of erstwhile Chinese Empire. Sino-Soviet alliance in the context of the Cold War furthered the policy. The self-exile of Dalai Lama and vast number of Tibetans since the end of the fifties has given a new dimension to the Tibetan question.

The author has sought to examine various options open to Tibetans but like all complex issues Tibetan question too has defied a solution. Events are unfolding rapidly in China. One can only hope that the process of gradual erosion of the economic and political base of the highly-centralised regime might pave the way for more reasonable accommodation between Tibetans and central government in China.

K R Singh

Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century : Regional Futures and US Strategy. Ed by Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian O Lesser (Santa Monica: Rand, 1998), pp. 336, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-8330-2529-5.

Despite the hullabaloo of peace and disarmament, we end the millennium with a bloody conflict portraying the modern and prehistoric instincts of mankind at its perigee in Kosovo. This poses a challenge to defence crystalgazers hazarding flashpoints and conflict scenarios in the world. Within this paradigm, this Rand study is an erudite scholastic attempt to project current conflict trends into the 21st Century and evolve predictive implications for the U S Air Force of 2025. Commencing with an overview of the future security environment, the authors predicate dominance of the US as the sole super power into the next century, challenged by a multiplicity of crises due to proliferation of NBC, military technology and ethnic rivalries. Three alternative Worlds are presented—a Base Case, Benign and Malign order. The latter being the worst case scenario is most significant from the security point of view and projects a fragmented European Union, sick Russia, anarchuous Middle East, competitive Japan, high NBC threat and unstable international power relations. Sources of conflict are discussed therefrom in the three principle regions of the World which engage the USA – Asia, Middle East and Europe including the CIS states.

The Asia-Pacific region is given prominence as the emerging central force of gravity due to its economic might and power of numbers, both in terms of states and population. The U S interests in the region relate to the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and preventing the rise of a hegemonic power (China?). A detailed analysis of key political, military and economic trends of principal players in the regions, to include China, Japan, Korea, South East Asia and South Asia, is carried out. The key portends are generally well predicted including such unobtrusive flashpoints as the ethnic conflict in Indonesia. South Asia receives limited attention in the study due to lack of vital US interests. The drivers of conflict in the region are identified as externally fostered dissensions, conventional cum nuclear arms modernisation and the cumulative effects of internal, regional and international power politics. While denying the possibilities of a major Sino-Indian conflict in the mid term, the occurrence of the same in 2015-2025 timeframe is hypothecated. Tacit acceptance of low nuclearisation in the region to create local stability without affecting overall policy of anti proliferation should provide cheer to Indian policy planners. In the scenarios at the end of the book, the U S role in large scale humanitarian operations in a nuclear combat zone in South Asia is one of the possibilities projected. The principal conclusions with reference to Asia include continued reliance on American air and space power for conventional and unconventional deterrence, rapid reaction in a breaking crisis and challenges posed by the WMD shadowed environment.

Similarly, conflict trends in the Middle East are analysed along familiar lines such as rise of Islamic nationalism, terrorism, civilisational wars and economic warfare. For Europe, a receding Russian conventional yet continued nuclear threat and fractionalised internal dissensions, emergence of rogue armies and cross border ethnic conflict in the Balkans and Russia are also accurately predicted.

In conclusion, the study assesses that the range of challenges to the US will be great and less predictable in the 21st Century, with the triad of terrorism, missiles and information attacks threatening North American mainland for the first time in history thus highlighting the need for the US to play an active part in shaping future security environment. Critical qualities identified for U S Air Force are global awareness, global reach, rapid reaction and appropriate force. Substitute global for regional in the first two criteria and you could perhaps have priorities for Indian Air Force. Given the conflict scenarios painted and the recent trends, the greatest challenge to the US Air Force appears to be the technological one of neutralising selected small targets without collateral damage. For conflicts of the 21st Century are likely to be ethnic or regional wars, waged by

Kalashnikov and improvised bomb totting bandits, an aspect which could have received greater attention in the study. This book is a valuable survey of the potential sources of conflict around the globe. The disturbing thought being that despite all-round progress, mankind will continue to be shackled with the yoke of warfare.

Colonel Rahul K Bhonsle

Transatlantic Relations : Sharing Ideals and Costs. *By Beatrice Huser (UK : The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), pp. 136, Price not indicated, ISBN 1-85567-355-X.*

Post Cold War there has been a dominance of the US position in Europe as is manifest from the series of Yugoslav crises. Though European powers, especially France and Germany, feel greatly frustrated at not being able to resolve European crises through their own endeavours, some smaller European powers like Denmark and Norway have been supportive of the US efforts fearing a hegemony of the major powers. France today is as much a partner as a rival in its relations with the US. The emphasis of both France and Germany is on a European identity. There is of course a special US-British partnership which has often prompted the British to maintain a distance from Europe.

The author's summation is that because of cultural affinities "North America and European Union are two poles of a magnet which radiates values throughout the world". However, with the emergence of strong economic entities in East, SE Asia and Latin America, these areas are today attracting as much, if not more, US attention. This is particularly so because of the changed pattern of immigration to the US.

A valuable edition for students of European geo-politics.

Air Marshal K D Chadha (Retd)

Imperial Decline : Russia's Changing Role in Asia. *Ed by Stephen J Blank and Alvin Z Rubinstein (UK : Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 296, £14.95, ISBN 0-8223-1897-0.*

A very fascinating collection of essays by eminent specialists in the field of international relations covering the inter-se relationships between Russia on one hand and the rest of the key players in Asia Pacific or alternatively North East Asia or North West Pacific, depending upon one's perspective. The book should have been titled 'Russia's Changing Role in Asia Pacific' as that is what it focusses on. Central Asia is only a passing reference. A collection of nine essays, the book describes the significance

of Asia to Russia encompassing relationship of Russia with China, Japan, the Korean Peninsula and the United States. The conclusion arrived at in these essays is that Russia is "the sick man of Asia" –militarily weak, systematically in turmoil and in economic decline. To these analysts, Russia seems to be more dependent on the behaviour of others than on its own wishes. Yet, realistically, in the very last paragraph of this analytical presentation, the prognosis is that it is too soon to write Russia off as a 'has been' in Asia . The strategic location, resources, nuclear capability and an "imperial tradition" warrant that it receive careful attention in the Asia Pacific. It is incumbent upon the United States that in the emerging configuration of power relationships in Asia Pacific, it accord a strategic recognition to Russia which surpasses what it accords to China. It is only then that the United States can hope for a co-optive relationship with Russia to restrain a resurgent China in the 21st Century.

A very useful analysis for students and scholars of international relations, foreign policy, Russian history, and to avid watchers of the emerging strategic situation in the Asia Pacific.

Brigadier Subhash Kapila (Retd)

The Stalin Years - The Soviet Union 1929-1953. By Evan Mawdsely (UK : Manchester University Press, 1998), pp. 162, £ 11.99, ISBN 0-7190-4600-9

The two greatest dictators of the 20th Century are Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. Both had many things in common. The two created vast empires and spheres of influence for themselves in a short period, they were of low origin and were mediocre in intellect. However, the two dictators were in opposite camps in the crucial World War II and had different ideological bases. Hitler rose from a corporal in the German Army to be the mighty ruler on the strength of his Aryan 'racial superiority'. His ambitions were crushed with his defeat in the war, though he was able to bring most of Europe under his Aryan Empire before his fall.

Stalin was on the winning side in World War II and, therefore, he survived and prospered. He ruled the Soviet Union for almost a quarter century. The end of Second World War saw him in virtual control of the whole of Eastern Europe and half of Germany. Besides, China, Cambodia, Laos, North Korea and Cuba became ideological allies and dependencies of the Soviet Union. The Cold War catapulted Stalin as the supreme commander of one of the two world powers; he also had millions working for his mission in the non-communist countries. One may be left wondering,

how did the mighty empire established by Stalin crumble despite its formidable military might and nuclear arsenal sufficient to destroy the world several times over. The author has sought to provide an answer to this.

The author has also dealt with various aspects of Stalinism – the ideology, economic development, social change and external relations. He has done commendable research by examining documents not available till now. A must read for those interested in history and international affairs.

Subedar Major N Kunju (Retd)

Zionism and the Foundations of Israeli Diplomacy. By Sasson Sofer (Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 449, £ 40.00, ISBN 0-521-63012-6.

Israel, after the holocaust, rose like Phoenix from the ashes. She fought four wars and survived to live in dignity as an independent nation. The World Zionist Organisation was established in 1897. Once the British mandate was coming to an end, armed outfits came to the fore. Israel is the sentinel of the Western world in the Middle East. This book examines the apt combination of Israel's military power and diplomatic acumen.

Lieutenant Colonel Daljit Singh (Retd)

Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain : 1945-1970. By Richard J Aldrich (UK : Manchester University Press, 1998), pp. 262, £ 13.99, ISBN 0 7190 49563.

As mentioned by the author in the first chapter, Intelligence is the missing dimension in international history and to include the issue of costs and benefits of secret service work in historiography, he proceeds to comprehensively review the course and thrusts of security and Intelligence systems of Britain in the Cold War era. The proliferation of committees, the reorganisation and retasking of intelligence departments, liaison and sharing of information with the USA -albeit as a junior partner - and the activities of the British agencies have been examined at length, in the background of the changing national and global environment after World War II. The author has narrated the cases of numerous defectors on both sides, and their effect on Intelligence and security scenarios.

The book provides a good insight into British Secret Service as it geared up for the challenges of the Cold War.

Major General S K Talwar (Retd)

Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa 1830-1914. By Bruce Vandervott (U K : ULC Press, 1998), pp. 274, £ 13.95 (Pb), ISBN-1-85728-487- 9.

Subjugation and colonisation of the Dark Continent by newly industrialised nations of Europe during the 19th Century can not be simplistically explained away as victory of the musket and the cannon over bow and arrow or spear wielding natives. In this comprehensive work, the author examines the prevailing warfare styles, implements of warfare and military systems of the chiefdoms and nation-states straddling the vast landmass of Africa, in particular Ethiopia, Sudan, Ashanti (Niger) and even the Zulus down south. The author also describes military systems of respective invaders— Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Portugal — and details their campaigns, which would interest students of military history. In fact, according to the author, "... technological superiority was far less important than the ability of Europeans to profit from the disarray of their enemies". The essential theme of author Vandervott is to analyse the degree and content of resistance offered by African nations and the consequential impact thereof and their post-Independence nationhood, where a cult of violence and rowdy soldiery created natural conflicts. His review of the social structure of civil and military volunteers opting for service and of military leadership style of different European nations makes interesting reading.

The book provides for a fresh look into the course of African history during the 19th Century.

Major General S K Talwar (Retd)

Rifleman to Colonel-Memoirs of Major Gajendra Malla 9th Gorkha Rifles. Compiled by Tony Mains and Elizabeth Talbot Rice (New Delhi : Reliance Publishing House, 1999), pp. 115, Rs 175.00, ISBN 81-7510-105-9.

From a clerk to a Gorkha Viceroy Commissioned Officer (VCO) was a rarity in the Indian Army of the 1930s, says FM the Lord Brammwell in foreword to *Rifleman to Colonel*. There is another singularity: British officers took real interest in their men and lost no opportunity in supporting talent. The manuscript of the memoirs was kept in the Gorkha Museum, Winchester, all these years until brought to light by his one time Officer Commanding (OC), Major Mains. The book has seen the light of the day with the help of Maj Gen Palit's Military History Trust.

British officers did not take kindly to Gorkha 'line boys' as we call them and it is all the more creditable that Gajendra was promoted Viceroy Commissioned Officer in the pre 1947 days. There is another angle to this. Though he could not be promoted Subedar Major in his own battalion he could be recommended to a commissioned rank. And he was in 1941. He

was a Major by 1947 and a Colonel by 1948. He was the first Indian to be the recruiting officer of the Indian Gorkhas at Gorakhpur. He was able to achieve all this by sheer hard work and devotion. He had another quality rare among OR/VCOs and that is he could speak out his mind when service matters were affected. This was not without repercussions in his career. But he has no regrets. He was regarded by the British officers as mildly nationalistic while the new Indian officers found him somewhat argumentative.

The book under review is a healthy round-up of the Indian Army of the pre and post 1947 period and an objective analysis of the break-up of the Army between the UK, Pakistan and India. The last chapter- 'The New Indian Army' and Appendix-'Gorkha Regiments Today' by Tony Mains are very thought provoking. And, unlike many other books on the Gorkhas, this one gives a very lucid and objective account of this period. The last few pages contain biographical details of names mentioned in the text and one relives the past if one happens to know some of them.

Lieutenant Colonel Gautam Sharma (Retd)

The Warrior Who Would Rule Russia-A Profile of Aleksandr Lebed.
Ed by Benjamin S Lambeth (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1996), pp.125, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-8330-02447-7.

The US government has always been inquisitive about many a goings on in Soviet Union and now Russia, including the profile of personalities who are to be watched. Rand has done its job in this field by portraying Lebed of the Russian Army who at the age of 46 became one of the most powerful and popular men in Russia.

As Yeltsin's National Security Advisor and Security Council Secretary, Lebed focussed on four key problems, i.e crime and corruption, the war in Chechnya, composition and role of Security Council and lastly military reforms. His other concerns varied from social problems and unrest in Russia to Russia's place in the world, what with Western countries' attitude being one of marginalising and isolating his country in the post Cold War period. The author also highlights Lebed's history of insubordination which raises doubts whether he will function with the flexibility required to operate effectively in a world quite unlike the one to which he has been accustomed.

The book would be of interest to the defence officers, politicians, bureaucrats and research scholars for a first hand knowledge of happenings in post Cold War Russia. An interesting book on the rise of a dynamic man named Aleksandr Ivanovich Lebed.

Commodore R P Khanna (Retd)

Spymasters : Ten CIA Officers in Their Own Words. *Ed by Ralph E Weber (Wilmington, DE. : Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), pp.355, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-8420-2715-7.*

The author is a former US Navy Serviceman who has had long stints as the resident scholar both at the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the National Security Agency. He has to his credit many earlier authoritative tomes on the shady world of the cloak and dagger. Probably no other historian comprehends the architecture of US intelligence better than he does, right from its inception during the American Civil War to the present day. It is just as well therefore that Professor Weber has had the brilliant idea of coming out with this thoroughly researched volume thereby rendering a signal service to the intelligence fraternity.

Combining insightful research, incisive questioning, and illuminating responses, ten top CIA operatives disclose fascinating information and perspectives on US foreign intelligence gathering and clandestine operations, that later, more often than not, went on to prop up foreign policy; especially during the Cold War era. Admiral Sidney Souers talks about the problems between the military services and the administrative agencies that beset the CIA during his brief tenure. Allen Dulles inherited a much revamped and strengthened organisation from General Walter Beddel Smith in the first year of the Korean War. With the backing of the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, his brother, and of course, President Eisenhower, a number of agents were sent to Iran and Guatemala to topple the governments in power. Richard Bissell who is credited with the very noteworthy achievement of getting the U-2 and SR-71 planes manufactured; agonises over the Bay of Pigs fiasco, as also Samuel Halpern, Lyman Kirkpatrick, Robert Amory Jr. and Ray Cline, who recount this debacle with fresh and deeper soul searching. 'Operation Mongoose' is also covered in great frankness. Fascinating details about the CIA covert operations in the Far East during the 1950's are narrated by two of these 'honourable' (first used by William Colby in the context of CIA top brass) gentlemen. Critical assessments of formidable directors of the CIA like Dulles, McCone and Helms are amongst the other strong points of this book.

This book is easy to read as it has been written in the first person conversational mode with the 'spymasters', just like interviews. Therefore, even the nonprofessional will find it engrossing. This mass appeal is further enhanced by the biographical sketches and the excellent studio photographs of protagonists that precede each interview. Anyone will find these very readable dialogues riveting, entertaining and at places even downright witty and humorous.

Lieutenant Colonel A K Sharma (Retd)

World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1992. By David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker. A SIPRI Product (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.246, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-19-829153-1

This book is a veritable treasure of information, as any SIPRI publication is, on the production facilities of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, the two alternate materials for the production of (fission) atomic bombs, that release enormous quantities of energy. This energy released is also used to ignite thermonuclear weapons. The study has provided information for assessing the atomic warfare capabilities of various nations. For example, it is stated that Pakistan owns Uranium mines and supplies it to enrichment plants. She is mainly dependent on bombs made of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) of Chinese design, requiring 20 kgs per bomb of HEU. Pakistan had enough material for six to ten warheads in 1991. The installation of Pakistan's Plutonium plant is in early stages. India on the other hand depends on Plutonium and, according to the information here, India had a stock of 290 kgs of it at the end of 1991. Assuming that each warhead requires five kgs or so, its capacity was much higher.

The book is well worth purchasing for the amalgam of information available. One hopes to read an updated edition on this subject.

Major General Partap Narain (Retd)

The Chemical Weapons Taboo. By Richard M Price (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp.233, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-8014-3306-1

A scholarly book with copious notes. It investigates the moral stigma attached to the use of chemical weapons and brings forth the inherent variations in the levels of morality attached to different types of chemical weapons. Various arguments are considered. The introduction of new technology, morality, ineffectiveness, connection with the word 'poison', etc are unconvincing. The author has traced the proposals made to outlaw the use of chemical weapons from the first such move at the Hague Conference in 1899, moves on to the Geneva Convention and World War II, which witnessed an extensive use of gas by both sides. The inter war years witnessed the legitimisation of use of gases for the control of mobs by Police and even for the extermination of pests. The year 1919 saw the use of gas against the tribals on the North West Frontier of India. The use of chemical weapons was once again visible in the Iran-Iraq War. Interestingly, Presidential Order 11850 of June 1994, allows use of chemical weapons for counter-terrorist operations.

A valuable book for those wishing to be informed on various chemical weapons and the use of non lethal weapons to fight future insurgencies.

Major General Partap Narain (Retd)

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending December 1999

*(The books reviewed in July-September 1999 issue have been added
to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)*

AFGHANISTAN

1. Matinuddin, K
(Lt Gen) **The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan
1994-1997.** New Delhi: OUP, 1999, Rs 450.00,
ISBN 0 19 577903 7
2. Marsden, P, **The Taliban War: Religion and the New Order
in Afghanistan.** London: Zed Books, 1999, Rs
395.00, ISBN 1 85649 5221

AIR COMBAT, THE PILOT AND MANAGE- MENT OF TRANSPORTATION

3. Wells, Alexander T, **Air Transportation: A Management Perspec-
tive (4th Edition).** UK: Wadsworth Publishing
Company, 1999, £ 35.00, ISBN 0 534 53478 3
4. Boyne, W J and
Handleman, P (eds) **Brassey's Air Combat Reader: Historic Facts
and Aviation Legends.** Washington DC:
Brassey's, 1999, \$24.95, ISBN 1-57488-182-5
5. Cosgrove, Brian, **Pilot's Weather: A Common Sense Approach
to Meteorology.** UK: Airlife, 1999, £ 20.00,
ISBN 1-84037-0270
6. Thom, T, **The Air Pilot's Manual (3 Vols.).** UK: Airlife,
1999, £18.00 (each), ISBN 1-85310-927-4

ARMS DEALS

7. Chakraborty, A K, **Dismissal of the Naval Chief: Arms Deals
Expose.** NOIDA: Trishul Publications, 1999, Rs
295.00, ISBN 81-85384-28-X-11
8. Mayadas, M (Lt Gen) **How the Bofors Affair Transformed India :
1989-1999.** New Delhi: Lancers Publishers,
1999, Rs 395.00, ISBN 1 897829 647

CHINA FOREIGN POLICY

9. Kumaraswamy, P R (ed) **China and the Middle East: The Quest for Influence.** New Delhi : Sage, 1999, Rs 425.00, ISBN 0-7036-847-2

INDIAN STATE

10. Aggarwal, K S, (ed) **Dynamics of Identity and Intergroup Relations in North East India.** Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1999, Rs 350.00, ISBN 81-85952-69-0
11. Prem, A C (Brig) **India: A Soldier's View.** New Delhi: Batra, 1999, Rs 695.00, ISBN 81 85462 14 3
12. Nalapat, M D, **Indutva.** New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1999, Rs 395.00, ISBN 81-241-0575-8

INFO-WARFARE AND INTELLIGENCE

13. Dunham, R C, **Spy Sub: A Top Secret Mission to the Bottom of the Pacific.** UK: Airline, 1996, £ 18.95, ISBN 1-85310-828-6
14. Campen, A D (ed) **The First Information War: The Story of Communications, Computers and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf War.** New Delhi : Bookmark, 1999, Rs. 495.00, 81-87583-00-2

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

15. Vats, B, **Global Armageddon: Emerging Challenges in the New Millennium.** New Delhi: Comcare International Publishers, 1999, Rs 460.00, ISBN 81-87601-00-0
16. Brown, L R
Project Director **State of the World 1999 - A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Towards a Sustainable Society.** UK: Earthscan Publications, 1999, £ 12.95, ISBN 1 85383 594 3

17. Kumar, Sushil, **New Globalism and the State: Considerations Towards Post Cold War International Relations Theory and the Third World.** New Delhi: Research Press, 1999, Rs 695.00, ISBN 81-7314079-0

ISLAM

18. Waardenburg, J (ed) **Muslim Perceptions of Other Religions: A Historical Survey.** New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, Rs 995.00, ISBN 0-19-510472-2
19. Shourie, A, **The World of Fatwas or the Shariah in Action.** Noida: ASA Publications, Rs. 450.00, ISBN 81-900199-5-3

KARGIL AND KASHMIR

20. Nanda, R (Col) **Kargil: A Wake-Up Call.** New Delhi: Lancer Books, 1999, Rs.350.00, ISBN 81-7095-074-0
21. Akbar, M K, **Kargil: Cross Border Terrorism.** New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1999, Rs 795.00, ISBN 81 7099 734 8
22. Sarkar, B (Col) **Kargil War: Past, Present and Future.** New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1999, Rs 395.00, ISBN 1-897829-620
23. Qureshi, H, **Kashmir: The Unveiling of Truth- A Political Analysis of Kashmir.** Delhi: Renaissance Publishing House, 1999, Rs.800.00, ISBN 81-85199-71-X
24. Pandit, S L, **My Kashmir Diary.** Delhi: Utpal Publications, 1999, Rs 395.00, ISBN 81-5217-11-4
25. Jafa, D S, **Three Countries One People: Tales from Two Wars.** New Delhi: Minerva Press, 1999, Rs 250.00, ISBN 81 7662 022 X

LEADERSHIP

26. Toteja, M M, **Changing Human Values and Leadership Styles.** Jaipur: Printwell, 1999, Rs.200.00, ISBN 81-7044-495-0

27. Barrett, Jim, **Total Leadership: How to Inspire and Motivate for Personal and Team Effectiveness.** New Delhi: Kogan Page, 1999, £24.95, ISBN 81-7554-091-5

MERCENARIES

28. Arnold, G, **Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World.** London: Macmillan Press, 1999, £42.50, ISBN 0-333-73387-8

MILITARY ISSUES

29. Desch, MC, **Civilian Control of the Military : The Changing Security Environment.** US: John Hopkins University Press, 1999, £ 29.00, ISBN 0-8018-6059-8.
30. Jackson, D (Major) **India's Army.** New Delhi: Shubhi Publications, 1999, Rs 1495.00, ISBN 81-87226-37-4
31. Kumar, N and Chaturvedi, R **Law Relating to the Armed Forces in India (3rd Edition).** New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing, 1999, Rs 595.00, ISBN 81-7534-143-9
32. Lloyd, M, **The Art of Military Deception.** New Delhi: Bookmark, 1999, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 81-87583-01-0
33. Nirmal, A, **The Decisive Battles of Indian History: From Alexander to Mutiny.** Jaipur: Pointer Publishers, 1999, Rs 800.00, ISBN 81 7132 203 4

PALESTINE - HISTORY

34. Zadka, S, **Blood in Zion: How the Jewish Guerrillas Drove the British Out of Palestine.** London : Brassey's 1999, £ 19.95, ISBN 1-85753-136-1

SOUTH ASIA - SECURITY

35. Gamage, S and Watson, I B **Conflict and Community in Contemporary Sri Lanka : 'Pearl of the East' or the 'Island of Tears'.** New Delhi : Sage, 1999, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 0-7619-9393-2

36. Manandhar, V K, **Cultural and Political Aspects : Nepal-China Relations.** Delhi : Adroit Publishers, 1999, Rs 300.00, ISBN 81-87392-06-1
37. Jetly, N **Regional Security in South Asia : The Ethno-Sectarian Dimensions.** New Delhi : Lancers Books, 1999, Rs. 750.00, ISBN 81-7095-072-4
38. Seth, S C **The Pakistan File.** New Delhi: Vikas, 1999, Rs295.00, ISBN 81-259-0729-7

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